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Introduction 
 
This research paper critically reviews the New Monetary Policy Consensus 
(NMPC) and outlines pro-poor alternatives to the mainstream policies associated 
with it.1 The paper is divided into five sections. The first outlines the NMPC and 
its key policy recommendations, inflation targeting (IT) and central bank 
independence (CBI), and assesses the performance of inflation targeting regimes 
(ITR). The second reviews the main implications of inflation and examines the 
theory of inflation undergirding the NMPC. The third considers the potential costs 
and pitfalls of IT and CBI. The fourth analyses the extent to which this policy 
framework is applicable to the developing (poor and middle-income) countries. 
Finally, the fifth section reviews the pro-poor policy framework proposed by 
UNDP and outlines monetary and anti-inflation policies compatible with pro-poor 
goals. 
 
Since the early nineties, the NMPC has become the dominant (‘best-practice’) 
monetary policy paradigm in several rich and middle-income countries. This 
consensus is not simply a fad. Its popularity among mainstream economists and 
policy-makers is based on its theoretical strengths, the alleged successes of 
countries implementing IT and CBI and, at a deeper level, on the elimination of 
several shortcomings of the anti-inflation strategies attempted after the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods System, especially money supply and exchange rate targeting. 
In this sense, the NMPC offers a well thought-out response to a thirty-year-old 
riddle: how to anchor domestic monetary systems in the post-Bretton Woods era? 
The difficulties of stabilising dynamic credit-money economies with bloated 
financial systems in the absence of exogenous anchors to the value of money 
cannot be underestimated – but these problems have been resolved in different 
ways recently. The period of global inflation associated with the collapse of the 
postwar boom has now ended, and inflation is no longer a serious problem in the 
 
                                                          
 
 
1
 The term NMPC is suggested by Arestis and Sawyer (2005). 
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vast majority of countries. IT and CBI are one of these possible solutions, and 
they are informed theoretically by the NMPC.2  
 
The success of this new monetary policy paradigm is not simply the triumph of 
reasoned academic debate and informed policy-making. It is, to a much greater 
extent, the outcome of a profound reorganisation of global social relations and the 
transformation of economic policies in most countries, which is usually called 
‘neoliberalism’. The social and political conditions underpinning the 
implementation of the NMPC cannot be addressed in this paper for reasons of 
space. This paper is limited in two other ways. First, it does not consider the 
problem of inflation stabilisation, because IT and CBI are not stabilisation 
strategies – they are appropriate only for countries where inflation has already 
been subdued. Second, the paper does not offer a detailed first-hand assessment of 
the performance of ITR in different countries (although it does survey the existing 
assessments), because this is impossible at this relatively early stage. These are 
worthwhile objectives, and they should be addressed at a later stage. 
 
The analysis below departs from three key assumptions. First, mass poverty is the 
most important problem faced by the developing countries, and its elimination 
should be their governments’ main priority. This aim is not only important in 
itself; it is also mandated by the United Nations through its Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), determined at the UN Millennium Assembly of 
September 2000. Second, rapid and sustained growth, balance of payments 
equilibrium, inflation control, industrial development, and other conventional 
parameters of economic ‘success’ have no value in themselves. They are, instead, 
instruments for the elimination of mass poverty and the achievement of secure, 
sustainable, equitable and empowering human development. Third, 
 
                                                          
 
 
2
 ‘[C]entral banks appear to have learned how to maintain inflation at a low level. For many 
central banks, this new era has been characterized by central banks adopting implicit or explicit 
inflation targets’ (Bordo et al 2003, p.1). 
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macroeconomic policy instruments and, specifically, monetary policy, can 
contribute to the elimination of mass poverty. 
 
From this pro-poor viewpoint, conventional (mainstream) economic strategies 
have been largely unsuccessful. The stabilisation and structural adjustment 
policies implemented in many poor countries during the last twenty-five years 
have failed to trigger rapid economic growth and the sustained reduction of 
poverty. Perversely, these policies are not self-correcting, and their perceived 
failure often leads to the intensification of the ongoing programmes, under even 
closer supervision by the IMF, the World Bank, the US Treasury Department and 
most aid agencies:  
 
How to explain that after sustained involvement and many structural 
adjustment loans, and as many IMF’s Stand-bys, African GDP per capita 
has not budged from its level of 20 years ago? Moreover, in 24 African 
countries, GDP per capita is less than in 1975, and in 12 countries even 
below its 1960s level ... How to explain the recurrence of Latin crises, in 
countries such as Argentina, that months prior to the outbreak of the crisis 
are being praised as model reformers ... How to explain that the best 
‘pupils’ among the transition countries (Moldova, Georgia, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Armenia) after setting out in 1991 with no debt at all, and 
following all the prescriptions of the IFIs, find themselves 10 years later 
with their GDPs halved and in need of debt-forgiveness? Something is 
clearly wrong’.3 
 
The introduction of poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) has made no 
significant difference, and it has become clear that most poor countries – 
 
                                                          
 
 
3
 Milanovic (2003, p.679). 
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especially the poorest sub-Saharan African countries – will not achieve their 
MDGs under the current policy framework.4  
 
These limitations of the mainstream development strategy are especially obvious 
in the field of monetary policy. Since the early nineties, mainstream theory and 
policy prescriptions have increasingly shifted towards the NMPC, and many 
developing countries are being pressurised to import this monetary policy 
framework and to enshrine permanently low inflation among their key policy 
objectives. This paper argues that this is misguided. The NMPC systematically 
exaggerates the costs of inflation for the poor, underestimates the output, income 
and employment costs of locking in very low inflation through IT and CBI, and 
downplays the economic, social and political consequences of imposing an 
exceptionally rigid institutional framework for monetary policy. 
 
It is both legitimate and urgent to consider pro-poor monetary policy alternatives 
for the developing countries, which should be compatible with MDGs and with 
broader human development targets.5 The analysis and recommendations included 
in this paper build upon previous work of the UNDP, especially through the Asia-
Pacific Regional Programme.6 This paper does not aim to offer a ready-made set 
 
                                                          
 
 
4
 ‘[T]he story of the 1990s can be summarised in three main points. First, progress was made but it 
was too slow for reaching the agreed targets by 2015. Second, in many cases less progress was 
made in the 1990s than in the 1970s and 1980s. Third, much of the modest progress by-passed the 
poor. The countries and the people who most needed to see progress frequently saw the least of it’ 
(Vandemoortele (2004, p.5). 
5
 ‘There is universally a greater recognition today of the need to place poverty reduction as the 
central objective of the process of development.  It is, therefore, essential to search for a national 
development strategy that seeks to achieve human development which is secure, sustainable, 
equitable and empowering for bulk of the population.  Perhaps the most powerful manifestation of 
a global commitment to poverty reduction is the Millennium Declaration ... The concern for pro-
poor policies is the consequence of a deep-rooted disillusionment with the development paradigm 
which placed exclusive emphasis on the pursuit of growth in many situations, the process of 
growth was accompanied by rising inequality such that the so-called trickle down effect was either 
weak or non-existent’ (Pasha 2002). 
6
 ‘UNDP’s approach is to help countries identify the most promising sources of growth and target 
inequality, both as an impediment to growth and as an obstacle to converting growth into progress 
against poverty. The recent evidence that inequality inhibits economic growth invalidates the 
conventional argument that a policy of redistribution will merely lead to sharing poverty, not 
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of policy alternatives, but it seeks to provide a platform for their development. It 
is argued below, first, that rapid economic growth is essential for poverty 
reduction, but growth, inflation control and exchange rate stability should not be 
the main objectives of government policy.7 Rather, governments should be able to 
count on all available instruments – including monetary policy tools – in order to 
further their pro-poor development strategy.  
 
Second, the combination between growth and equity offers the best opportunity 
for translating expanded production capabilities into poverty reduction and human 
development. This combination is policy-driven. Experience shows that the 
impact of growth on poverty can be highly different depending on the economic, 
social and political features of the society, and the policies accompanying the 
process of growth.8 It is therefore essential to  
 
forge consistency between the macroeconomic framework and the national 
poverty reduction strategy. This is usually interpreted as a ‘one-way’ 
consistency, in which the anti-poverty strategy has to adjust to a fixed and 
rigid macroeconomic framework. However, both should be jointly 
determined to serve the overriding objective of poverty reduction.9 
 
Third, monetary policy can play an important supporting role in this development 
strategy, and this paper outlines some of the ways in which this can be achieved. 
This is not meant to offer a policy blueprint applicable to all countries. This paper 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
 
 
 
 
wealth. Equity is good for the poor because it is good for growth as well as for ensuring that its 
benefits are widely shared among the population’ (UNDP 2002). 
7
 ‘If it can be demonstrated that fast economic growth is always accompanied by rapid poverty 
reduction, as a result of the ‘trickle-down’ effect, then such strategies can focus, more or less, 
exclusively on achieving faster growth. However, if this is not necessarily the case, then the 
pursuit of growth will have to be combined with an effort at achieving more pro-poor growth 
through a degree of redistribution of assets and incomes in the economy. This would have 
significant implications on the nature of anti-poverty strategies’ (Pasha and Palanivel 2004, p.1). 
8
 See Pasha and Palanivel (2004, pp.1-2). 
9
 UNDP (2002). 
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argues that inflation is a socially and historically specific process, and its causes 
are always very complex and concrete. By necessity, anti-inflation policy is also 
similarly specific. In spite of this, there are monetary policy lessons to be learned 
from theory and experience, and general guidelines to be followed within a 
broader pro-poor policy framework. This research paper aims to contribute to the 
development of this new analytical and policy approach. 
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1 – The New Monetary Policy Consensus  
 
The new monetary policy consensus (NMPC) belongs to the family of monetary 
policy approaches based on nominal anchors. Other members of this family 
include the gold standard, currency boards and money supply targeting, with 
which the NMPC has a lot in common (see section 2.1.2). The NMPC evolved 
gradually, drawing on the insights of the monetarist, new classical and new 
Keynesian schools of thought.  
 
This section reviews, in four parts, the main features of the NMPC. The first 
outlines the essential aspects of the consensus, especially IT and CBI. The second 
explains the anti-inflation policies associated with the consensus. The third 
reviews the advantages of the NMPC vis-à-vis its mainstream predecessors, and 
the fourth assesses the performance of inflation targeting countries. 
 
1.1 – The Consensus 
 
This section briefly summarises the theoretical underpinnings of the NMPC. The 
new consensus departs from four basic propositions, discussed below, concerning 
the costs of inflation, the scope for monetary policy, IT and CBI.1 
 
1.1.1 – The Costs of Inflation 
 
The NMPC claims that inflation is costly and that high or variable inflation can be 
very costly. Inflation distorts the tax system, exacerbates price volatility and 
reduces the transparency of the relative prices,2 increases the riskiness of nominal 
 
                                                          
 
 
1
 See, inter alia, Agénor (2001), Arestis and Sawyer (2005, forthcoming) and Mishkin (2004). 
2
 Meyer (2001) offers the following definitions of price stability, drawing on Paul Volcker and 
Alan Greenspan: ‘A workable definition of reasonable “price stability” would seem ... to be a 
situation in which expectations of generally rising (or falling) prices over a considerable period are 
not a pervasive influence on economic and financial behavior. Stated more positively, “stability” 
would imply that decisionmaking should be able to proceed on the basis that “real” and “nominal” 
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contracts and contributes to malinvestment and resource misallocation.3 It also 
taxes money-holders arbitrarily and regressively, because the poor tend to hold a 
larger proportion of their assets as cash, and they are less able than the rich are to 
avoid paying the inflation tax. Inflation also leads to demonetisation, lower 
savings, lower financial system depth and efficiency, and it stimulates capital 
flight into foreign assets, precious metals, or unproductive real estate. These costs 
and inefficiencies imply that economies experiencing high or variable inflation 
over long periods will tend to perform poorly, and they may even face social and 
political unrest. Conversely, price stability reduces economic costs, increases the 
efficiency of the price system, and it can help the economy achieve higher long-
term GDP growth rates. 
 
1.1.2 – The Real-Monetary Dichotomy 
 
There is a real-monetary dichotomy in the economy. The first implication of this 
dichotomy is that the long-run Phillips curve is vertical. In other words, there is no 
long-run trade-off between nominal variables, such as inflation, and real variables 
such as output, output growth or unemployment. There may be short-run trade-
offs between them, and monetary policy can influence real variables transitorily. 
However, it cannot fine-tune the level of output or employment because its short 
and medium-term impact on the real variables is mediated by unpredictable lags. 
In the long-term, as was explained above, monetary policy is neutral: the economy 
will supposedly adjust to the natural rate of unemployment, the NAIRU, or the 
equivalent rate in other models at any inflation rate. Since inflation has significant 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
 
 
 
 
values are substantially the same over the planning horizon – and that planning horizons should be 
suitably long’ (Volcker), or ‘We will be at price stability when households and businesses need not 
factor expectations of changes in the average level of prices into their decisions’ (Greenspan). 
3
 See, for example, Agénor (2001), Bernanke and Mishkin (1997, pp.106, 109) and Fischer, Sahay 
and Végh (2002, p.876-7). 
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costs (as was shown in section 1.1.1) but brings no long-term benefits, inflation 
control is an important economic policy objective: 
 
[I]f one believes that, in the long-run, there is no trade-off between 
inflation and output then there is no point in using monetary policy to 
target output .... You only have to adhere to] the view that printing money 
cannot raise long-run productivity growth, in order to believe that inflation 
rather than output is the only sensible objective of monetary policy in the 
long-run.4 
 
The second implication of the real-monetary dichotomy is that, in the long-run, 
inflation is determined by excess money supply: 
 
Few economists would disagree that inflation is, as Milton Friedman 
taught us long ago, always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon ... 
[M]onetary policy ... determines the rate of inflation in the long-run. While 
... supply shocks – such as abrupt changes in the price of energy or food 
unrelated to the overall balance between aggregate demand and supply – 
can result in short-run changes in inflation, such changes in inflation can 
persist only if central banks accommodate them. Central banks therefore 
must accept full responsibility for inflation in the long-run and have the 
tools to achieve price stability.5 
 
Presumably, adverse supply shocks or rigidities, terms of trade shifts, distributive 
conflicts and changes in expectations have only a limited impact on inflation. 
 
                                                          
 
 
4
 Mervyn King, current Governor of the Bank of England, cited in Arestis and Sawyer (2005). Fed 
Governor Laurence Meyer (2001) similarly claims that ‘monetary policy ... cannot affect the level 
of output or its growth rate in the long-run, other than by maintaining low and stable inflation. 
Therefore, the objective of price stability should be assigned to monetary policymakers, but the 
objective of high and rising living standards should not be’. See also Agénor (2001, p.3) and 
Mishkin (1998, p.1). 
5
 Meyer (2001). 
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They either fade away gradually or cancel each other out over time. In contrast, 
monetary control is essential at all times in order to avoid persistent inflation.  
 
It is difficult to deliver monetary control because of the inflation bias due to the 
time-inconsistency problem: myopic policy-makers have an incentive to misuse 
the short-term power of monetary policy to inflate the economy for crass electoral 
reasons even though this is ultimately destabilising and inflationary (the political 
business cycle).6 The ‘rational political business cycle’ offers a variation of this 
argument, suggesting that an inflation bias may arise as the rational response of 
the private agents to uncertainty as to future government policy, or their belief that 
the government may artificially inflate the economy at some point. Once this 
possibility has been factored into their inflation expectations there will be inflation 
even though government policy has not actually changed (yet).7 Milton Friedman 
famously proposed his fixed money supply growth rule (money supply targeting) 
in order to limit the politicians’ access to monetary policy instruments and remove 
this inflation bias. Nominal anchors such as money supply targeting discipline the 
behaviour of the central bank and, indirectly, the politicians, helping to remove 
the inflation bias from the economy.8  
 
In sum, price stability is the most important contribution that monetary policy can 
give to social welfare. Attempts to use monetary policy to achieve other goals, 
such as higher output or employment, may conflict with price stability and can 
introduce a persistent inflationary bias in the economy. 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
6
 See Gärtner (2000, p.529). 
7
 See Forder (2003, p.22) and Mayes (1998, p.8). 
8
 ‘A nominal anchor is a publicly announced nominal variable that serves as a target for 
monetary policy. A nominal anchor fosters price stability by constraining the value of money 
and thereby tying down inflation expectations. The potential nominal anchor choices 
encompasses those based on convertibility into a commodity, generally specie, such as gold 
or silver; the currency of another country; a common currency in a currency union; a 
monetary target, an exchange rate target, and an inflation target’ (Stone and Bhundia 2004, p.5). 
See also Mishkin (1998, p.1). 
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1.1.3 – Inflation Targeting 
 
The government should signal its ‘explicit acknowledgement that low and stable 
inflation is the overriding goal of monetary policy’9 by setting a legally binding 
numerical inflation target (IT), that should be pursued by an independent central 
bank (see section 1.1.4).10 The IT can be either an interval or a point, and it may 
include tolerance margins (see section 1.3.1). The IT should be the only nominal 
anchor in the economy, as it cannot be pursued simultaneously with money 
supply, wages, employment or exchange rate targets (see section 3.3).11  
 
The inflation targeting regime (ITR) operates at multiple levels.12 At the level of 
government, it institutionalises ‘good’ (i.e., conservative, see section 1.1.4) 
monetary policies, increases the transparency and accountability of central bank 
actions, and provides guidelines for other policies, especially fiscal, employment 
and exchange rate policies. From the point of view of the private sector, ITR 
offers clear objectives for government policy (in this sense, it operates like 
exchange rate targeting regimes, and in sharp contrast with money supply 
targeting systems). ITR also provides a trend for the inflation expectations and 
indications about future government policies. This will reduce uncertainty and 
facilitate economic planning and co-ordination across markets, lowering the 
adjustment costs and assisting the consolidation of the new, low inflation 
 
                                                          
 
 
9
 Bernanke and Mishkin (1997, p.97). 
10
 ‘The hallmark of inflation targeting is the announcement by the government, the central bank, or 
some combination of the two that in the future the central bank will strive to hold inflation at or 
near some numerically specified level’ (Bernanke and Mishkin 1997, p.98). 
11
 See Debelle et al (1998). 
12
 The preconditions for this policy regime are explained by Eichengreen (2002, p.7). 
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regime.13 If it is implemented competently, ITR can be highly successful – it can 
even ‘deliver as much price level stability as a commodity [gold] standard’.14 
 
The transition costs to the new policy regime, which are measured by the extent 
and duration of any fluctuation of the level of output, are usually low. They 
depend largely on the credibility of the government’s commitment to the ITR and 
the reputation of the central bank.15 The more credible the government’s 
commitment and the better the central bank’s reputation, the faster the 
expectations will converge to the IT and the lower the output costs of reducing 
inflation (the ‘sacrifice ratio’). Hence, ‘imperfect credibility may require the 
central bank to target inflation [more] rigidly’,16 implying that there is a transitory 
trade-off between credibility and flexibility. In the short-term, making the regime 
credible requires the authorities to abdicate from short-term flexibility and policy 
discretion. However, in the long-term, having acquired credibility the authorities 
will have more scope to be flexible.17 Once established, ITR will bring other 
benefits in addition to policy flexibility. They include lower and more stable 
inflation, higher economic growth rates, and a permanently lower sacrifice ratio.18 
These potential benefits suggest that other government policy objectives – such as 
 
                                                          
 
 
13
 ‘[T]he credible commitment of the monetary authority to a numerical target may also contribute 
to better coordination among agents and markets. For example, announcing inflation targets may 
reduce the reaction of agents to inflation news or the dependence of specific prices on formal or 
informal indexation mechanisms, aligning expectations closer to central bank actions’ 
(Landerretche et al 2001, pp.7-8). See also Gavin (2003) and Meyer (2001). 
14
 Bordo et al (2003, p.1). 
15
 ‘Monetary policy works both through the setting of a target short-term nominal interest rate and 
by the expectations policymakers induce in the markets, wittingly or unwittingly, about the course 
of future policy. To the extent that market participants correctly anticipate future policy moves, 
long-term interest rates will move in response to expectations of future moves in short-term rates, 
in effect, speeding the response of aggregate demand to monetary policy’ (Meyer 2001). 
16
 Eichengreen (2002, p.36); see also Agénor (2001, p.59). In other words, credibility is 
determined ex ante, by the perceived commitment of the central bank to the new policy regime. 
Reputation is established ex post, on the basis of the bank’s performance. 
17
 Debelle et al (1998); see also Agénor (2001, pp.3, 21-2, 26, 62-3), Bogdanski et al (2000, p.5) 
and Mishkin (1998, p.27). 
18
 See Fontana and Palácio-Vera (2002). The sacrifice ratio is usually computed as the ratio of the 
sum of deviations of potential from actual output, divided by the decline in inflation (Landerretche 
et al 2001, p.6n6). 
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employment generation, economic growth and income distribution – should be 
subordinated to the IT (see section 1.3.4): 
 
A mandate to pursue an inflation target, a reasonable degree of instrument 
independence, and public accountability make up the first set of initial 
conditions for adopting inflation targeting. Other objectives, such as wage 
rates, the level of employment, or the exchange rate must be subordinated 
to the inflation objective.19 
 
In contrast with money supply or exchange rate targeting regimes, under ITR the 
central bank does not make policy decisions based on current developments, past 
data or arbitrary assumptions. The long lags in the monetary policy transmission 
process imply that bank policies must be guided by future trends, especially 
inflation forecasts conditional on the probable development of the exogenous 
variables (see section 1.2). In doing this, the central bank will respond to 
inflationary pressures before they have become embedded in the agents’ 
expectations and in the wage and price setting processes, which would increase 
the costs of stabilisation. In this sense, this policy regime may usefully be called 
inflation forecast targeting.  
 
The important role of future developments for this policy regime supposedly 
makes monetary policy transparency and central bank accountability essential for 
inflation targeting. Transparency (or openness) and accountability concern the 
clarity of the central bank’s commitment to the IT, and its regular assessment of 
government policy and its likely consequences for inflation. This includes, for 
example, the publication of periodic Inflation Reports setting out the central 
bank’s analysis of recent developments and its inflation forecasts, regular 
statements to Parliament, press briefings, and so on. Transparency and 
accountability allow the economic agents to assess whether deviations from the IT 
 
                                                          
 
 
19
 Carare et al (2002, p.5). 
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or policy adjustments are due to random shocks, policy blunders or, more 
worryingly, lack of commitment to the announced policies. Increased 
transparency and accountability reduce the lag between monetary policy changes 
and their effects on prices and wages, increasing their effectiveness.20  
 
In spite of its advantages, IT is not always appropriate for all countries and 
circumstances (see section 4). In particular, five conditions should be satisfied in 
order to make this policy regime viable. First, it the monetary authorities should 
have effective policy tools and autonomy to deploy them (see section 1.1.4). 
Second, the absence of fiscal dominance; in other words, fiscal policy 
considerations cannot play a determining role in macroeconomic policy 
decisions.21 This requires that government borrowing from the central bank should 
be strictly limited, and that public sector funding should rely on a broad tax base 
and an efficient tax system, rather than on seignorage. Third, the rate of inflation 
should be low enough at the start to ensure a reasonable degree of monetary 
stability and central bank control (in other words, IT is not a stabilisation policy; 
see section 1.4.3).22 Fourth, the financial market needs to be sufficiently 
developed, deep and efficient to absorb placements of public debt, such as 
treasury bills or bonds, and to avoid financial instability, which could side-track 
monetary policy.23 Fifth, absence of external dominance, in other words, the 
country’s balance of payments should be sufficiently strong to allow monetary 
policy to focus on inflation control in the face of adverse external shocks (see 
sections 3.3 and 4.2). 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
20
 See Debelle et al (1998). 
21
 See Agénor (2001, p.22-3). 
22
 See Carare et al (2002, p.13). 
23
 ‘[A] safe and sound financial system is ... a necessary condition for the success 
of an inflation targeting regime. A weak banking system is particularly dangerous. Once a 
banking system is in a weakened state, a central bank cannot raise interest rates to sustain the 
inflation target because this will likely lead to a collapse of the financial system. Not only can 
this cause a breakdown of the inflation targeting regime directly, but it can also lead to a 
currency collapse and a financial crisis that also erode the control of inflation’ (Mishkin 2004, 
pp.6-7). See also Carare et al (2002, p.4). 
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These are not straightforward requirements. On the one hand, a country may move 
towards ITR even if not all elements of the package are in place, since the 
increased economic stability and the enhanced credibility of the government’s 
policies will help to create the conditions for the further success of ITR. On the 
other hand, however, the initially low credibility of the new policy regime – 
especially in countries historically plagued by high inflation, economic instability 
and weak institutions, implies that exceptionally tight monetary policies will be 
required at the beginning. This will negatively affect the fiscal balance and, 
potentially, financial stability. However, in time, the economy will adjust to the 
new regime and monetary policy can be relaxed without any loss of control over 
inflation (see above).24 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
24
 See Fraga et al (2003, p.23). 
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1.1.4 – Central Bank Independence 
 
In the NMPC, CBI is essential for inflation targeting. Perceptions of the role of 
the central bank in anti-inflation programmes have changed significantly over 
time (see Figure 1, which is also included in Appendix A). The first generation of 
models of CBI draws on Friedman’s (1968) proposal of money supply targeting 
and on the pioneering work of Kydland and Prescott (1977), who argued that 
monetary policy ‘rules’ lead to higher levels of social welfare than ‘discretion’.25 
Rogoff (1985) developed their work, and claimed that if the social loss function 
includes both deviations of inflation and output from their optimal levels, losses 
could be minimised if monetary policy is guided by a conservative central banker 
(the banker’s preferences remain unexplained in this model, but see section 3.6).26 
A ‘conservative’ central banker places a higher weight on inflation stabilisation in 
her/his objective function than society as a whole (i.e., the representative 
government), although s/he is not necessarily unconcerned with unemployment. 
The central banker’s preferences and reputation create a tendency towards 
disinflation that will partly compensate for the inflation bias identified by Kydland 
and Prescott. 
 
These first-generation models imply that CBI can help to reduce the rate of 
inflation because it insulates monetary policy from the political prices. This 
minimises the time-inconsistency problem created by political pressures to 
explore the short-run Phillips curve through overly expansionary monetary policy. 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
25
 ‘Arguably, the most important result in political macroeconomics has been that democratic 
governments, or central banks with representative preferences, tend to generate inefficiently high 
inflation rates, without the benefit of reaping lasting output gains beyond potential output. While 
this inflation bias was initially rationalized in the context of deterministic models ... much of the 
recent discussion surrounding this issue makes sense only in a stochastic framework. Only there 
does the possibility of a conflict arise between a reduction in the inflation bias on the one hand and 
optimal stabilization, i.e. the right intensity of the policymaker’s response to supply shocks, on the 
other hand’ (Gärtner 2000, p.528). See also Forder (n.d.) and Mendonça (2002). 
26
 For a critique, see Lapavitsas (1997). 
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Figure 1: Models of Central Bank Independence and Inflation Targeting 
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Given CBI, the appointment of a conservative central banker whose preferences 
are more inflation averse than the government’s functions as a commitment device 
that helps to maintain lower inflation rates than would otherwise be possible.27 
However, the cost of low inflation is increased output instability – in fact, the 
more conservative is monetary policy the smaller the variance of inflation, but the 
higher is the variance of output.28  
 
The assumption that the central bank is primarily responsible for achieving price 
stability is the point of departure of the second generation of models of CBI. 
Given the limitations of Rogoff’s conservative central banker, the key problem 
becomes the institutional framework that is most conducive to the elimination of 
the inflation bias. Drawing on principal-agent theory, Walsh (1995) suggested that 
optimal contracts could be drawn for the central bankers, penalising them if 
inflation deviates from the target set by the government. This approach is 
supposedly compatible with political democracy, because the central bank will 
attempt to pursue the government’s objective of inflation minimisation regardless 
of any differences between the bank and the government’s objective functions, or 
the existence of information asymmetries.  
 
The third generation of models combines the arguments developed previously. 
These models claim that CBI and IT are the most credible, reliable and lowest-
cost institutional arrangements for addressing the time-inconsistency problem. 
Typically, Svensson (1997a) grants autonomy to a central bank that is held 
responsible for the achievement of a given IT. Svensson rejects the idea of 
performance contracts for the central bankers because of practical difficulties 
(e.g., it would be politically unpalatable to reward the central bankers financially 
for achieving low inflation at the expense of exceptionally high unemployment). 
 
                                                          
 
 
27
 See Alesina and Summers (1993, pp.151-2) and Gärtner (2000, pp.528-30). 
28
 See Gärtner (2000, p.532). Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) and Backus and Driffill (1985) draw 
even more extreme conclusions from the work of Kydland and Prescott, pointing out that there 
would be advantages in the central banker being extremely inflation-averse; see Forder (n.d.). 
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However, Svensson also shows that the IT can effectively mimic the optimal 
incentive contracts, so there is no macroeconomic performance loss.29 This 
generation of models implies that the choice between inflation and output 
stabilisation depends on the parameters of the problem at hand, especially how 
often shocks occur and how big they are. If shocks are rare, the conservative 
central banker tends to dominate a representative government; otherwise, the 
choice of a more liberal central banker could become optimal.30 
 
The distinguishing features of CBI are the institutionalisation of the primary 
responsibility of the central bank for achieving the IT, the appointment of its 
directors for fixed terms (preferably not coinciding with the mandate of the 
country’s president or the legislators, in order to ensure policy continuity), and the 
regular assessment of the bank’s performance through the trajectory of inflation 
and the bank’s reports to the government, the legislature and the media.31 At a 
more specific level, the institutional arrangements underpinning CBI may vary 
between countries and over time. These potential differences may include the 
precise duties of the bank, the policy instruments that it controls, its degree of 
administrative autonomy, the institutional relationship between the central bank 
and other government departments, the procedure for appointing bank directors 
and the limits on government borrowing from the bank.32 In spite of their practical 
 
                                                          
 
 
29
 See Agénor (2001, p.24), Gärtner (2000, p.537) and Mishkin (1998, p.19). 
30
 See Gärtner (2000, p.531). 
31
 ‘Few economists would disagree that inflation is, as Milton Friedman taught us long ago, always 
and everywhere a monetary phenomenon. This was earlier interpreted as a statement about a tight 
relationship between money growth (controlled by the central bank) and inflation. Today, it is 
recognized that even if the relationship between money growth and inflation has weakened, 
perhaps because of financial innovations, central banks can achieve their inflation targets by 
adjusting their preferred instrument, typically some short-term interest rate. Hence, monetary 
policy still determines the rate of inflation in the long-run. While it is also well understood that 
supply shocks – such as abrupt changes in the price of energy or food unrelated to the overall 
balance between aggregate demand and supply – can result in short-run changes in inflation, such 
changes in inflation can persist only if central banks accommodate them. Central banks therefore 
must accept full responsibility for inflation in the long-run and have the tools to achieve price 
stability’ (Meyer 2001). 
32
 See Grilli et al (1991); see also Arestis and Sawyer (1998a). 
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significance these details will be ignored in what follows, in order to permit a 
general assessment of the NMPC. 
 
Presumably, CBI would limit the influence of the politicians over economic 
policy-making, greatly reducing or eliminating uncertainty, time-inconsistency, 
the political business cycle and the inflation bias. In this sense, CBI could improve 
economic performance.33 Even though it limits the power of the politicians, CBI is 
allegedly not inimical to democracy because the central bank regularly reports to 
Parliament and the public. At a further remove, the bank’s performance is 
assessed continually through the credibility of the ITR, the public’s expectations, 
and the trajectory of inflation – the bank’s independence does not create a 
‘democratic deficit’. 
 
Finally, the central bank must be technically competent (informed by mainstream 
economic theory and run by experts, presumably mainstream economists, 
financiers or trusted civil servants, see section 3.6), and it must be able to select 
the appropriate policy instruments and conduct monetary policy autonomously.34 
In other words, in addition to political (administrative) independence the central 
bank also needs to have instrument independence.35 In contrast, goal 
independence (the central bank’s ability to select the appropriate goals for 
monetary policy) is usually frowned upon, because it is perceived to be 
undemocratic (see section 3.5).36 
 
                                                          
 
 
33
 See Forder (2003, p.22) 
34
 ‘Inflation targeting requires that the central bank be endowed by the political authorities with a 
clear mandate to pursue the objective of price stability and most importantly a large degree of 
independence in the conduct of monetary policy–namely, in choosing the instruments necessary to 
achieve the target rate of inflation. This implies, in particular, the ability to resist political 
pressures to stimulate the economy in the short-term’ (Agénor 2001, p.22-3). 
35
 ‘Instrument independence means that the central bank is prohibited from funding government 
deficits, has to be allowed to set the monetary policy instruments without interference from the 
government and the members of the monetary policy board must be insulated from the political 
process by giving them long-term appointments and protection from arbitrary dismissal’ (Mishkin 
2004, p.12). 
36
 ‘Instrument independence would seem to be the form of independence that maximizes central 
bank accountability and minimises opportunistic political interference, while still leaving the 
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1.2 – NMPC Policies 
 
The economic model underpinning the NMPC is essentially very simple (see 
Figure 2 and Appendix A).37 It includes two key parameters, the IT and the 
inflation expectations; the former is set by the government and the latter by the 
private sector. The model also includes one discretionary policy instrument, the 
nominal interest rate.  
 
The government policy objective is to eliminate the inflation gap, or the difference 
between the rate of inflation and the IT at some point in the future (the policy 
horizon; see section 1.3.2).38 The model presumes that inflation is jointly 
determined by the inflation expectations and the output gap, with the latter 
fluctuating around a supply-side equilibrium. Alternatively, the rate of 
unemployment fluctuates around the natural rate or the NAIRU, such that 
unemployment below (above) the NAIRU would lead to higher (lower) rates of 
inflation.39 The output gap (the difference between the rate of unemployment and 
the natural rate, or the NAIRU) is determined by the real interest rates. Finally, the 
real interest rates are, by definition, equal to the nominal interest rates minus the 
inflation expectations. 
 
In this essentially new Keynesian model the central bank attempts to hit the IT 
through the manipulation of the nominal interest rates in order to influence the 
state of expectations immediately and, at a further remove, fine tune the level of 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
 
 
 
 
ultimate goals of policy to be determined by democratic processes’ (Bernanke and Mishkin 1997, 
p.102n8). 
37
 See Agénor (2001, pp.5-7), Arestis and Sawyer (2005) and Eichengreen (2002, pp.10-11). 
38
 See Agénor (2001, p.10). 
39
 See Arestis and Sawyer (2005). 
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Figure 2: Inflation Control in the NMPC 
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aggregate demand.1 If the central bank forecasts a positive inflation gap during the 
policy horizon, either because aggregate demand is too high or because the market 
expects that inflation will rise in the future for whatever reason, the central bank 
will adjust monetary policy, usually by raising nominal (and, ceteris paribus, real) 
interest rates.2  
 
Higher interest rates will depress demand and raise the output gap through many 
different channels. They will revalue the exchange rate, immediately lowering 
imports prices; raise the cost of borrowing, dampening investment and durables 
consumption; reduce wealth and consumption; cut corporate net worth, 
investment and bank lending, and lead highly leveraged firms to bankruptcy, 
worsening the expectations of economic activity. The rate of inflation will 
eventually decline through a combination of these pressures.3 Conversely, if the 
inflation gap is negative or if the expected rate of inflation is too low the central 
bank will lower nominal interest rates. The output gap will fall and inflation will 
rise, again converging to the target.  
 
The model implies that inflation control is achieved at the expense of fluctuations 
in the output gap. The lower is the government’s tolerance to an inflation gap, the 
shorter is the time-span available to achieve IT, and the more open the economy 
the larger will be the fluctuations of the output gap and, therefore, the variance of 
the unemployment rate (see sections 1.1.4, 2.2 and 3.1).4  
 
 
                                                          
 
 
1
 See Minella (2002) and Roberts (1995). 
2
 The bank’s procedure follows an appropriate instrument rule, which is a formula for setting the 
central bank’s instrument rate a as given function of a small number of observable variables. The 
best-known example is the Taylor rule, where the instrument rate is a linear function of the 
inflation gap and the output gap. See Dennis (2001, p.105) and Svensson (2004, p.1).  
3
 See Carare et al (2002, p.19). 
4
 ‘[I]f the central bank, in addition to seeking to achieve its inflation target, aims at stabilizing 
output, it should allow for a slower adjustment of the inflation forecast to the target value 
compared to a situation in which the inflation target is the only goal. Extension of the analysis to 
an open-economy setting showed that, given the critical role that the exchange rate plays in the 
transmission process of monetary policy, inflation targeting may lead to a relatively high degree of 
output volatility by inducing excessive fluctuations in interest rates’ (Agénor 2001, p.63). 
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Finally, although a wide variety of instruments can be used in order to achieve IT, 
in practice central banks tend to focus primarily on the manipulation of the 
nominal interest rates.5 This instrument is especially convenient because it is 
simple to use; it is also supposedly non-distortionary, because changes in the base 
rates do not systematically discriminate between different sectors of the economy 
and, therefore, do not lead to resource misallocation.  
 
1.3 – Anchors and Flexibility 
 
In contrast with such policy regimes as money supply or exchange rate targeting, 
the NMPC is flexible at four levels.  
 
1.3.1 – Low but Positive Inflation Targets 
 
The IT is normally low and positive, rather than zero, and the targets are usually 
bands, rather than points (see section 1.4). Bands are used for three reasons. First, 
because of the possibility of misspecification, parameter uncertainty or structural 
breaks in the central bank economic model. Second, because of the uncertainty 
surrounding the monetary transmission process and the links between the policy 
levers and the inflation outcomes. Third, because of the regular occurrence of 
shocks (see section 1.3.2).6 This would make it very difficult to hit continuously a 
single point target for inflation, and even trying to do so would cause interest rates 
to be highly volatile, which would be destabilising. Targeting bands rather than 
points also provides a measure of flexibility for the central bank, because it can 
enjoy some discretion over which point in the band it aims for in taking its policy 
decisions allowing it to accommodate transitory shocks more easily. However, 
bands create a trade-off between credibility and flexibility, because the wider the 
bands the more likely it is that they will be hit, but the less credible the target will 
 
                                                          
 
 
5
 See Bogdanski et al (2000, p.8) and Bordo et al (2003, p.23). In particular, fiscal policy is 
perceived to be given in the short-term because of the delays and uncertainties involved in its use. 
6
 See Minella et al (2002, p.35). 
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be.7 Their size also gives an indication of the limits of the central bank’s 
forecasting model, and the trade-off between inflation and output variance in the 
bank’s objective function, with tighter bands signalling a preference for lower 
inflation volatility relative to output volatility.8  
 
The preference for low rather than zero inflation can be explained at three levels. 
First, the price indices usually overstate the rate of inflation, so even if the 
government aims to eliminate inflation its target should be a small positive 
number.9 Second, if nominal wages are rigid downward zero inflation would 
reduce the flexibility of real wages and worsen the allocative efficiency of the 
labour markets, increasing the natural rate of unemployment. Third, zero inflation 
would increase the risk of the economy tipping into deflation (see section 4.5). A 
small but positive IT helps to avoid this risk, because the targets provide not only 
a ceiling, but also a floor for the rate of inflation. 
 
1.3.2 – Tolerance to Deviations 
 
In currency boards or exchange rate targeting regimes it is impossible to depart 
temporarily from the peg or target band without a severe loss of credibility and 
possibly a currency crisis. In contrast, in ITR the central bank does not aim to 
reach the IT either continually or inflexibly.10 The bank normally targets inflation 
over a policy (target) horizon of one to three years in the future because of the 
delays of the monetary policy transmission mechanism,11 and to avoid having to 
respond to transitory price disturbances that would not normally trigger long-term 
variations of the rate of inflation. A very short policy horizon would require 
returning inflation to the target too rapidly following some departure, which could 
 
                                                          
 
 
7
 See Agénor (2001, p.33-5). 
8
 See Fraga et al (2003, p.30) and and Minella et al (2002, p.39). 
9
 See Bernanke and Mishkin (1997, p.110). 
10
 See Agénor (2001, pp.21-2) and Eichengreen (2002, p.7). 
11
 In other words, the target horizon cannot be shorter than the control horizon (Agénor 2001, 
p.35). 
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result in excessive variability of output. The policy horizon may even be 
lengthened or the targets changed if the economy faces relatively large adverse 
shocks, in order to avoid drastic interest rate adjustments.12  
 
In order to make the system even more robust, the rate of inflation is usually 
measured by a ‘core’ (rather than headline) price index, usually the CPI, in order 
to exclude the direct impact of price disturbances that should not be allowed to 
influence monetary policy.13 These disturbances include adverse supply shocks, 
natural disasters, sudden fluctuations in the exchange rate or the terms of trade, 
seasonal variations of food and energy prices, changes in indirect taxes, regulated 
prices, subsidies and mortgage payments, and even the direct (first-round) impact 
of interest rate changes (which may trigger a ‘spurious’ rise in inflation).14 In 
cases such as these, a strong monetary policy response could produce very large 
fluctuations in the real economy for no significant long-term gain in terms of 
inflation control. Finally, if the economy is especially prone to shocks the bands 
should be wider and the central target should be higher, in order to increase the 
probability of fulfilment with acceptable output costs.15 
 
A failure to hit the original targets continually should not endanger the ITR for, 
although there may be an initial credibility loss due to the change in the targets or 
 
                                                          
 
 
12
 ‘[T]he bands should be treated mainly as a communications device. The bands should be 
considered mainly as checkpoints, with the central bank explaining clearly the reasons for the 
[occasional] nonfulfillment of the targets’ (Fraga et al 2003, p.30). See also Agénor (2001, pp.14-
15) and Bernanke and Mishkin (1997, p.101).  
13
 See Arestis, Caporale and Cipollini (2002, p.531) and Carare et al (2002, pp.28-9). 
14
 ‘The main argument contrary to the use of [a] core inflation [index] is that it is less 
representative of the loss of the purchasing power of money, at a given point in time ... [However,] 
there are two advantages ... First, the core inflation measure is not necessarily isolated from the 
effect of shocks ... the construction of the adjusted target is directly based on the idea that 
monetary policy should neutralize second-order effects of supply shocks and accommodate the 
first-round effects, and on the fact that some weight to output volatility should be assigned in the 
[central bank’s] objective function ... The main advantages of the adjusted target procedure are the 
following: i) it is a forward looking procedure, ii) it defines clearly the new target to be pursued by 
the central bank, and iii) it explains how the new target is measured’ (Fraga et al 2003, pp.37-8). 
See also Agénor (2001, p.31), Bernanke and Mishkin (1997, pp.101, 109), Meyer (2001) and 
Mishkin (1998, p.20). 
15
 See Agénor (2001, p.13) and Fraga et al (2003, p.31). 
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the policy horizon, there will be a subsequent gain if the central bank is 
transparent about its ultimate objective and the policies being implemented to 
reach it. In fact, sticking to an unrealistically low target would be more damaging 
to the credibility of the ITR, since the private agents would rapidly realise the 
pointlessness of the exercise and would lose confidence in the central bank’s 
statements about the effectiveness of its policies.16 
 
1.3.3 – Instrument Flexibility 
 
Although interest rate manipulation (and the corresponding open market 
operations) is clearly the favoured monetary policy instrument under ITR, the 
central bank should employ all relevant information and a wide variety of tools in 
order to pursue the IT. These tools depend on the institutional structure of the 
central bank, the country’s political system and the policy-maker’s conviction 
about how best to operate in the circumstances. They could include, for example, 
changes in the banking regulations or the required reserve ratios, the imposition of 
differential asset requirements, and so on, as long as they contribute to the 
achievement of the IT within the policy horizon.  
 
By potentially accommodating widely different policies, ITR is a flexible policy 
framework that grants the central bank discretion to respond to specific challenges 
within a clear commitment to achieve price stability. This is called ‘constrained 
discretion’, and it presumably offers a middle ground between inflexible rules and 
unfettered discretion.17 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
16
 See Fraga et al (2003, p.33). Note, however, that ‘flexibility can be destabilizing when 
credibility is lacking’ (Eichengreen 2002, p.40). 
17
 Arestis and Sawyer (2005); see also Agénor (2001, p.65) and Bernanke and Mishkin (1997, 
p.101). 
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1.3.4 – Hierarchical and Dual Mandates 
 
Many proponents of the NMPC argue that monetary policy should be sufficiently 
flexible to incorporate the secondary objective of minimising output fluctuations, 
as long as this does not detract from the IT in the long-run.18 This is called a ‘dual 
mandate’, or ‘flexible inflation targeting’, in contrast with the stricter ‘hierarchical 
mandate’ where all policy objectives are subordinated to the inflation target:  
 
[M]onetary policymakers should be concerned about two long-run 
properties of the economy. One is price stability and the other is the 
variability of output around full employment. Policy has to be judged by 
its success in both dimensions ... [Moreover,] policy is made in the short-
run, not the long-run. The speed of return of output to its potential level is 
influenced by policy decisions and cannot be treated with indifference. It 
may just take too long and waste too many resources in the interim to rely 
on the self-equilibrating forces of the economy. Policymakers will 
therefore have to take into account, in practice, both objectives in their 
policy actions ... [Bank of England Governor] Mervyn King calls regimes 
which take no account of output gaps (where the coefficient on the output 
gap is zero in the loss function) “inflation nutters.” That language suggests 
that entirely ignoring output stabilization is now viewed as an extreme 
position and not as a desirable option for central banks. Lars Svensson 
argues that there has, in fact, been a convergence toward “flexible inflation 
targeting” – meaning inflation-targeting regimes that in practice take into 
account deviations in both output and inflation from their respective 
targets. Such an evolution has brought many inflation-targeting regimes 
closer in practice to a dual mandate regime.19 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
18
 See Eichengreen (2002, p.8), Meyer (2001) and Mishkin (1998, p.26). 
19
 Meyer (2001). 
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Although the dual mandate is a step in the right direction (see section 3.5), it 
remains strictly limited. Its proponents claim that monetary policy is sufficient to 
control inflation, that inflation control is essential for welfare maximisation, and 
that the central bank is the main institution responsible for achieving IT. In 
practice, the dual mandate means only that the inflation target will be achieved 
over a somewhat longer horizon.20 Moreover, even if there is scope for output 
stabilisation, growth maximisation and the minimisation of output volatility under 
the dual mandate, these objectives necessarily involve several government 
institutions and agencies. It is never argued that the central bank has any special 
power to deliver these outcomes, or that it should have targets or obligations in 
this respect. In other words, the dual mandate offers only a bit more flexibility in 
the process of achieving low inflation, rather than a fundamentally different (i.e., 
more expansionary) economic policy (see section 3.4).  
 
1.3.5 – Summing Up 
 
The NMPC is the culmination of several years of mainstream research, and it 
reflects the accumulated experience of decades of monetary policy-making. It has 
broad theoretical foundations, including insights from the monetarist, new 
classical and new Keynesian schools of thought. It explains what monetary policy 
can and cannot achieve, identifies the adequate policy targets and the most 
efficient instruments to achieve them, and specifies the institutional framework in 
which these instruments may be deployed successfully. The NMPC also offers 
concrete suggestions for the elimination of the inflation bias and the dynamic 
time-inconsistency problem: while CBI insulates monetary policy from short-run 
political considerations, IT ensures that the goals of monetary policy cannot 
diverge from the ultimate interests of society for extended periods.21 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
20
 See Fraga et al (2003, p.31). 
21
 Mishkin (1998, p.24). 
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This policy regime offers several advantages vis-à-vis alternative nominal 
anchors. For example, in contrast with exchange-rate targeting inflation targeting 
allows monetary policy to focus on domestic considerations and to respond to 
shocks to the domestic economy. In contrast with money supply targeting ITR is a 
robust policy regime, that is immune to velocity changes or shifts in the 
relationship between the intermediate targets (money supply growth) and the 
policy goals (low and stable inflation).22 
 
The advantages and the internal consistency of the NMPC increase the credibility 
of monetary policy and the accountability of the authorities. This will help the 
convergence of the inflation expectations toward IT, and reduce the sacrifice ratio 
and the inflationary impact of adverse shocks. Credibility and accountability will 
also help the central bank to deliver increased economic stability and efficiency, 
as well as faster output and employment growth in the long-run, with considerable 
benefits for the poor. In sum, the NMPC claims to offer the optimal combination 
of instruments to lock in low inflation and create the essential conditions for 
sustainable and equitable growth, including policy simplicity, credibility, 
legitimacy, sustainability and flexibility. Claims such as these have contributed to 
the rapid growth of the appeal of the NMPC around the world.  
 
1.4 – Performance 
 
There is a vast literature assessing the performance of IT regimes. Several studies 
have identified gains stemming from inflation targeting in such areas as lower 
inflation rates, volatility and inertia, improved expectations, faster absorption of 
adverse shocks, lower sacrifice ratio, output stabilisation, and the convergence of 
poorly performing countries toward well performing country standards. For 
example: 
 
                                                          
 
 
22
 ‘[A]n inflation target [regime] allows the monetary authorities to use all available information, 
and not just one variable, to determine the best settings for monetary policy’ (Mishkin 1998, p.19). 
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The performance of inflation-targeting regimes has been quite good. 
Inflation-targeting countries seem to have significantly reduced both the 
rate of inflation and inflation expectations beyond that which would likely 
have occurred in the absence of inflation targets. Furthermore, once 
inflation is down, it has stayed down; following disinflations, the inflation 
rate in targeting countries has not bounced back up during subsequent 
cyclical expansions of the economy. Also inflation targeting seems to 
ameliorate the effects of inflationary shocks.23  
 
These gains are attributed to the greater credibility and transparency of the system, 
the improved reputation of the central bank, and the presence of a more flexible 
institutional framework. Similar gains have been attributed to CBI, especially 
lower inflation.24  
 
In contrast, other studies have been less supportive of IT and CBI. It has been 
claimed that there is no convincing evidence that IT improves economic 
performance as measured by the behaviour of inflation, output or interest rates, 
and it may even lead to a deterioration of some performance indicators: 
 
[T]he evidence does not conclusively indicate whether inflation targeting 
has led to a lowering of inflationary expectations and enhanced credibility, 
thereby mitigating the real output costs that disinflation typically entails. 
In fact, sacrifice ratios ... do not appear to have been much affected by 
inflation targeting ... Inflation expectations have come down, in most 
 
                                                          
 
 
23
 Mishkin (1998, p.24). See also Arestis, Caporale and Cipollini (2002), Bernanke et al (1999), 
Debelle et al (1998), Fatas, Mihov and Rose (2004), King (2002), Landerretche et al (2001), 
Mishkin (1999), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002), Svensson (1997a, 1997b) and Wu (2004). 
For detailed country case studies supporting these conclusions see, inter alia, Arestis, Caporale 
and Cipollini (2002), Bogdanski et al (2000), Mayes (1998), Mayes and Razzak (1998), Minella et 
al (2002) and Mishkin (2004). 
24
 See, for example, Alesina (1988, 1989), Alesina and Summers (1993), Cukierman (1992) and 
Grilli et al (1991). 
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cases, mainly because inflation-targeting central banks were able to 
demonstrate that they were capable of achieving and maintaining low 
inflation.25 
 
Alternatively: 
 
Although inflation has fallen, it has been accompanied in most of the 
seven [IT] countries by higher unemployment ... Comparing 
unemployment in the inflation-targeting countries with that in other major 
industrial countries shows that the average unemployment rate rose 
significantly in the early 1990s in the inflation-targeting countries, but 
since 1994 has tended back toward the level of the major industrial 
countries.26  
 
Similar questions have been raised about CBI: 
 
[E]mpirical evidence shows that central bank independence is not 
associated with higher rates of economic growth or employment, ... 
financial stability (as excess credit growth and stock and real estate price 
inflation often occur in the presence of independent central banks), budget 
balance or a reduced tendency for the central bank to monetize fiscal 
deficits.27  
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 Agénor (2001, pp.43-4). 
26
 Debelle et al (1998). Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999) claim that IT increases output volatility 
even if it helps to reduce inflation, while Neumann and von Hagen (2002) find no evidence that IT 
is superior to other disinflation strategies. In spite of his strong support for IT, Mishkin (1998, 
p.24) accepts that ‘the likely effects of inflation targeting on the real side of the economy are … 
ambiguous. Inflation expectations do not immediately adjust downward following the adoption of 
inflation targeting. Furthermore, there appears to be little if any reduction in the output loss 
associated with disinflation, the sacrifice ratio, among countries adopting inflation targeting.’ 
27
 Chang and Grabel (2004, pp.183-4). 
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These conflicting conclusions are partly due to the different approaches and 
econometric methodologies used in these studies and, as such, they are no 
different from the contradictory evidence found in other areas of macroeconomics. 
However, there may be two additional reasons for these discrepant assessments of 
IT and CBI.  
 
1.4.1 – Regression towards the Mean 
 
There are strong indications that the economic performance of most OECD 
countries has improved, in terms of inflation, output volatility and interest rates 
during the last 10-15 years. These improvements are obvious in both IT and non-
IT countries. This seems to indicate that these performance improvements were 
due to something other than IT.28 Moreover, even when the performance of IT 
countries improves more than that of non-IT countries, it cannot be simply 
assumed that the difference was due to IT.  
 
Ball and Sheridan (2003) find strong evidence that the countries showing the 
greatest improvements were those with the worst performance in the previous 
period (before the early nineties). In other words, IT countries tended to be those 
with the worst initial performance and that, perhaps for this reason, were more 
easily tempted to shift their economic policy towards IT. These countries 
eventually found that their performance improved – but not because of IT. Rather 
more prosaically, they simply regressed towards the mean, which helps to explain 
the similar improvements observed in countries that did not adopt IT. In this 
sense, the apparent success of IT countries is merely due to them having ‘high 
initial inflation and large decreases, but the decrease for a given initial level looks 
similar for targeters and non-targeters’.29 
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 See Arestis and Sawyer (2005). 
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 Ball and Sheridan (2003, p. 16).  
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Once they control for regression towards the mean Ball and Sheridan find that 
there is no evidence that IT improves economic performance, including inflation, 
interest rates, the variance of inflation, output and interest rates, or the persistence 
of shocks:  
 
There is no evidence whatsoever that inflation targeting reduces inflation 
variability ... Our robust finding is that inflation targeting has no beneficial 
effects ... [T]here is no evidence that targeting affects inflation behavior.30 
 
Ball and Sheridan also claim that it is illegitimate to draw any conclusions about 
growth performance because the available samples are simply too short, and the 
economies being studied started at different points in the economic cycle. 
Consequently, all that can be concluded is that: 
 
A paper that replicates this study in 25 or 50 years may find ample 
evidence that targeting improves performance. The evidence is not there, 
however, in the data through 2001.31 
 
In sum, in the words of Arestis and Sawyer (2005):  
 
Both IT and non-IT countries performed over the IT period equally well. 
The average rate of inflation and its variance have been reduced in both 
periods. This is true for both IT and non-IT countries ... We may conclude 
... by suggesting that on the basis of the average inflation and GDP growth 
rates performance, there is not much difference between IT and non-IT 
countries ... Consequently, IT has been a great deal of fuss about really 
very little! 
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 Ball and Sheridan (2003, pp.11-12). 
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 Ball and Sheridan (2003, p.17). 
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1.4.2 – Differences in Economic Structure and Policy Content 
 
Most studies of IT and CBI ignore the differences between the content of the 
economic programmes implemented in each country, and completely fail to take 
into account their distinct economic structures. Carare and Stone (2003) attempt to 
do so, at least implicitly, and their paper offers important pointers for the analysis 
of the relevance of NMPC for poor countries. 
 
Carare and Stone classify IT regimes into full-fledged inflation targeting (FFIT), 
eclectic inflation targeting (EIT) and inflation targeting lite (ITL) (see Table 1 and 
Appendix A).32 Their classification is based on 
 
the clarity and credibility of the central bank’s commitment to the inflation 
target. Clarity is gauged by the public announcement of the inflation target 
and by the institutional arrangements in support of accountability to the 
target. Credibility is proxied by the actual inflation outturn and by market 
ratings of long-term local currency government debt.33 
 
The appropriateness of this criterion is discussed below.  
 
For Carare and Stone, FFIT is the typical form of IT (which was explained in 
sections 1.1-1.3 above). The eighteen FFIT countries in their sample are either 
small or medium-sized industrial economies, or medium and large middle-income 
countries.  
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 Eichengreen (2002) draws a similar distinction between ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ inflation 
targeting in the context of middle-income countries. While explicit targeters implement the full 
gamut of measures required for IT, implicit targeters attempt to stabilise the price level without 
adopting all the ingredients of outright inflation targeting.  
33
 Carare and Stone (2003, p.3). 
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Table 1 – Inflation Targeting Regimes in 2003    
 
 
 
FFIT EIT ITL  
Australia Euro Area Albania  
Brazil Japan Algeria  
Canada Singapore Croatia  
Chile Switzerland Dominican Republic  
Colombia United States Guatemala  
Czech Republic   Honduras  
Hungary   Indonesia  
Iceland   Jamaica  
Israel   Kazakhstan  
Mexico   Mauritius  
New Zealand   Peru  
Norway   Philippines  
Poland   Romania  
South Africa   Russia  
South Korea   Slovakia  
Sweden   Slovenia 
Thailand   Sri Lanka 
United Kingdom   Uruguay 
    Venezuela  
Source: Carare and Stone (2003). Stone and Bhundia (2004) include Peru and the Philippines 
among the FFIT countries, and Argentina, Egypt, Iran and Turkey among the ITL countries; they 
also claim that Honduras, Uruguay and Venezuela are exchange rate targeters rather than ITL. 
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They ‘have a medium to high level of credibility [and] enjoy a large degree of 
financial stability ... [but they] are not able to maintain low inflation without a 
clear [institutional] commitment to an inflation target ... Their ... commitment to 
the inflation target comes, however, at the price of less flexibility for output 
stabilization’.34  
 
In contrast, all five EIT central banks are in industrial countries, and they have a 
history of low inflation, financial stability and very high credibility. These central 
banks pursue distinct monetary policies, and they do not make a clear 
commitment to an inflation target.35 In fact, they  
 
have so much credibility that they can maintain low and stable inflation 
without full transparency and accountability with respect to an inflation 
target. Their record of low and stable inflation and high degree of financial 
stability affords them the flexibility to pursue [simultaneously] the 
objective of output stabilization, as well as price stability.36  
 
In other words, EIT central banks avoid a commitment to inflation targets because 
this would reduce their ability to stabilise output without any additional gains in 
price stability.37 However, their ‘dual objectives mean that they cannot operate 
with as much transparency as FFIT countries’.38 
 
The nineteen ITL countries are ‘emerging market economies’.39 They have low 
credibility and higher and variable inflation rates due to their weak institutional 
framework, greater government reliance of central bank financing and greater 
vulnerability to financial instability and economic shocks. These countries 
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 Carare and Stone (2003, pp.3-5). 
35
 Carare and Stone (2003, pp.3, 14). 
36
 Carare and Stone (2003, p.3), emphasis added. 
37
 Carare and Stone (2003, p.20).  
38
 Carare and Stone (2003, pp.4-5).  
39
 Carare and Stone (2003, p.14). 
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announce a broad inflation objective but they are unable to commit themselves 
credibly to a numerical target, because low inflation cannot be their foremost 
policy objective. Their monetary policies are heterogeneous, because their central 
banks need to have flexibility to deal with their government’s financing needs 
and, especially, the shocks that regularly buffet their economies:40 
 
[A] high degree of clarity is not always optimal when financial stability is 
an ongoing concern ... Constructive ambiguity, or a deliberate lack of 
clarity, is needed in the lender-of-last-resort role of the central bank to 
address the contagion and moral hazard problems inherent in potential 
bailouts of banks that can be deemed ‘too big to fail’ ... The less clear 
commitment to an inflation target of ITL central banks provides more 
scope for dealing with financial crises.41 
 
Finally, very small poor countries are unable to commit to any form of ITR, 
however ‘lite’, because of their underdeveloped financial sectors and concentrated 
production profiles. These countries tend to choose fixed exchange rate regimes or 
to adopt the currency of their largest trading partner.42 
 
Carare and Stone conclude their study with guidance notes for switches from one 
regime to another. Switches from FFIT to EIT would be possible if the central 
bank’s inflation-fighting credibility becomes so entrenched that it can ‘reduce the 
clarity of its commitment to its inflation target without an increase in inflation 
expectations. But no country has actually undertaken this regime change’.43 
Conversely, a ‘switch from EIT to FFIT depends on whether the long-run gain in 
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 ‘This [ITL] regime covers a grab-bag of monetary frameworks with variable weights to 
inflation, exchange rate and monetary objectives and intermediate targets’ (Stone and Bhundia 
2004, p.10). 
41
 Carare and Stone (2003, p.20); see also pp.4-5, 14-15. 
42
 Carare and Stone (2003, p.6). 
43
 Carare and Stone (2003, p.5). 
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inflation-fighting credibility outweighs the loss in flexibility to achieve other 
objectives’.44 
 
Switches from ITL to FFIT may be relevant for a larger number of countries. For 
Carare and Stone, ITL can be seen as ‘a transitional regime during which the 
authorities implement the structural reforms needed for the credible adoption’ of 
FFIT.45 The switch would be facilitated by ‘a deep and broad financial sector, 
which reduces systemic risks and potential policy conflicts, provides for market-
based monetary policy implementation, and allows the government to raise the 
bulk of its funding in financial markets’.46 
 
Carare and Stone’s study is important because it shows that FFIT requires 
minimum levels of institutional development, financial depth and economic 
stability (see section 4). Carare and Stone also rightly point out that in spite of its 
potential advantages (outlined in sections 1.1-1.3) FFIT entails costs, especially 
the loss of policy flexibility, which need to be factored into each country’s 
strategic policy decisions. In particular, while some countries can afford to lose 
their monetary policy flexibility in order to achieve low inflation others cannot 
because their economies are too fragile. Finally, a small number of privileged 
countries can afford to preserve their policy flexibility while, at the same time, 
maintaining low inflation rates. Carare and Stone’s study implies that monetary 
policy choices are constrained by the material differences between countries, and 
these differences are determined by their distinct levels of development, 
institutional arrangements, trajectory and economic problems.  
 
In spite of these valuable conclusions, Carare and Stone do not directly 
acknowledge the decisive role of these material constraints in the determination of 
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 Carare and Stone (2003, p.24). 
45
 Carare and Stone (2003, pp.3-4). For Stone and Bhundia (2004, p.10), ‘[i]nflation targeting lite 
can be viewed as a transitional monetary regime aiming at maintaining monetary stability until the 
implementation of structural reforms in support of a single nominal anchor’. 
46
 Carare and Stone (2003, p.5). 
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economic policy. Instead, their attempt to grapple with these constraints is marred 
by the substitution of the wholly subjective concept of ‘credibility’ for measures 
of institutional development, financial fragility and external vulnerability. In other 
words, Carare and Stone’s use of ‘credibility’ to underpin their classification of 
policy regimes obscures the role of other, more relevant variables that are trapped 
in the background. 
 
1.4.3 – Summing Up 
 
Although there is some scope for disagreement with the classification schemes 
used in the available studies, a growing number of countries has been turning to 
IT and CBI as their preferred monetary policy framework.47 While IT is not 
formally sponsored by the international financial institutions, even the most 
cursory perusal of IMF publications will reveal a favourable assessment of this 
policy regime. The Fund is even more bullish about the potential advantages of 
CBI, and the central banks of several poor countries have been granted operational 
autonomy or independence in the context of their recent agreements with the 
IMF.48 This is partly a reflection of the growing popularity and academic prestige 
of the NMPC around the world. 
 
Given their growing popularity and prestige, it is odd that a vast literature has 
failed to confirm beyond reasonable doubt the superior performance of IT and 
CBI regimes. The conflicting evidence in numerous studies seems to indicate that 
IT and CBI can make only a minor (if any) contribution to performance 
improvement in such diverse areas as credibility, expectations, inflation rates, 
output growth, interest rates and the sacrifice ratio).49  
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 See Agénor (2001, pp.40-1). 
48
 See IMF (2002). 
49
 See Chang and Grabel (2004, p.183).  
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These statistical difficulties may be due to four reasons. First, it is extremely 
difficult to classify policy regimes objectively as the starting point for the 
investigation of performance differences. Countries can be grouped according to 
whether or not they follow explicit IT policies, or whether or not their central 
banks follow hierarchical or dual mandates. They can be regrouped according to 
their ‘explicit’ or ‘implicit’ inflation targeting strategies, or rearranged into full-
fledged, eclectic or ‘lite’ inflation targeters. It is even more difficult to classify 
countries according to the degree of autonomy of their central banks (see section 
3.5). If one also controls for the structural differences between the economies 
being contrasted, as is essential for any meaningful study, the available samples 
become insignificantly small making meaningful comparisons impossible. 
 
Second, IT and CBI experiences are relatively new in most countries. For 
example, Stone and Bhundia (2004) list twenty FFIT countries, only five of which 
targeting inflation for more than ten years.50 Another five have been targeting for 
more than five years,51 and ten for an even shorter period.52 It is impossible to 
draw meaningful conclusions based on these short and disparate sample periods. 
This limitation implies that it is impossible to reject the hypothesis that IT and 
CBI countries simply reverted towards the mean – i.e., their superior performance, 
even if it could be demonstrated, is simply a statistical fluke.  
 
Third, and related to the previous point, even the supporters of IT admit that this is 
not an inflation stabilisation strategy. Consequently, although high inflation 
countries may be more inclined to adopt IT, they can do so only after a successful 
disinflation programme that is entirely unrelated to IT. On adoption, the ITR will 
almost invariably inherit declining inflation rates, growing monetary policy 
credibility and, quite possibly (if their economies have been in the doldrums for 
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 Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and the UK. 
51
 Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, Israel and Poland. 
52
 Colombia, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, South Korea 
and Thailand. 
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long periods) healthy economic growth rates. These favourable developments are 
causes of IT rather than its effects, and they need to be factored into the 
assessment of the performance of the ITR.53  
 
Fourth, the last fifteen years have been relatively tranquil by post-Bretton Woods 
standards. Although growth rates have deteriorated steadily, inflation has been 
declining strongly almost everywhere (see Boxes 1, 2 and 3, appendix B). 
Although several countries have experienced profound economic crises recently 
these were mostly due to exchange rate and balance of payments difficulties; high 
inflation is no longer a problem in the vast majority of countries. 
These features of the world economy create problems for the assessment of IT and 
CBI regimes, because it is extremely difficult to assess the impact of different 
economic policies on performance under relatively stable circumstances at home 
and abroad. In other words, in the absence of economic turbulence the range of 
possibly successful policies is too broad to permit discrimination between them, 
and IT ‘may have had little impact over what any sensible strategy could have 
achieved’.54 The most obvious grounds on which to distinguish country 
performances is not even their policies, but their structural economic features.55  
 
In conclusion, IT and CBI seem to have little or no influence in economic 
performance, and the performance differences that can actually be observed were 
due to other reasons.56 Why, then, does the mainstream economic discourse place 
so much emphasis on IT and CBI? This question cannot be addressed in this 
paper, but three contributing factors can be easily identified. First, mainstream 
theory is structurally predisposed to see value in IT and CBI, since they share the 
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 See Arestis and Sawyer (2005). 
54
 Arestis and Sawyer (2005). 
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 ‘IT emerging market economies (EMEs) have had a relatively worse performance. In these 
countries, deviations from both central targets and upper bounds are larger and more common ... 
[I]n comparison to developed economies, the volatilities of all variables – inflation, exchange rate, 
output and interest rate – and the inflation level are higher in EMEs’ (Fraga et al 2003, pp.4, 8). 
56
 See Arestis and Sawyer (2005). 
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same methodological foundations (real-monetary dichotomy, quantitativism, and 
so on; see section 1.1). Second, IT and CBI are fashionable, and they have 
become part of the ‘common sense’ of our age. Therefore, these policy 
recommendations tend to creep unthinkingly into even heterodox discourse (see 
section 2.1).57 Third, IT and CBI unwittingly promote the interests of domestic 
and international finance, which ensures that these policy recommendations will 
tend to find support among an extraordinarily powerful constituency (see sections 
3.5 and 3.6). 
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 For example, Fontana and Palácio-Vera (2002) find a ‘growing consensus’ between the NMPC 
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2 – Inflation Theory and Policy in the NMPC 
 
The inflation theory underpinning the NMPC and the ensuing policy 
recommendations are open to question on several counts, reviewed below. They 
include the theory of inflation, its economic implications, and the potential costs 
of inflation. These aspects of the NMPC are critically discussed below. 
 
2.1 – The Theory of Inflation 
 
The NMPC is fashionable. It incorporates the most advanced economic theory, is 
attractively packaged, and its policy recommendations are easy to understand and 
defend. These policies promote powerful interests which can also be presented as 
the ‘common good’ (see section 3) – and it has been claimed that these policies 
work (see, however, section 1.4). In what follows, the inflation theory 
underpinning the NMPC is scrutinised from four angles, ‘economics fashions’, 
fashionable theories of inflation, their implications for anti-inflation policy, and 
other insufficiencies of mainstream inflation theory. 
 
2.1.1 – Economics Fashions 
 
Economic theory is regularly afflicted by changing fashions. The rise and decline 
of economics fashions is determined by several factors. They include external 
events, especially the internal development of economic theory (as was shown in 
section 1.1.4, in the case of CBI and IT), economic fluctuations (instability and 
underperformance favour the development of new ideas, such as Keynesianism in 
the thirties and monetarism in the late sixties and early seventies, while booms 
tends to consolidate the prestige of the current fashions), structural social changes 
and other macro-social developments (e.g., the Welfare State left its imprint in 
several branches of economic theory), and the incorporation of exciting 
developments outside economics.  
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At a macro or long-term level, Keynesianism was fashionable between the thirties 
and the sixties, monetarism in the seventies, new classical economics in the 
eighties, and new Keynesianism and new institutionalism in the nineties. At a 
micro or short-term level, the growing popularity of chaos theory in physics and 
mathematics encouraged attempts to introduce chaotic models into economics in 
the late eighties and early nineties regardless of their relevance or applicability, 
while the ‘latest’ econometric technique regularly influences the direction and 
content of economic research whether or not they can contribute to the progress of 
economic analysis.1  
 
In spite of these reservations, economics fashions are not necessarily dangerous or 
wrong, and they can contribute to the long-term progress of economics. However, 
the theoretical insights and economic policies suggested by the latest fad must be 
internally consistent and empirically useful. Even in this case, practitioners and 
policy-makers must be prepared to abandon them once the material conditions 
underpinning their applicability have changed.2 Both problems have plagued the 
mainstream theory of inflation during the last half century. 
 
2.1.2 – Fashionable Theories of Inflation 
 
Mainstream claims for the identification of a ‘general’ theory of inflation have 
appeared at frequent intervals, usually in connection with long-term economics 
fashions. For example, in the postwar (Keynesian) ‘golden age’ inflation was 
normally assumed to be due to cost pressures, especially rising wages and balance 
of payments difficulties. Policy recommendations included incomes policies and 
adjustments to the Bretton Woods System, to allow different rates of productivity 
growth to be absorbed by changes in the exchange rates rather than through rising 
inflation, unemployment or different GDP growth rates. Between the late sixties 
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 Fine (2001, ch.7) reviews the role of economics fashions in the context of social capital. 
2
 See, in this context, the excellent study by Watson (2002). 
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and the early eighties inflationary pressures were assumed to result from adverse 
supply shocks, excess money supply growth and excessively optimistic 
assumptions about the stability of the Phillips curve. Many mainstream 
economists turned towards monetarism, and advised governments to avoid 
tampering with the Phillips curve, reform the labour market to increase 
‘flexibility’ and cut costs, and impose money supply targets in order to bring 
inflation under control.3  
 
Unfortunately for the monetarists, the experiences in Germany, Switzerland, the 
UK, the US and elsewhere did not vindicate their claims that money supply 
targeting was either feasible or conducive to inflation stabilisation.4 In addition to 
these practical difficulties, monetarist theory was badly damaged by the severe 
criticisms inflicted by new classical, Keynesian and radical political economists.5 
Briefly, the Keynesians and the radical political economists argued, first, that the 
velocity of money and the money demand function are unstable and, therefore, 
that the relationship between money supply and nominal income is unpredictable. 
Therefore, even if money supply targeting were feasible it would be insufficient to 
control inflation. 
 
Second, although there is always some relationship between changes in the stock 
of money and changes in the price level, this does not imply that the growth of the 
money stock determines the rate of inflation. Therefore, money supply targeting 
can help to squeeze inflation out of the economy, but only slowly and unreliably, 
and potentially at a high cost. Third, government attempts in the seventies and 
eighties to control the money supply while, at the same time, liberalising the 
financial system and the capital account of the balance of payments were self-
defeating. Liberalisation modified the monetary transmission process and the links 
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 See, inter alia, Laidler (1981) and Laidler and Parkin (1975). 
4
 See Arestis and Sawyer (1998b). 
5
 For an overview of these debates, see Carlin and Soskice (1990), Levacic and Rebmann (1982) 
and Sawyer (1989). 
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between money, finance and output. It also created incentives for the development 
of a whole host of financial instruments that blurred the definition of the monetary 
aggregates and bypassed the existing controls over the supply of money, throwing 
the entire exercise into confusion.6 The new classical economists also criticised 
heavily the monetarist experiment. In spite of their general agreement with the 
monetarist theory of inflation, the new classicals claimed that the policy shift 
towards money supply targeting induced changes in private sector behaviour that 
invalidated the predictions of the existing econometric models. Therefore, the 
monetarist policy recommendations were doubtful, and they may even be 
unhelpful.  
 
The shortcomings of monetarism and the heavy criticisms levelled by its 
opponents contributed to the development of a vast literature on inflation and 
stabilisation since the mid-eighties, mostly drawing upon the monetarist and new 
classical theories of inflation (see section 1.1). In the absence of significant wage 
pressures or major supply shocks during this period, inflation has become 
increasingly associated with fiscal deficits and, especially, with the lack of 
government policy credibility. This diagnosis of inflation led to recommendations 
for increasing credibility, and introducing nominal anchors (initially exchange rate 
and, later, inflation targeting) in order to thwart the government’s incentive to 
surprise the public with unexpected inflation. These recommendations were 
usually accompanied by pressures for CBI and trade and capital account 
liberalisation in order to dismantle selected features of the Welfare State, increase 
labour market flexibility even further, curtail the remaining sources of labour 
 
                                                          
 
 
6
 These criticisms were eventually accepted by the mainstream: ‘monetary targeting requires 
adequate knowledge of the parameters characterizing the demand for money. In an economy 
undergoing rapid financial liberalization, however, these parameters (notably the interest elasticity 
of money demand) may be highly unstable. In such conditions money ceases to be a good 
predictor of future inflation; that is, the relation between the intermediate target and the final 
objective becomes unstable. Similarly, in a context of disinflation, the demand for money may be 
subject to large and unpredictable shifts; as a consequence, the information content of money for 
future inflation will be very low. Both arguments suggest that relying on monetary aggregates can 
be potentially risky’ (Agénor 2001, pp.19-20). See also Mishkin (1998, p.14). 
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unrest and impose finance-friendly forms of fiscal and monetary policy discipline 
on presumably reluctant governments (see section 3).7  
 
In the mid-nineties, the NMPC had already become fashionable and the 
hegemonic framework informing anti-inflation policy. This policy regime was 
perceived to be the most conducive to the consolidation of the low inflation 
regime recently achieved in the rich countries. The NMPC also seemed to have 
something to offer to the middle-income and poor countries, even though their 
central banks generally lack experience supervising complex, liberalised and 
internationally integrated financial systems (which were, nevertheless, being 
imposed by external as well as internal pressure). In these countries, the NMPC 
can presumably deliver greater economic stability, institutional transparency, 
objective monetary policy rules, standardised channels for the diffusion of 
information and, hopefully, lower the costs of international financial integration 
(see section 4). 
 
2.1.3 – Economics Fashions and Anti-Inflation Policy 
 
The shift of inflation theory away from Keynesianism and towards monetarist 
views (including its successors, such as the NMPC) had three significant 
implications for economic policy-making. First, it has fostered the prominence of 
monetary or excess demand factors at the expense of supply or cost factors. This 
is unfortunate, because detailed studies of inflation generally find that both 
aspects are essential. In order to explain sustained inflationary episodes simplistic 
descriptions of the government’s fiscal, monetary, exchange rate and financial 
policy stance are rarely sufficient. It is also necessary to take into consideration 
the country’s position in the international division of labour, the structure of the 
local value chains (including the degree of oil dependence, the relations between 
industry and agriculture, and so on), their vulnerability to adverse terms of trade 
 
                                                          
 
 
7
 See Gowan (1999), Panitch and Gindin (2005) and Rude (2005). 
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movements, the system of labour relations, the economy’s wage and price-setting 
mechanisms, the influence of distributional conflicts, and other factors. 
 
Although mainstream economics does not deny the potential influence of these 
factors, it tends to dismiss their long-term implications or to claim that, at the end 
of the day, they are irrelevant because all inflationary pressures can be neutralised 
by monetary policy. This is questionable. Experience suggests, first, that each 
time that a ‘general’ theory of inflation has been identified, it has been a 
fashionably different theory. It follows that none of these theories were really 
general, as would be demonstrated by their failure to interpret the onset of new 
inflationary pressures, and their eventual inability to inform economic policy.  
 
Second, inflation changes over time and differs across countries and regions.8 It is 
therefore unlikely that any ‘general’ theory of inflation is possible, or that ‘one 
size fits all’ anti-inflation policies can be efficient (least cost), even if they are 
effective (capable of eliminating high or unstable inflation). Each inflationary 
episode is unique, and efficient anti-inflation policies will tend to combine distinct 
policies operating at different levels.  
 
Moreover, even if a given anti-inflation policy is optimal in a given context, its 
efficiency and effectiveness could be entirely different in another set of 
circumstances. In sum, following the latest fashion can help to increase one’s 
credibility, which is valuable in itself, but popularity could be a poor guide to 
economic policy. 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
8
 For example, the French economy experienced very similar rates of inflation in the early sixties 
and in the late eighties and early nineties, but no economist would claim that they indicate that the 
underlying circumstances and the government’s policies were identical during these periods. By 
the same token many Latin American countries and several Eastern European and former Soviet 
countries experienced very high rates of inflation in the late eighties and early nineties, but their 
causes were profoundly different. 
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2.1.4 – Other Insufficiencies of Mainstream Inflation Theory 
 
It was shown above and in section 1.1 that mainstream inflation theory 
distinguishes between a ‘technical’ monetary policy, drawing upon the real-
monetary dichotomy, and a ‘political’ fiscal policy, that can be time-inconsistent 
and create an inflation bias. However, this distinction is untenable for two reasons. 
 
First, fiscal and monetary policies are inseparable. Contractionary monetary 
policy does not simply slows down the economy and mechanically reduces 
inflation. It also increases the cost of the domestic debt service, which has an 
immediate fiscal impact especially if the public debt is already large or if the 
state’s budget constraint is tight. High interest rates also increase the private 
sector’s borrowing costs, which affects the unemployment rate, the level and 
composition of the output (highly leveraged firms and relatively unprofitable 
sectors will tend to be penalised more heavily), and the state’s tax revenues. They 
create incentives for foreign borrowing and capital inflows, which requires 
sterilisation and can create large fiscal costs. They also redistribute income 
towards finance. In extreme circumstances monetary policy tightening may trigger 
a financial crisis, with severe consequences for fiscal policy and the economy as a 
whole. It is simply wrong to presume that one part of economic policy is sealed 
off in a neutral ‘technical’ department, while the ‘political’ department only is 
involved in the rough-and-tumble of daily politics, and should be answerable to 
the voters.  
 
Second, the mainstream assumption that governments tend to follow time-
inconsistent policies is also untenable, because it contradicts the rational 
expectations hypothesis. Rational economic agents should know that there is no 
long-term trade-off between inflation and unemployment – so why should they, as 
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voters, irrationally elect such a scheming government in the first place?9 This 
contradiction is important because the time-inconsistency hypothesis underpins 
the demand for an independent central bank – a public institution funded by the 
taxpayers but impervious to ‘irrational’ social or electoral pressures.  
 
This logical difficulty brings to light the undemocratic implications of mainstream 
inflation theory. This theory departs from the assumption that the economic agents 
can be represented by a single individual who, being rational, is also a 
neoclassical economist. This definitional sleight of hand turns the mainstream 
economists into the intellectual guardians of social welfare, regardless of the 
wishes of the electorate, the political process, or the social and political divisions 
that may exist in the real world.10 These implications of mainstream inflation 
theory – including the NMPC – are incompatible with the most basic principles of 
representative democracy and political accountability. Milton Friedman was 
therefore right when he said that ‘money is too important to be left to the central 
bankers’.11 There is simply no substitute to democratic policy-making and the 
openness and accountability of the public institutions (see section 5). 
 
Mainstream inflation theory is not only inconsistent and undemocratic; it also 
operates at an excessively high level of abstraction. This makes the theory 
uninformative and excessively general, and leads to ‘horizontal’ anti-inflation 
policies (e.g., money supply, exchange rate or inflation targeting) that fail to 
distinguish the role of the ‘vertical’ (sector and historically specific) features of 
 
                                                          
 
 
9
 ‘It is true that the model argues that democracy brings a cost with no economic benefit. But the 
behaviour which generates the cost is entirely lacking in a rationale. In the model one [political] 
party has a greater desire than the other to reduce unemployment, but the assumed structure of the 
economy means this can manifest itself only as a higher rate of inflation. Thus, fundamentally, the 
electorate are choosing rates of inflation. The difficulty is that no explanation is offered as to why 
parties favouring different rates of inflation continue to exist when voters understand that inflation 
brings no benefits. The parties are in effect being exogenously given policies which do not make 
sense in the context of the model, whereas one would have expected the members of the pro-
inflation party, recognising that it brings no benefit, to change the policy’ (Forder 2003, pp.22-3). 
10
 See Watson (2002, p.187). 
11
 Cited in Chowdhury (2004a, p.25). 
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specific inflationary episodes. This bias towards excess abstraction is, in part, a 
reflection of the insufficiencies of mainstream economics, which is structured 
around ‘equilibrium’ positions determined simultaneously by all the variables in 
the system. In this case, it is difficult to ascertain the causes of disequilibrium 
(e.g., persistent inflation) in a logically consistent manner, and to devise specific, 
low cost policies to address them. 
 
Finally, mainstream theory is also misleading. It purports to be ‘neutral’ and to 
advocate technically ‘efficient’ solutions to severe economic problems but, in fact, 
it fosters the narrow interests of finance above all others (see sections 3.5 and 3.6). 
Policies inspired by the mainstream approach detract from the achievement of 
MDGs, and they should be replaced by pro-poor alternatives (see section 5.3). 
 
2.2 – Economic Implications of Inflation 
 
Given the strong emphasis of mainstream theory on the costs of inflation (see 
section 1.1.1), it may seem surprising to find how thin is the literature addressing 
this issue. This section briefly considers four potential macroeconomic 
implications of inflation, without any attempt to quantify their potential trade-offs. 
They include the relationship between inflation, growth and unemployment, the 
costs of moderate inflation, and the distributive and financial implications of 
inflation. 
 
2.2.1 – Inflation, Growth and Unemployment 
 
It was shown in sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 that mainstream theory claims that there 
is a short-term trade-off only between inflation, growth and unemployment, but 
there is no long-term trade-off. It also claims that high and variable inflation 
carries significant costs in terms of growth and unemployment. In this case, it may 
be worth paying a substantial short-term cost to reduce inflation, in order to enjoy 
higher growth rates and levels of welfare in the long-term.  
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Take, for example, the study by Ghosh and Phillips (1998) examining the 
relationship between inflation, disinflation and output growth in IMF member 
countries between 1960 and 1996. The main findings of this study were, first, that 
inflation is ‘one of the most important determinants of GDP growth (second only 
to physical and human capital).’12 Moreover, ‘of the various factors that might 
affect growth, perhaps none is as readily changed in the short-run as the inflation 
rate’,13 suggesting that anti-inflation policy can play an important role in the 
promotion of sustainable growth.  
 
Second, there is a ‘statistically significant and ... economically interesting’ 
negative relationship between inflation and growth. Although part of this 
relationship may stem ‘from effects of growth on inflation, we still find a 
statistically and economically significant relationship between inflation and GDP 
growth when we use several sets of instruments to control for such 
simultaneity’.14  
 
Third, this relationship is nonlinear, in two senses: ‘at very low inflation rates ... 
inflation and growth are positively correlated. Otherwise, inflation and growth are 
negatively correlated’. Moreover, ‘the decline in growth associated with an 
increase from 10 percent to 20 percent inflation is much larger than that associated 
with moving from 40 percent to 50 percent inflation’.15 This implies that there is 
‘an optimal or growth-maximizing rate of inflation’ around 2-3 per cent per 
annum (this kink cannot be identified precisely, but it is certainly below 5 per 
cent).16  
 
Fourth, disinflation is not bad for growth; in fact, the ‘short-run growth costs of 
disinflation are only relevant for the most severe disinflations, or when the initial 
 
                                                          
 
 
12
 Ghosh and Phillips (1998, p.675). 
13
 Ghosh and Phillips (1998, p.708). 
14
 Ghosh and Phillips (1998, p.674). 
15
 Ghosh and Phillips (1998, p.674); see also p.678. 
16
 Ghosh and Phillips (1998, p.697). 
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inflation rate is well within the single-digit range’.17 However, starting ‘from 
inflation rates above 6 percent, only the most drastic disinflations (at least halving 
the inflation rate in a single year) are associated with any negative impact on 
growth (which itself is largely offset by the higher growth associated with the new 
lower level of inflation)’.18  
 
Findings such as these have been questioned by a substantial literature, not always 
heterodox. For example, it has been claimed that there is no statistically 
significant relationship between inflation and growth,19 that disinflation does carry 
significant short-term costs,20 that moderate inflation is not bad for growth (see 
section 2.2.2), that inflation is not always costly for the poor (see section 2.2.3), 
and that estimates of the costs of inflation systematically ignore the costs of 
unemployment, stagnation and technological backwardness (see section 3). 
 
If there is a trade-off between inflation, growth and unemployment it must be both 
elusive and unstable, as is shown by the conflicting evidence found in the 
literature and the frequently changing estimates of the ‘equilibrium’ rate of 
unemployment in most economies.21 Mainstream studies often generalise on the 
basis of a few cases of extremely high inflation in which growth was 
simultaneously compromised, and where the resumption of growth was 
accompanied by the elimination of high inflation. It is certainly likely that very 
high inflation creates obstacles to growth; in these cases, stabilisation could 
facilitate the growth of output and productivity. However, high inflation and low 
growth rates could be merely symptoms of other economic problems (e.g., the 
process of transition in the former socialist countries), in which case stabilisation 
per se may not be conducive to the resumption of growth. 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
17
 Ghosh and Phillips (1998, p.672). 
18
 Ghosh and Phillips (1998, p.675). 
19
 See Kirkpatrick and Nixson (1987) and the references therein. 
20
 See Dornbusch and Fischer (1991).  
21
 See Arestis and Sawyer (2005, table 2). 
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It is likely that a general trade-off between inflation, growth and unemployment is 
simply non-existent, since economies are known to grow rapidly for long periods 
– often for several years – with stable or falling unemployment, and without any 
significant inflationary pressures (see Box 4, appendix B). In other words, this 
trade-off cannot simply be assumed to exist, or even be ‘demonstrated’ through 
panel data analysis. Since the relationship between these variables is likely to shift 
significantly depending on the structural and institutional features of the economy, 
its stage in the cycle and the state’s economic policies, this trade-off has to be 
shown to exist (or not) for each economy, and in every period. It would be 
misguided to design economic policy under the assumption that there is a stable 
and universally valid trade-off between inflation, growth and unemployment, 
since none may be present. 
 
The case for the superiority of price stability can also be questioned on the basis 
of estimates of this presumed trade-off. For example, Forder (2003, p.14) reports 
that holding the US unemployment rate 1 per cent below the NAIRU for a year 
results in an increase in inflation of only 0.3 per cent.  
 
Alternatively, suppose that Milton Friedman is right, and that it takes many years 
for expected inflation to catch up with reality. If a country adopts a policy of 
gradually raising inflation over thirty years, and manages to keep unemployment 
two per cent below its natural rate during the entire period, 
 
we can perform a thoroughly back of the envelope cost-benefit calculation. 
Over the 30 year period, the total of output in excess of the natural level 
will be about 60% of one year’s GDP. At a rate of return of 5%, that extra 
output, if invested, is worth 3% of GDP per year in perpetuity. On the cost 
side we have an equilibrium rate of inflation of 10%. The question, 
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therefore, is whether we would think such an increment in income is worth 
the price of the inflation.22  
 
Finally, suppose that there is a natural rate of unemployment but this rate is 
unknown at any point in time. It may therefore be worthwhile to adopt a policy of 
‘cautious expansionism’, testing the limits of growth even at some risk of 
increasing inflation, especially if the cost of inflation is not extraordinarily high 
(as was claimed above).23 
 
None of these arguments indicates that inflation is ‘good’. Rather, they highlight 
the fact that there may be choices to be made about the priority and intensity to be 
given to inflation control. These are not simply ‘technical’ issues, and the benefits 
of low inflation do not necessarily trump every conceivable alternative, every 
time. 
 
2.2.2 – Moderate Inflation 
 
Several studies indicate that moderate inflation, around 10-40 per cent per annum, 
does not always have negative economic consequences, and does not tend to 
accelerate. Moderate inflation is not associated with slower growth, lower 
investment, higher unemployment, less foreign direct investment, or the 
deterioration of any other important real variables.24 It is even possible that 
moderate inflation will help to sustain economic growth, especially when there is 
excess capacity and significant unemployment or underemployment.  
 
It has also not been shown convincingly that moderate inflation is harmful either 
to the poor, or for the distribution of income (see section 2.2.3). Quite the 
 
                                                          
 
 
22
 Forder (n.d.). 
23
 This suggestion made by Joseph Stiglitz is cited by Forder (n.d.). 
24
 See, for example, Bruno (1985), Bruno and Easterly (1996), Chang and Grabel (2004, ch.11), 
Dornbusch and Fischer (1991), Epstein and Yeldan (2004) and Rao (2002). 
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contrary, moderate inflation has been reported to be associated with higher 
incomes for the poorest, and monetary contraction with a worsening of the relative 
position of the poor.25 In fact, several studies claim that excessively low inflation 
can be bad for growth, especially if prices and wages are sticky downwards (see 
sections 2.2.1, 3.1 and 4.5).  
 
In sum, it seems, first, that the relationship between inflation and growth is non-
linear. Second, the optimal rate of inflation can change in space and in time, and it 
may even be positively correlated with the rate of economic growth:  
 
While some will interpret this as a licence for big spending, huge deficits 
and hyperinflation, we simply point out that there is no strong evidence in 
support of the argument that very low inflation is either pro-growth or pro-
poor. Actually, too low an inflation rate can be as harmful to the poor as 
too high a rate of inflation.26 
 
Third, even though high inflation can harm the poor, excessively low inflation and 
conventional stabilisation policies can have the same result (see section 3). 
Therefore, there seem to be no grounds to claim that inflation should always be 
maintained in the 0-5 per cent range, as tends to be the case in IT countries (see 
Box 4).27  
 
2.2.3 – The Distributive Implications of Inflation 
 
Mainstream theory traditionally claims that inflation is especially costly for the 
poor (see section 1.1.1). This is because the earnings of the poor (mainly wages, 
pensions and benefits) are fixed in nominal terms, and they tend to be easily 
eroded by inflation. The poor also hold a larger share of their assets in liquid form 
 
                                                          
 
 
25
 Forder (2003, pp.16-17); see also Vandemoortele (2004, p.13) and Weeks et al (2002). 
26
 Vandemoortele (2004, p.13). 
27
 See McKinley (2003). 
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when compared to the rich, and these assets are immediately devalued by 
inflation. Finally, the poor find it difficult to hedge against inflation because they 
lack access to the financial system.28 
 
These losses are probably true.29 However, this is not the full picture. First, many 
poor people, especially in rural areas, are relatively less exposed to the monetary 
economy and less dependent on cash earnings than the (possibly less poor) urban 
population. Second, the poor are often net debtors, and inflation may reduce their 
debt burden. Third, if the relative price of food increases through inflation at least 
some of the poor might benefit, if they are net food producers. Fourth, experiences 
in Latin America have indicated that it is the middle-class that is especially 
vulnerable to high inflation, because they are highly dependent on monetary 
exchanges, have little surplus cash to invest and do not have much access to own 
produced basic goods.30  
 
Finally, numerous studies show that the poor are heavily and disproportionately 
penalised by conventional (mainstream) disinflation programmes.31 These 
programmes normally generate absolute as well as relative losses for the poor, 
that is, they tend to make the poor poorer and the rich relatively (if not absolutely) 
richer. This is because they reduce the rate of economic growth and the real 
wages, increase the rate of unemployment and the cost of debt, and eliminate 
protective labour regulations that previously helped to protect the standard of 
living of the poor (see section 4).  
 
It seems that there is no linear or stable relationship between inflation and the 
distribution of income, in either the short or the long-run. This relationship is 
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 For an overview of these arguments see, for example, Pasha and Palanivel (2004, p.13) and 
Sahay, Cashin and Mauro (2001, p.6). 
29
 Sahay, Cashin and Mauro (2001, p.6) claim that although inflation erodes the poor’s wages, the 
confiscation of their savings is not especially serious because they hold little cash.  
30
 See Pasha and Palanivel (2004, p.13) and Vandemoortele (2004, p.13). 
31
 See, for example, Garuda (2000), Pastor (1987) and Vreeland (2002). 
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indirect and highly complex, and simplistic claims that inflation is always worse 
for the poor tend to draw on a small number of unrepresentative cases. Moderate 
inflation, in particular, seems to have no significant impact on poverty or 
distribution, if one controls for the rate of economic growth.32 In their careful 
study of inflation, growth and poverty in Asia, Pasha and Palanivel conclude that: 
 
The lack of sensitivity of poverty to inflation is one of the potentially more 
important findings of [this] paper. It highlights that the trade-off faced by 
policies, fiscal or monetary, between growth and inflation from the 
viewpoint of impact of poverty is not as severe as has traditionally been 
thought. It appears that to the extent that expansionary policies are resorted 
to with the objective of stimulating the process of growth, then any 
resulting inflation is likely to be less damaging on poverty. This clearly 
strengthens the case for pursuing expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies at a time when space already exists, as inflation rates are currently 
low throughout the region.33 
 
Similarly, Bulíř (2001) claims that the distributive impact of inflation is non-
linear, that is, inflation increases income inequality, but this effect is strongest at 
very high rates of inflation: 
 
[H]yperinflation dramatically worsens income distribution ... countries 
with either high or low inflation have Gini coefficients that are lower by 
about 7 or 8 Gini points, respectively, than countries with hyperinflation.34  
 
There seems to be a kink in the impact of inflation on distribution at very low 
rates of inflation. This kink works both ways, implying that a reduction in 
inflation from hyperinflationary levels reduces income inequality significantly, 
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 See Pasha and Palanivel (2004, pp.14-15). 
33
 Pasha and Palanivel (2004, pp.15-16). 
34
 Bulíř (2001, p.151). 
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but further disinflation towards very low rates of inflation bring about negligible 
distributive gains.35  
 
Although these distributive effects are statistically significant, Bulíř points out that 
they are small: 
 
There is little reason to assume that changes in inflation can cause a major 
swing in a country’s income distribution rapidly. If this were so, we would 
observe much larger annual swings in income distribution because 
inflation is prone to cyclical fluctuations.36 
 
In other words, it would be misguided to try to address ingrained problems of 
poverty and inequality through anti-inflation policies. Serious attempts to alleviate 
poverty and improve the distribution of income require specific programmes 
involving several levels of government, rather than primarily or exclusively the 
monetary authorities (see section 5.3).  
 
Finally, it is curious that, even though the poor are supposed to lose heavily 
through inflation, it is finance that tends to complain most loudly about the 
damage caused by inflation, and to demand its elimination through mainstream 
stabilisation programmes, among them IT and CBI (see section 3). This may 
indicate that – regardless of who actually loses out from inflation – mainstream 
stabilisation programmes systematically favour finance:  
 
Independent central banks are structurally biased towards the interests of 
the financial community, an interest group for whom low inflation is of 
paramount importance. While there are other interest groups that are also 
harmed by inflation (e.g. those living on a fixed income, such as 
 
                                                          
 
 
35
 See Bulíř (2001, pp.139, 151, 154). 
36
 Bulíř (2001, p.146). 
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pensioners), the economic interests of the financial community are most 
directly and profoundly harmed by inflation. It is therefore unsurprising 
that the financial community – a community that is mobile, politically 
powerful, and maintains strong international ties – is such a forceful 
advocate of central bank independence, an institutional form that 
maximizes the opportunity for monetary policy that is in its interests.37 
 
In fact, 
 
the industrial community and export-oriented producers (and those 
employed in their enterprises) do not share with financiers an obsession 
with the prevention of inflation through restrictive monetary policy. 
Industrialists are often damaged by increases in borrowing costs that result 
from increases in interest rates. In addition, export-oriented producers are 
also often harmed by the appreciation of the domestic currency that results 
from an increase in interest rates ... Thus the distributional effects of the 
monetary policy pursued by independent central banks are far from 
neutral.38 
 
This insight may be substantiated by the positive relationship that seems to exist 
in many countries between high real interest rates (an essential element of 
mainstream stabilisation programmes) and high Gini coefficients (see Box 5, 
appendix B). 
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 Chang and Grabel (2004, pp.182-3). 
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 Chang and Grabel (2004, pp.183). 
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2.2.4 – The Financial Implications of Inflation 
 
Mainstream theory claims that inflation contributes to economic inefficiency and 
underperformance through demonetisation and the reduction of financial system 
depth.  
 
This is plausible, but it is not necessarily the end of the story. The financial 
consequences of inflation depend, among other things, on the structure of the 
monetary and financial systems, their relationship with the productive and foreign 
sectors, the sources and uses of saving, and the relationship between finance, 
industry and the state. For example, inflation could induce wealth holders to shift 
their savings from monetary and financial assets to investment in plant and 
equipment, which could assist the process of growth.39 Alternatively, inflation 
could create incentives for the development of index-linked financial assets that 
may help to deepen the financial system.40 It is impossible to draw generally valid 
conclusions, especially in cases of moderate inflation.  
 
2.2.5 – Summing Up 
 
This section has indicated that there are no grounds to presume that there is a 
general relationship between inflation and unemployment, growth, financial 
development or income distribution. It is also possible that moderate inflation may 
carry no significant costs, and it may even be conducive to faster growth. In 
contrast, excessively low inflation may be costly (there is no dispute about the 
negative implications of high inflation), and mainstream stabilisation programmes 
can be highly costly for the poor.  
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 See Chowdhury (2004a). 
40
 This seems to have been the case in Brazil, see Goldsmith (1986) and Lees, Botts and Cysne 
(1990). 
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In these circumstances, it would be unwise to impose on poor countries a rigid 
institutional framework compelling the central bank to pursue very low rates of 
inflation with little regard to the costs of this strategy and the costs of low 
inflation. After all, why should governments give absolute priority to possibly 
non-existent problems to the exclusion of really existing economic ills, and 
relentlessly promote inflation control as the cornerstone for a healthy economy 
when there is no consistent evidence supporting this claim? This misguided 
priority may be part of an attempt to foster on society the interests of the domestic 
and international financial sector. In this case, CBI and IT would be inimical to 
the achievement of pro-poor outcomes. This claim is discussed in the next section. 
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3 – The Costs of CBI and IT 
 
This section considers the potential costs of the NMPC. Six types of costs are 
considered below, the costs of low inflation, the costs of using interest rates to 
control inflation, the costs of conflicts between IT and balance of payments 
equilibrium, the costs of the central bank’s dual mandate, the costs of CBI and the 
costs of agency capture and financial bias. 
 
3.1 – The Cost of Targeting Very Low Inflation 
 
The first important cost of the NMPC is due to the imposition of invariably very 
low IT. The theoretical insufficiencies of the NMPC, reviewed in section 2.1, 
foster the view that governments should put in place institutional mechanisms to 
ensure that inflation will be permanently very low or zero.  
 
This is misguided, because excessively low and inflexible inflation targets can 
foster output volatility (as was shown in section 1.1.4), and they can lock the 
economy into a low-level equilibrium with low growth, high unemployment and 
intractable problems of poverty and inequality (see section 4.5). Moreover, 
permanently contractionary policies can also have negative distributive 
implications (see section 2.2.3), which is incompatible with MDGs and pro-poor 
objectives. 
 
3.2 – The Cost of High Real Interest Rates 
 
In the NMPC inflation control is achieved primarily through the manipulation of 
interest rates (see section 1.2). This implies that real interest rates tend to be 
higher under this policy regime than under an alternative regime in which other 
instruments play a more significant role in inflation control. 
 
There is no question that higher interest rates can reduce inflation. They do so, 
first, because they increase the costs of production, investment and consumption, 
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and they may trigger government spending cuts because of the greater cost of the 
domestic public debt service. The weakening of demand tends to compress the 
profit margins in the competitive sector of the economy (the oligopolistic firms 
may be able to increase prices in order to defend their profits, but this will be 
ignored below for simplicity).  
 
Higher financial costs may force highly leveraged or financially weaker firms into 
bankruptcy, regardless of their economic prospects, technical efficiency or 
strategic importance. The remaining firms could respond to these cost and demand 
pressures by reducing variable costs by inequitable and inefficient means. For 
example, they could find ways to reduce tax payments, increase the intensity of 
work or the unpaid working hours (in order to compel the employed workers to 
work for their dismissed colleagues), increase the turnover of labour (to hire 
cheaper workers), increase the degree of informalisation of the workforce (since 
informal workers tend to earn lower wages and lack social security and 
employment protection), and so on. 
 
These economic changes will shift the structure of the economy. Finance will tend 
to gain (see below), and other shifts may affect the relationship between the 
tradable and non-tradable sectors, industry and agriculture, and the sub-sectors 
within them. The impact of higher interest rates cannot be anticipated in the 
abstract, because it depends on the initial structure of the economy, the response 
of the exchange rates, the pattern of demand, the responses of the export and 
import sectors, and other variables. 
 
In this framework, it is possible that when growth finally resumes firms may 
attempt to restore their profit margins, possibly triggering an inflation bubble. 
Although this bubble would tend to blow itself over, it may trigger a knee-jerk 
response by the central bank through another round of interest rate increases. In 
this case, the recovery may be throttled, and the economy may be eventually 
locked into a low-growth, high-unemployment trap (see section 4.5).  
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Finally, macroeconomic policies are not distributionally neutral. Higher interest 
rates can transfer income in two ways, firstly from industrial profit to rentiers and, 
secondly, from workers to capital (see section 2.2.3). In their careful study of the 
distributional impact of high interest rates in the US and the UK between 1963 
and 1997, Argitis and Pitelis identify both effects. They argue that higher interest 
rates increase production costs, transfer income from industrial capital to finance, 
and reduce the share of industrial capital in non-wage income. Later, the industrial 
capitalists may try to recoup their losses by raising prices, if the market conditions 
are favourable, or they may try to reduce unit wage costs by extracting more 
labour for the same wage (as was explained above). In order to offset its higher 
interest costs industrial capital will tend to demand more flexible labour markets 
(and, possibly, lower import barriers, since cheap imports can overwhelm labour 
resistance very effectively1). If the industrial capitalists are successful, the non-
wage income share will increase, while the workers’ share will fall as a result of 
the higher interest rates.2  
 
In the US and the UK (and elsewhere) higher interest rates were not imposed by 
market processes. Rather, they were introduced by governments as part of a 
macroeconomic management strategy. These policies contributed to a significant 
shift of the distribution of income towards non-wage income in general, and 
finance in particular: 
 
The money lending interest rate appears to be the most important 
determinant of the industrial profit share ... Monetary policy ... [is] a 
channel through which intracapitalist distributional conflicts directly affect 
the distribution of non-wage income between industrial and financial 
capital. The implementation of a restrictive monetary policy ... will 
redistribute non-wage income in favour of the financial capital ... The 
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 See Argitis and Pitelis (2001, pp.625-6) and Saad-Filho (2005). 
2
 Argitis and Pitelis (2001, pp.620-2). 
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opposite distributional effects will occur if monetary policy is 
expansionary.3 
 
The imposition of these restrictive monetary policies is simultaneously a reflex of 
the growing power of finance, and it fosters the further increase of the power of 
this social group.4 However, both the concentration of power in the hands of 
finance and the concentration of income in the hands of the capitalist sector are 
inimical to pro-poor outcomes. If high interest rate policies systematically foster 
these outcomes, they should not play a prominent part in pro-poor economic 
strategies and, specifically, in pro-poor disinflation programmes. 
 
3.3 – The Cost of Conflicts between IT and Balance of Payments Equilibrium 
 
Open economies have more trouble pursuing IT, especially if they are poor (see 
section 4). This is because some of their policy instruments must be committed to 
maintaining a sustainable balance of payments position (unless they can print 
international currency, but this is the privilege of only a small number of nations), 
dealing with external shocks and contending with the additional channels linking 
policy variables and outcomes (for example, the employment effect of exchange 
rate changes).5  
 
These economies are also unable to target both inflation and the exchange rate 
simultaneously, because an economy can have only one nominal anchor (see 
section 1.1.3). Having said this, IT is also incompatible with completely freely 
floating exchange rates, because they generate too much instability and can wreak 
 
                                                          
 
 
3
 Argitis and Pitelis (2001, p.632); see also pp.626 and 628 and Rao (2002). 
4
 Argitis and Pitelis (2001, p.629). 
5
 ‘Insofar as the additional exchange rate channel linking interest rates to inflation changes the 
structure of policy lags, openness also requires rethinking the relative weights on inflation and 
output in the [central bank’s] reaction function. In general, the central bank of an open economy 
will respond less to inflation deviations relative to output deviations, since monetary policy, which 
also operates through the exchange rate, now has a more powerful, immediate effect on inflation’ 
(Eichengreen 2002, p.20); see also p.41. 
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havoc on relative prices and on tight inflation targets.6 IT countries must therefore 
adopt managed (‘dirty’) floating exchange rate regimes: 
 
A basic requirement for implementing an inflation targeting framework 
[is] the absence of implicit targeting of the exchange rate ... Adopting a 
low and stable inflation rate as the main objective of monetary policy 
requires in principle the absence of any commitment to a particular value 
of the exchange rate, as is the case under a floating exchange rate regime.7  
 
The IT may conflict with the country’s balance of payments position at two levels. 
First, there may be conflicting demands on the interest rates (see section 3.2). In 
any small open economy with relatively developed currency and financial markets 
there is a close relationship between the following variables: the level of the 
interest rates, the inflation rate, the fiscal deficit, the unemployment rate, the 
exchange rate and the level and direction of the international capital flows. There 
is no guarantee that a single interest rate can control aggregate demand (and 
deliver IT), maintain a sustainable fiscal balance, clear the labour market, ensure 
exchange rate stability and deliver balance of payments equilibrium. Achieving 
these widely different goals requires a combination of policies in which the 
interest rates play an important but not necessarily decisive role.  
 
Attributing unwarranted priority to the manipulation of interest rates in economic 
policy-making, as is the case in IT countries (see section 1.2) implies that these 
rates will tend to be determined by the higher of two possible levels: the interest 
 
                                                          
 
 
6
 ‘Exchange rate ... volatility generates frequent revisions of inflation rate expectations and may 
result in non-fulfillment of inflation targets. As a general rule, the actions of the central bank 
should not move the exchange rate to artificial or unsustainable levels. However, the central bank 
may react to exchange rate movements to curb the resulting inflationary pressures’ (Minella et al 
2002, p.25). 
7
 Agénor (2001, pp.4, 24). For this reason, ‘the central bank of Brazil ... has ... been implementing 
a dirty-floating exchange rate policy. Such interventions are made as transparent as possible in 
order to avoid the concern ... that intervention may hinder the credibility of monetary policy as the 
public may realize that stabilizing the exchange rate takes precedence over promoting price 
stability as a policy objective’ (Minella et al 2002, pp.25-6). 
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rates required to achieve IT, and those needed to close the balance of payments. If 
the latter is higher the exchange rate will be stable, but the economy will tend to 
become depressed through lack of demand. Unemployment will increase, inflation 
will decline to very low levels or move into negative territory, and the country 
could slide into a stabilisation trap (see section 4.5). Alternatively, if the former is 
higher there will be abundant inflows of foreign capital, especially if the capital 
account of the balance of payments has been liberalised, as is often the case in 
NMPC countries.8 These inflows could finance industrial development, or they 
could finance consumer goods imports to satisfy the solvent classes. They would 
also foster the revaluation of the exchange rate, potentially creating deflationary 
pressures. The increase in the country’s external liabilities will be matched by the 
swelling of the domestic public debt, potentially exposing the economy to a 
financial crisis, a balance of payments crisis, a fiscal crisis, or all three of them.9 
In sum, IT could generate additional output instability in an open economy.10 
 
Second, it may be difficult to pursue IT if the private sector has large liabilities 
denominated in foreign currency (liability dollarisation, see section 4.2). In this 
case the financial institutions and their customers will be saddled with currency 
mismatches, which could be very costly should the exchange rate depreciate 
(especially if these exposures are not hedged). These mismatches will create 
demands for the central bank to maintain exchange rate stability, although this is 
ultimately incompatible with the IT regime (see above).11 It is possible that, under 
these circumstances, inflation targeting may be wholly inappropriate, and a hard 
exchange rate peg may be more desirable, especially for very small economies. In 
this case the advantages of CBI would become purely academic. 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
8
 See Eichengreen (2002, p.13) and Helleiner (1998). 
9
 See, inter alia, Arestis and Glickman (2002), Jomo (2001), Palma (1998) and Weller (2001). 
Several Latin American countries experienced periods of high interest rates for one or the other 
reason during the nineties; see Saad-Filho (2005). 
10
 Eichengreen (2002, p.14). 
11
 Eichengreen (2002, pp.38-41). 
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3.4 – The Cost of the Central Bank’s Dual Mandate 
 
The NMPC debate about dual or hierarchical mandates for the central bank (see 
section 1.3.4) is largely a red herring, since by definition inflation targeting 
implies that inflation control is the most important objective of economic policy. 
There is, however, another type of dual mandate for the central bank which is 
unavoidable, not always clearly recognised by the advocates of the NMPC, and 
which may carry considerable costs. 
 
It was shown in sections 1.1-1.3 that the independent central bank is responsible 
for achieving IT. However, the central bank must also continue to be the bank of 
banks and the institution responsible for preserving the stability of the domestic 
financial system. These tasks cannot be delegated to another institution; they are 
necessarily part of the central bank’s remit.12 In normal circumstances these two 
mandates are compatible, but they may conflict especially if the asset and product 
markets give contradictory signals about inflation, if asset prices are very volatile, 
or if asset prices rise rapidly as a proportion of GDP. For example, if price 
inflation threatens to escalate the central bank may be compelled to raise interest 
rates, which could undermine financial system stability and trigger a costly 
crisis.13 Alternatively, if deflation looms the central bank may be forced to lower 
interest rates, although this may fuel a destabilising bout of asset price inflation 
(i.e., excessively rapid increases in the prices of shares, bonds, houses or land) and 
a debt and consumption bubble based on loans secured on those rising asset 
prices.14 
 
The close relationship between price inflation, personal and company debt, 
financial system stability and asset price inflation – especially when the 
 
                                                          
 
 
12
 See Lapavitsas (1997). 
13
 ‘To target price stability if that was in danger or bringing financial collapse would ... be a very 
narrow vision ... of monetary stability. It would certainly not be good policy’ (Forder 2003, p.15). 
14
 See Arestis and Sawyer (1998, 2005) and Toporowski (2000). 
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manipulation of interest rates becomes the most important instrument of economic 
policy – and the potentially huge cost of financial crises indicate that central banks 
ought to monitor asset prices and levels of debt as part of their duty to maintain 
economic stability (see section 5.1).15 In fact, the excessive focus of the NMPC on 
inflation control tends to distract attention from the financial sector as a major 
source of instability, which is misguided because the output and employment 
costs of financial crises can easily exceed any reasonable estimate of the cost of 
moderate inflation.16 In this sense, the NMPC offers poor guidance for monetary 
policy. 
 
Most mainstream economists claim that it is impossible to monitor asset prices 
and debt levels and, even if this were possible, it should not be attempted for four 
reasons. First, because attempts to influence asset prices would interfere with the 
principles of the free market. However, complaints are never heard when the 
central bank must clean up the financial system, at public expense, after the crisis. 
Second, because it is allegedly impossible to know when asset price rises result 
from ‘speculative’ or ‘fundamental’ factors. This is true at the margin, but the 
curbs being discussed here concern only large deviations of the prices of financial 
assets from their historical pattern. It would be disingenuous to claim that trained 
economists are unable to spot price movements of this magnitude. Third, because 
loans are based on voluntary contracts and the state should not interfere in 
economic transactions between willing parties. This view is based on a partial 
assessment of the problem, because the debt bubble concerns not only individual 
choices but also their macroeconomic consequences, which are of concern to the 
monetary authorities. Fourth, and finally, because central bank attempts to prickle 
an ongoing financial bubble may trigger a costly crisis. This is certainly possible, 
but the costs of financial instability and crisis at an even later stage would 
probably be even higher. In sum, there is no reason why central banks should fail 
 
                                                          
 
 
15
 For estimates of the cost of financial crises, see World Bank (1989, ch.5). 
16
 See Rao (2002) for a similar argument. 
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to monitor asset prices and intervene in asset markets in order to preserve 
financial system stability.17 
 
Excessive debt, asset price volatility and asset price inflation can be tackled in 
different ways. They include credit controls, the regulation of the issue and 
trading of financial assets, the demand for the disclosure of detailed information 
about the traded assets and their owners, and the imposition of capital gains taxes. 
These are not undue interferences with a smoothly functioning market. Rather, 
this is the minimum counterpart for the insurance services provided by the 
government to the owners of financial assets and the shareholders of the financial 
institutions. 
 
3.5 – The Cost of Central Bank ‘Independence’ 
 
The NMPC claims that IT and CBI will boost the credibility of monetary policy 
and the transparency and accountability of the central bank, because the bank will 
be able to focus on clear and achievable goals and its performance will be 
accountable to the public. The democratic veneer of CBI is reinforced by the 
claim that ‘independence’ should refer to instruments rather than goals (see 
section 1.1.4). 
 
The contrast between instrument and goal independence is not part of a serious 
debate about economic policy. ‘Goal independence’ is a caricature – a straw man 
invented to support the case for instrument independence. No one claims that the 
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 For Agénor (2001, p.40), ‘the information contained in asset prices movements may be limited 
because they may reflect erratic changes in expectations. To what extent this is actually the case 
may be difficult to gauge, because existing asset price models are based on unobserved variables; 
their empirical predictions are subject to wide margins of error. This makes it difficult to identify 
the “right” price (reflecting, say, future profit growth rates or productivity shocks) and therefore 
what is an erratic movement or speculative bubble. In such conditions, incorporating asset prices 
systematically in monetary policy feedback rules may be unwarranted. Moreover, the risk 
premium that is typically embedded in asset prices tends to vary over time. Basing monetary 
policy on a broader, asset-based measure of prices or monetary conditions may actually lead to 
greater variability in current and future output and inflation.’ 
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central bank should be able to choose its own targets, instruments and policy 
horizons, and pursue them at public expense. 
 
Let us then focus on the more serious matter of instrument independence. The 
case for instrument independence was outlined in sections 1.1.3, 1.1.4 and 1.3. 
This case hinges on the credibility, transparency and accountability of monetary 
policy. These arguments are inconsistent, disingenuous and politically and 
financially costly for five reasons. 
 
First, arguments for CBI are based on the presumably greater transparency, 
legitimacy and accountability of monetary policy under this institutional 
arrangement. However, this claim veils the greater scope for discretion in the 
conduct of monetary policy under CBI. In this policy regime the board of the 
central bank becomes free to consult ‘the markets’ and select among a broad range 
of possible levels of interest rates, among other policy instruments. In contrast, in 
previous monetary policy regimes claims for higher interest rates, for example, 
would have to be argued politically at several levels of government, especially at 
the Ministry of Finance. There, counter-claims expressing the interests of different 
social groups could (at least in principle) be heard, and there might have been 
scope for reaching a balanced decision (see section 5.3). In other words, anti-
inflation policies ought to be determined through a reasonable assessment of the 
social and economic costs of inflation, their distributive implications, and the 
distribution of the gains of stabilisation. This debate should be welcomed for how 
‘could it be thought reprehensible for the elected representatives of the people to 
seek to influence – by persuasive argument perhaps – the central aspects of 
[economic] policy?’18 
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 Forder (n.d.). 
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Therefore, CBI is undemocratic because the insulation of monetary policy from 
public debate reduces the accountability of the central bank to the public, and 
curtails the democratic legitimacy of monetary policy: 
 
It is apparent, then, that the advocates of independence have settled on a 
notion of ‘accountability’ which misses the essential point and is 
inadequate to the task of establishing the democratic legitimacy of 
independent central banking. Placing an obligation to ‘explain’ on 
agencies is not a means by which the demos governs.19 
 
Second, greater central bank ‘credibility’ and ‘reputation’ are misnomers. The 
improved indicators of credibility that usually follow CBI are not due to higher 
values being generated by impartial econometric models. ‘Expectations’ are the 
sentiments of a relatively narrow circle of individuals in positions of power, and 
whose material interests are directly affected by the choice of government policy. 
In this case, ‘improved expectations’ are simply a reflection of the closer 
institutional relationship between the central bank and the financial markets under 
CBI, the financial operators’ appreciation of the central banks’ performance, and 
their confidence that monetary policy will continue to be determined by their 
narrow interests in the future. ‘Credibility’ measures the takeover of monetary 
policy by the financial interests (see below).20 In spite of these limitations, 
government behaviour can influence the existing measures of credibility in a more 
constructive way. Consistent policies that are initially ‘not credible’ (that is, not 
conducive to the short-term objectives of the financial markets) can gain 
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 Forder (2003, p.41). This article includes a comprehensive review of the inconsistencies in CBI 
and the case for economic democracy. See also Epstein and Yeldan (2004). 
20
 ‘What does one make, for example, of the remark of former Bundesbank president Blessing ... 
that a central bank “has to be independent because one cannot really trust the politicians – they are 
all a rotten lot and any of them might seek to get out of a hole by printing money”? One wonders 
what Mr Blessing would have trusted to politics’ (Forder 2003, p.3n1). 
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credibility if they are implemented firmly and purposefully, and if they achieve 
results that are not wholly incompatible with the long-term interests of finance.21 
 
Third, the central bank is presumably different from other public sector 
institutions because of the supposed neutrality of its objectives and the technical 
difficulty of implementing the ‘optimal’ monetary policy.22 From a mainstream 
perspective, most public institutions allocate limited budgets among competing 
priorities, and their choices should be scrutinised by the voters regularly. In 
contrast, the central bank does not have real choices to make, and its routine 
operations should normally be insulated from ‘unwarranted’ pressures from sub-
national governments, politicians, trade unions, civil society organisations and 
social movements, in order to avoid ‘politicising’ monetary policy decisions and 
risking the credibility of the ITR. This argument is inconsistent. The management 
of the tax system, the rail network, the electricity grid and the government’s 
housing programme are just as complex as the implementation of sound monetary 
policies.23 All of them have significant distributive implications, and they involve 
a combination of technical knowledge and political choices – in fact, just like the 
administration of large private firms. The difference between them, trivially, is 
 
                                                          
 
 
21
 The success of the initially much-derided Malaysian capital controls in the early eighties is only 
one example of how governments can transform financial market expectations; see Epstein, Grabel 
and Jomo (2003) and Kaplan and Rodrik (2000). See also Sicsú (2001). 
22
 ‘The remarkable degree of isolation of the European central bank from democratic control is 
called ‘independence’, it is emphasised by its advocates that complete protection from political 
control is necessary to its successful operation, and it is said that this is desirable because monetary 
policy is a purely technical matter involving no value judgements; politicians in control will set it 
for electoral ends; and independence will improve credibility’ (Forder 2003, p.42). 
23
 ‘Blinder ... is unusually explicit amongst the advocates of [central bank] independence in 
making the case in terms of the absence of normative issues. He specifically draws attention to the 
fact that the details of tax policy are no less complex than the operation of monetary policy, but 
argues that they are properly kept under Congressional control because they have significant 
distributive effects. Monetary policy, on the other hand, he says, lacks these effects, and therefore 
the fact that it is difficult argues for the removal of direct control of it from politicians ... Although 
the claim that monetary policy involves only technical matters does not acknowledge the view that 
democracy has intrinsic value, it also suffers other, perhaps more important internal weaknesses. 
First, there is doubt as to the value of the natural rate theory itself. Secondly even if it is the case 
that monetary policy has no lasting effect on employment, it does not follow that it has no 
temporary effect that should be the concern of policy. Thirdly, it is erroneous to deduce from the 
non-existence of monetary effects on employment that monetary policy has no effects on any 
policy objective other than inflation’ (Forder 2003, p.11). 
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that incorrect decisions by private firms are punished financially, while 
government policy decisions must be open to public scrutiny through the 
democratic process.  
 
Fourth, advocates of CBI implicitly argue that the central bank should become 
simply a machine that performs reliably a specific task. The bank should 
mechanically (and ‘transparently’) manipulate a given set of instruments, 
especially the interest rates, in order to deliver the inflation targets set by the 
government. In this case central bank policies can be assessed only through their 
efficacy, and studies of IT never forget to mention that the Governor of the central 
bank of New Zealand can be dismissed if s/he fails to achieve the IT.24 This 
argument is incorrect. On the one hand, it presumes that the central bank can 
deliver (something approaching to) the inflation targets if it really wants to. This 
is merely a revamped version of the monetarist claim that money supply targeting 
is feasible and sufficient to control the rate of inflation, which was proven to be 
wrong many years ago (see section 2.1).25 On the other hand, it ignores the real 
dilemmas involved in central bank policy, especially the potential conflicts 
between monetary and financial stability (see sections 3.3 and 3.4). 
 
Finally, it is odd that the IMF should insist so heavily on the advantages of CBI 
when the Fund itself is anything but ‘independent’. The members of the Fund’s 
board of governors and executive board are appointed politically, through a 
process that is anything but transparent or accountable, they have no significant 
autonomy. Their decisions are normally strictly guided by the interests of its large 
member countries, especially the United States. 
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 For a detailed study, see Mayes (1998) and Mayes and Razzak (1998). 
25
 See Lapavitsas (1997, p.26n16). 
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3.6 – The Costs of Agency Capture and Financial Bias 
 
The arguments outlined in the previous section point to the fact that CBI 
implicitly promotes agency capture. The term ‘agency capture’ is used to explain 
the convergence of interests between the regulator and the regulated sector, 
potentially leading to the takeover of the former by the latter. Regulated sectors 
always find it worthwhile to lobby the regulator because of its enormous influence 
over the health of the sector and the distribution of benefits within it. At the same 
time, the regulator tends to become identified with the health of ‘its’ sector. 
Contacts and professional specialisation ensure that there will be a continuous 
exchange of personnel between them and, if the regulator is insulated from public 
scrutiny, its capture by the private sector is facilitated – in extreme cases, the 
regulated eventually regulate the regulator at the expense of the public interest.26 
 
The interaction between the central bank and the financial sector is especially 
prone to agency capture. They must always work closely together, because of the 
central bank’s duty to manage the monetary system and ensure financial system 
stability. The technical expertise required by central bank activities narrows the 
pool of potential recruits to novices, that must be trained by the experts, academic 
specialists in finance, who are usually committed to mainstream views, and 
financial market operators, who tend to return to greener pastures at the end of 
their (usually brief) stint in the public sector: 
 
[C]entral bankers are typically chosen from conservative elements of the 
financial community. One incentive that the head of the central bank might 
have for holding down inflation is that he can thereby improve his 
standing in the financial community, and thus earn greater remuneration 
upon returning to the private sector.27 
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 Arestis and Sawyer (1998a). 
27
 Rogoff (1985, pp.1179-80). 
  
 
 
 
 
82 
 
Similarly, for Stiglitz,  
 
In many countries bankers are disproportionately represented [among 
central bank staff], and even if they do not come from a banking 
background, they quickly get captured by the banking community in which 
they are immersed. Few countries ensure that workers and their interests 
are represented, even though the actions of the central bank have a vital 
impact on them.28 
 
Given their material and ideological interests, it is unsurprising that central bank 
staff tend to share the financial market’s understanding of the ‘needs’ of the 
economy. In effect, CBI tends to make the central bank even closer to the 
financial community than was legally and politically feasible before. This 
objective is clearly acknowledged by the advocates of the NMPC: 
 
It is harder for the central bank to ‘cheat’ on its mandate when it is forced 
to lay out an internally consistent basis for the decisions to be made. To be 
sure, a good publicist can make almost any position sound reasonable, but 
when it matters financial markets seem to have good noses for spin-
doctoring.29  
 
This statement indicates that the financial markets should be entrusted with the 
role of judging public policy, which they will be very happy to do in their own 
benefit. Alternatively, and this time more subtly: 
 
Because a short-term interest rate can be monitored by the public on a real-
time basis and is easy to understand, it is usually a more transparent 
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 Cited by Patrício (2002). 
29
 Agénor (2001, p.27), emphasis added. 
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operating guide than one defined in terms of base money or a monetary 
conditions index. Any changes in the stance of monetary policy should be 
communicated immediately to the public.30 
 
There are no prizes for guessing which members of ‘the public’ monitor short-
term interest rates on a real-time basis, and who should be informed first of any 
change in the stance of monetary policy. 
 
CBI is not simply a technically ‘neutral’ response to objective economic 
constraints. It entrenches new constraints upon social and economic behaviour by 
reconstituting the relationship between the financial sector and public policy. For 
example, the executive’s right to dismiss the board of the central bank can be an 
important counterweight to the hegemony of the financial interests. The removal 
of this prerogative makes it harder to ensure that the bank responds to the 
demands of the majority. Under CBI, nominally independent central banks are 
meant to serve primarily the interests of the financial sector through the 
institutionalisation of the role of ‘credibility’ and ‘expectations’ in monetary 
policy-making. The economy develops a financial bias.31 This is the culmination 
of agency capture.32  
 
Under CBI the financial markets are increasingly able to determine the economy’s 
long-term prospects. Their influence becomes decisive for the intersectoral 
allocation of resources, the level and composition of output, the distribution of 
income, the composition of investment and the stability of the balance of 
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 Carare et al (2002, p.8), emphases added. 
31
 This term is used, in another context, by Bresser-Pereira and Nakano (2003). 
32
 ‘Posen ... suggests that consistent counter-inflationary policy is maintained only where the 
financial sector has the political power to protect the central bank from other interest groups. In 
this way, he is able to explain both independence and low inflation with a measure of financial 
sector power. But it is also evident from this view that independent central banks are construed as 
serving the interests of their clients in a certain section of society. If that is the case, then there is 
clearly an important issue about the democratic legitimacy of the arrangements ... [I]t is difficult to 
see where the advocates of independence have responded to such a concern’ (Forder 2003, pp.28-
9), emphasis added. 
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payments. This increasing influence is not counterbalanced by accountability. 
Although the financial sector is regulated by the central bank (which it has already 
captured), it is accountable only to a small number of partners and shareholders 
who, in all likelihood, are not committed to pro-poor objectives or MDGs (see 
section 5). It is very difficult to find a democratic rationale for this arrangement.33  
 
CBI can therefore be explained by agency capture and by the attempt to 
institutionalise the economy’s financial bias.34 Therefore, central bank 
performance contracts, inflation targets, inflation reports and other monitoring 
devices are little more than diversions – instruments facilitating (indeed, ensuring) 
the delivery of financial market goals by a public sector agency, at a cost borne by 
society as a whole: 
 
To date, there is no evidence that insulating policy from the political 
process improves economic performance in any significant respect. But 
there is overwhelming evidence that this strategy imposes severe costs on 
the economy and especially on the most vulnerable segments of society. 
This finding contradicts the neoliberal view that independent 
policymaking institutions are neutral guardians of the national interest. 
These institutions typically meet the needs of investors, lenders and 
business interests rather than serve the public good.35  
 
The institutional rigidity imposed by CBI and IT can be interpreted as part of an 
attempt to secure agency capture and the reproduction of financial bias. It would 
be unwise for governments aiming to achieve pro-poor objectives to adopt NMPC 
policies, and doubly so to entrench them into an excessively rigid monetary policy 
framework. This is not only because this would make it harder to change policies 
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 ‘Placing policymaking authority in the hands of un elected technocrats runs counter to principles 
of democracy, accountability and transparency. Moreover, this strategy does not even improve 
long-term economic performance’ (Chang and Grabel 2004, p.49). 
34
 For a similar analysis applied to the Korean case, see Chang (2000). 
35
 Chang and Grabel (2004, p.51). 
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that do not serve the interests of the majority. It is also because it is always best to 
preserve monetary policy flexibility. Inflation is determined by shifting 
combinations of complex factors (see section 2.1), and institutional rigidity is 
hardly the most efficient way to tackle changing economic problems. CBI and IT 
will lock into place the theory of inflation and the anti-inflation policies that are 
currently fashionable, and that serve primarily the interests of the financial 
sector.36 These rigidities are bound to create unnecessary costs and political 
difficulties in the future, as the causes of inflation change or when shifts in the 
correlation of social forces permits the implementation of pro-poor anti-inflation 
policies (see section 5.3). Finally, the insulation of monetary policy from public 
scrutiny and government control may thwart the co-ordination of policies that is 
essential for the success of any broad-ranging government initiative. It is much 
harder to deliver the outcomes chosen by the electorate if the government can 
count on only one set of (fiscal) instruments, while monetary policy may be 
pursuing entirely different targets – which may even compromise the achievement 
of other desirable objectives.  
 
But why should the politicians consent to this extensive erosion of their power? 
The answer is that CBI and IT may be functional for many politicians because 
they externalise three important problems – the level of interest rates, the 
relationship between finance and the productive sector and the level and structure 
of output and employment. It can also improve their credibility with the 
‘international community’. This process of externalisation can be politically 
expedient (as well as personally advantageous) because it obviates the need for 
politicians to defend unpopular (neoliberal) policies, and it locks in these policies 
regardless of the wishes of the electorate. Economic policy becomes 
unchangeable, and it is effectively excluded from political debate. 
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 ‘[E]conomic theory is so subject to change that a long-term commitment to a certain approach to 
policy is a dangerous thing’ (Charles Goodhard, cited in Forder 2003, p.12). 
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This section has shown that, in spite of its shortcomings and inconsistencies, the 
NMPC is functional for the financial system and for many politicians. It transfers 
power from the state to finance, excludes inconvenient political dilemmas from 
public scrutiny, and helps to consolidate a specific form of minority power 
through a veil of ‘neutrality’ and ‘objectivity’. This massive redistribution of 
power and income is validated by a slick discourse, perfected over many years in 
academia, in journalistic outlets and in political circles. CBI and IT are not 
isolated political choices, and they are not determined from without (presumably 
from a disembodied ‘global economy’). They are part of a process of institutional 
reorganisation that seeks to capture policy-making capacity and state resources 
and legitimacy, in order to promote financial market interests dressed up as the 
general good. Mainstream economics provides an essential element for this 
emerging consensus – academic credibility – and it lends depth and density to the 
ruling discourse.  
 
The NMPC will not go away easily, because it is part of, and promotes, a stable 
institutional arrangement. Its imposition in country after country triggers material 
and institutional changes that reinforce and validate the dominance of financial 
interests. Challenges to the NMPC must be, correspondingly, multilayered, 
including the academic, political, ideological and institutional levels. In this 
confrontation, pro-poor policies and MDGs offer the best possible platform for the 
critics of the ruling policy compact (see section 5). 
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4 – The NMPC and the Developing Countries 
 
This section reviews the implications of the NMPC for the poor countries. In 
recent years several middle-income countries have implemented ITR,1 often in 
response to unsustainable pressures on their fixed or adjustable peg exchange rate 
regimes.2 The NMPC offers these countries not only an alternative nominal 
anchor, but also a ready-made policy framework that can – at least in principle – 
deliver the best of both worlds: 
 
[I]n a world of high capital mobility and unstable capital movements, 
conventional pegged exchange rates have proved fragile ... [R]ecent 
experiences suggest that exchange rate pegs can be sustainable only when 
they are credible, and credibility is to a large extent determined by 
domestic macroeconomic policies ... [T]he adoption of inflation targeting 
may lead to a more stable currency if it signals a clear commitment to 
macroeconomic stability and a freely-floating exchange rate.3 
 
In spite of these reassuring promises, the NMPC places heavy demands on the 
developing countries. These demands help to explain why no poor country has, 
thus far, been either able or willing to adopt inflation targeting. These demands 
can be grouped into four areas: fiscal, balance of payments, financial and 
institutional constraints. They are considered below. 
 
4.1 – The Fiscal Constraint 
 
It was shown in section 1.1.3 that IT is incompatible with fiscal dominance; in 
other words, fiscal constraints cannot determine the choice of macroeconomic 
 
                                                          
 
 
1
 For example, the Czech Republic and Israel in 1998; Brazil, Chile and Poland in 1999; Hungary, 
Mexico, South Africa and Thailand in 2000; Colombia and South Korea in 2001, and Peru and the 
Philippines in 2002. 
2
 See Agénor (2001, pp.3-4). 
3
 Agénor (2001, p.21). 
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policy. Many developing countries will find it difficult to satisfy this requirement 
because their fiscal institutions tend to be weak. These countries are poor, their tax 
system tends to be inefficient and, consequently, their tax ratios tend to be low. 
Many governments find it impossible to fund their expenditures through taxation, 
and the financial system tends to be too shallow to allow these deficits to be 
covered through borrowing. Seignorage is therefore important for many 
governments. However, 
 
Reliance on seigniorage is perhaps the simplest and most common 
indication of fiscal dominance ... in a large number of developing 
countries, fiscal dominance and a poor financial market infrastructure 
severely constrain the scope for independent monetary policy.4 
 
Appropriate solutions will need to be found, taking into account this structural 
feature of the fiscal system of most poor countries. 
 
4.2 – The Balance of Payments Constraint 
 
The balance of payments constraint influences developing country monetary 
policy choices at three levels: vulnerability to crisis, vulnerability to exchange rate 
movements, and vulnerability to balance sheet disorders. 
 
4.2.1 – Vulnerability to Crisis 
 
The risk of balance of payments crisis is much higher in developing countries than 
in rich countries. These countries are economically small, their currencies are 
weak, and their economies tend to be highly vulnerable to externally induced 
disturbances. Very poor countries are often confronted with a structural scarcity of 
foreign exchange that grinds down their growth prospects and compels these 
 
                                                          
 
 
4
 Debelle et al (1998). 
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economies to underpeform for long periods. In contrast, the middle-income 
countries are the ‘customers of last resort’ of the international financial markets: 
 
[N]o matter how much liquidity international financial markets have on 
offer, their operators can always solve the problem of “market clearing” by 
loosening their quantity restrictions to LDCs. However, this process has 
proved to be an inefficient mechanism for allocating financial resources 
since it has led to the accumulation of risk at levels that are not privately 
efficient, let alone socially efficient.5  
 
The middle-income countries have an insatiable demand for foreign currency at 
any level of interest rates. Their economies tend to perform well when funds are 
abundant;6 however, when market conditions turn to the worst – and they can do 
so very rapidly (‘sudden stops’) – these countries can face devastating balance of 
payments crises.7 The crisis eliminates any possibility of inflation targeting 
possibly for a long time, because of its overwhelming implications for inflation, 
interest rate policy, the fiscal balance, the financial system, the rate of 
unemployment and the country’s pattern of trade.8 More generally, the possibility 
of ‘sudden stops’ and balance of payments crisis creates uncertainty and economic 
instability which may reduce the credibility of the IT regime and jeopardise the 
fulfilment of the targets.9 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
5
 Palma (1998, p.791). 
6
 See Calvo et al (1993). 
7
 For example, in 2002 Brazil was faced with a negative swing in capital flows of US$ 30 billion 
(6 per cent of GDP), relative to an already difficult 2001. This ‘sudden stop’ led to a nominal 
exchange rate depreciation of 50 per cent; see Fraga et al (2003, p.5) and Saad-Filho (2003). See 
also Helleiner (1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). 
8
 Other types of adverse shock can also compromise an inflation targeting regime; see, for 
example, Rogoff (1985, pp.1186-7).  
9
 See Fraga et al (2003, pp.24-25) and Mishkin (2004, pp.3, 5). 
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4.2.2 – Vulnerability to Exchange Rate Movements 
 
Developing country currencies tend to be relatively volatile, regardless of balance 
of payments crises.10 The impact of exchange rate movements also tends to be 
passed through into domestic prices more rapidly in developing countries than in 
the rich countries because of indexation or currency substitution. This rapid pass-
through tends to consolidate otherwise transitory depreciations into a permanently 
lower exchange rate, making it more difficult to maintain price stability.11 
 
The central bank may be tempted to respond either by raising interest rates in 
response to even minor currency devaluations, or by intervening in the foreign 
exchange market to limit currency fluctuations (‘fear of floating’). Both types of 
intervention would probably be successful most of the time. However, they could 
occasionally trigger conflicts between IT and balance of payments equilibrium 
(see section 3.3). 
 
4.2.3 – Vulnerability to Balance Sheet Disorders 
 
In poor and middle-income countries currency substitution tends to be much more 
frequent than in the rich countries because of ingrained economic instability, 
generalised distrust of the local currency, and the currency’s marginal role in 
international exchanges. Balance sheet disorders are much more likely to occur in 
this type of monetary system. 
 
In the rich countries a currency devaluation does not tend to affect the balance 
sheets of households, firms, banks or the state because their debts are generally 
denominated in domestic currency (and, in the case of banks and the state, these 
debts are normally hedged). This is not the case in several developing countries. 
 
                                                          
 
 
10
 See, for example, Fraga et al (2003, pp.25, 27). 
11
 See Eichengreen (2002, p.21). 
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In these countries many domestic agents have debts denominated in foreign 
currency. In this case, a large currency devaluation creates a mismatch between 
the value of their assets (denominated in devalued domestic currency) and 
liabilities (denominated in foreign currency) that can increase significantly their 
debt burden. The deterioration of their balance sheets can create hardship for the 
households, bankruptcies among firms, and it can trigger a fiscal and financial 
crisis. The banks tend to respond to the crisis by contracting their lending 
operations, which exacerbates everybody else’s problems and may even induce a 
full-scale depression, especially if the state fails to reflate the economy promptly 
(at the risk of triggering a severe bout of inflation).12 
 
In other words, the central bank’s objective function must include the stabilisation 
of the exchange rate, because the cost of ‘benign neglect’ can be devastating. For 
countries in this situation IT may be an entirely misguided objective for, if the 
central bank attempts to reduce the economy’s vulnerability, it will find it 
impossible to focus primarily on achieving the IT. This is especially true in 
periods of turbulence, i.e., precisely when a nominal anchor would be most useful.  
 
4.3 – The Financial Constraint 
 
The financial system of developing countries tends to be fragile when compared 
to the rich countries.13 This is partly a reflex of their short-termism and lack of 
depth, partly a result of the severity of the fiscal constraint in these countries (see 
section 4.1), partly the outcome of financial liberalisation14 and partly due to their 
greater balance of payments vulnerability (see section 4.2). 
 
                                                          
 
 
12
 The Argentine crisis of 2001 is the most dramatic example of this sequence of events in recent 
times; see Calcagno (1997), Halevi (2002) and Rozenwurcel and Bleger (1998). However, similar 
processes were observed in Chile, in 1982, Mexico, in 1994-95, East Asia in 1997-98 and Turkey 
in 2001; see Agénor (2001, pp.24-5) and Mishkin (1998, pp.7-8). 
13
 Fraga et al (2003, p.25). 
14
 ‘The record of financial liberalisation has been neither pro-poor nor pro-growth. It often 
destabilised the economy and denied access of poor people to credit. Real interest rates have 
tended to rise and the spread between the deposit and lending rates has widened – both 
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The relative lack of long-term financial assets in the developing countries, and 
their lower ratios of liquid liabilities to GDP and private credit to GDP reduce the 
effectiveness of the monetary transmission mechanism, making it less reliable for 
policy purposes. Because of these weaknesses, short-term interest rates have to 
move more quickly and sharply, which can be tricky because developing country 
central banks tend to be less able to manage monetary policy efficiently, and their 
financial systems are less able to absorb such shocks. The inevitable consequences 
are higher interest rate volatility and greater financial fragility in these countries.15 
 
Financial fragility implies that the central bank must focus on financial system 
stability much more closely than in the rich countries (see sections 3.4 and 4.2). 
This constraint implies that the central bank is unable to focus primarily on 
achieving the IT through interest rate manipulation; it also means that the ITR is 
less credible because the financial markets know their own vulnerabilities. 
Therefore, the market operators have strong reasons to doubt the commitment of 
the monetary authorities: 
 
Faced with a weak banking system ill prepared to absorb interest rate increases, which 
raise the cost of servicing its short-term liabilities and increase default rates by borrowers, 
[the central bank] may want to limit interest-rate volatility and administer its anti-
inflationary medicine in small doses. But if the monetary authorities fail to respond 
quickly when inflation heats up, observers may begin to wonder whether they are 
optimally trading off objectives or they are in fact not really committed to price 
stability.16 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
 
 
 
 
undercutting jobs and growth. Farm and non-farm enterprises often lost access to credit as banks 
focused on short-term lending for consumer durables in urban areas’ (Vandemoortele 2004, p.14). 
15
 See Fraga et al (2003, p.24). 
16
 Eichengreen (2002, p.36). 
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4.4 – The Institutional Constraint 
 
Developing countries lack several institutional requisites for inflation targeting. In 
order to set up a successful ITR, 
 
the authorities ... have to take certain preliminary steps. They must 
establish explicit quantitative targets for inflation for some periods ahead. 
They must indicate clearly and unambiguously to the public that hitting the 
inflation target takes precedence over all other objectives of monetary 
policy. They must set up a model or methodology for inflation forecasting 
that uses a number of indicators containing information on future inflation. 
Finally, they must devise a forward-looking operating procedure in which 
monetary policy instruments are adjusted (in line with the assessment of 
future inflation) to hit the chosen target. The monetary authorities must 
have the technical and institutional capacity to model and forecast 
domestic inflation, know something of the time lag between the 
adjustment of the monetary instruments and their effect on the inflation 
rate, and have a well-informed view of the relative effectiveness of the 
various instruments of monetary policy at their disposal.17 
 
This is a very tall order for most developing countries.18 The countries that would 
presumably benefit most from IT lack a strong history of low inflation and of 
successful anti-inflation policies. Their central banks lack the institutional 
capability to monitor prices and real and financial sector developments 
 
                                                          
 
 
17
 Debelle et al (1998). 
18
 The proponents of the NMPC are prepared to be flexible: ‘such requirements should not be 
overstated; forecasting capability, for instance, can never be perfect and sensible projections 
always involve qualitative judgement. A more important and difficult task, in many cases, may be 
to design or improve the institutional framework in order to allow the central bank an effective 
degree of independence in pursuing the goal of low and stable inflation without undue pressure to 
stabilize output fluctuations or alleviate the public debt burden through low interest rates’ (Agénor 
2001, pp.65-6). In other words, governments can presumably circumvent the lack of the basic 
conditions for IT purely administratively, by giving the central bank more independence! 
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adequately. They may lack a minimally sophisticated model of the economy, and 
the monetary transmission process in particular, among many other shortcomings. 
 
These difficulties inevitably compromise the ‘credibility’ of the monetary 
authorities. If they are nevertheless determined to press ahead with IT, the central 
bank will be forced to impose more stringent policies than would be the case in 
other countries, in order to reap credibility gains in the future, which will 
eventually allow the bank to relax its policy stance: 
 
[T]he central bank incurs a cost of trust building as it has to react to curb 
the inflationary pressures stemming from low credibility and has to 
‘prove’ that is committed to the new regime. During some period, the 
volatility of interest rate and output will be higher, and, since the central 
bank also takes into account output costs, the inflation volatility also tends 
to be higher when compared to a situation of full credibility ... [However] 
later on [the economy] benefits from an improved trade-off with lower 
output and inflation variability, and the central bank can then be a more 
flexible inflation targeter.19 
 
It is even harder if the ITR is adopted in an economy with an inflation rate much 
higher than the long-term goal. In this case, 
 
the central bank has to conduct an active policy with output costs to bring 
inflation down. The reduction in inflation faces two obstacles, which result 
in costly disinflation and higher volatility of inflation and output: ... 
imperfect credibility, and ... inflation persistence, resulting from some 
backward-looking behaviour in price setting. The presence of backward-
 
                                                          
 
 
19
 Fraga et al (2003, pp.14, 18). 
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looking behaviour may be due to factors such as indexed wage contracts, 
and adaptive expectations.20 
 
The advocates of the NMPC acknowledge the existence of a vicious circle 
between, on the one hand, low credibility and relatively fragile institutions and, on 
the other hand, fiscal and financial fragility, macroeconomic instability and higher 
vulnerability to external shocks.21 However, they claim that this vicious circle can 
be broken through the establishment of the credibility of the monetary 
authorities.22 In this case, the economy would gradually converge towards a good 
equilibrium with high monetary policy credibility, low and stable inflation, and 
greater financial and balance of payments stability. 
 
This is certainly possible, and there is no question that important successes have 
been achieved in several inflation targeting middle-income countries recently. 
However, the structural economic problems of the developing countries, outlined 
above, cannot be simply wished away or addressed purely through subjective 
manoeuvres.23 Fiscal, balance of payments and financial instability and 
institutional weaknesses are not simply due to subjective deficiencies in 
‘credibility’. They are features of poverty and underdevelopment. The questions, 
 
                                                          
 
 
20
 Fraga et al (2003, p.17). 
21
 ‘Absent confidence that the central bank is committed to low inflation, interest rates will not fall 
to the levels of other low-inflation countries. Shocks will raise questions about whether the 
authorities are prepared to stay the course. Sharp changes in interest rates, exchange rates and 
international capital flows may feed upon themselves: financial variables will be volatile, with 
negative implications for the economy. If policy is not credible, then firms will not reduce price 
increases to meet the inflation target. Hitting it will require an increase in interest rates sufficient to 
deliver a substantial reduction in import prices (through a sharp appreciation of the exchange rate), 
with destabilizing output effects’ (Eichengreen 2002, p.35). 
22
 See Eichengreen (2002, p.38) and Fraga et al (2003, p.4). 
23
 For example, it is insufficient to state that the emerging market countries face ‘more acute trade-
offs – higher output and inflation volatility – and worse performance than developed economies. 
These results stem from more pronounced external shocks, lower credibility, and lower level of 
development of institutions in these countries. In order to improve their performance, we 
recommend high levels of transparency and communication with the public and the development of 
more stable institutions’ (Fraga et al 2003, p.3, emphasis added). This is a wish-list rather than a 
set of sensible policy recommendations, which is surprising coming from the central bank 
president that introduced IT in Brazil. 
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then, are the cost of addressing these shortcomings, the expected success, and 
whether there may be a more socially productive use for these resources. 
 
4.5 – Stabilisation Traps 
 
The previous sections have argued that inflation and inflation control through CBI 
and IT can be costly. These costs should be compared and contrasted across 
different types of stabilisation policy in order to inform pro-poor policy choices 
(see section 5). Section 2 and Box 3 have also shown that inflation has declined to 
its lowest level since the sixties in many countries. In spite of this, GDP growth 
rates have failed to pick up and, in fact, they have continued to fall almost 
everywhere, while unemployment has tended to increase in many countries. These 
trends lend credence to the claim that there is no stable trade-off between 
inflation, growth and unemployment (see section 2.2.1). The relationship between 
these variables depends on the circumstances of time and place, and it cannot be 
generalised. 
 
Persistently falling inflation and growth and rising unemployment can be 
dangerous, because they can trigger a stabilisation trap.24 The implementation of 
persistently contractionary policies in order to achieve very low inflation (whether 
or not through ITR) can lock the economy into a perverse equilibrium with very 
low inflation, low growth rates and high unemployment. Stabilisation traps can 
also induce a deterioration of the distribution of income either directly (because of 
the job losses and the greater rewards to finance through high interest rates), or 
they may do so indirectly (because the economic stagnation reduces the resources 
available for poverty reduction policies). 
 
The NMPC can be conducive to stabilisation traps because of its obsession with 
achieving very low rates of inflation. The IT is secured through the manipulation 
 
                                                          
 
 
24
 See McKinley (2003). 
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of the output gap by changes in the nominal interest rates. If every time that 
aggregate demand increases and some prices rise, perhaps to compensate previous 
losses (see section 3.2), the central bank raises interest rates because of its ‘fear of 
inflation’, the bank will be hampering relative price changes. This will make it 
harder for the price system to signal consumer preferences and resource scarcity 
(as well as economic power). An obsession with very low inflation will therefore 
increase relative price rigidity, impeding the economy’s adjustment to real shocks, 
making it more costly to introduce technical innovations, and systematically 
choking growth.25 In this sense, a little inflation can help to ‘grease’ the economy. 
 
If investment is sensitive to the interest rates, as is normally expected, and to the 
output gap (i.e., if, all else constant, there is less investment when unused capacity 
is high), very low IT will hamper not only current GDP growth but also depress 
investment and the growth rate of the capital stock. The cumulative reduction of 
investment and growth will reduce the economy’s potential output over time, 
leading to persistent economic underperformance in spite of the full utilisation of 
the existing capital stock.  
 
In other words, the economy will adjust to persistently contractionary economic 
policy through a downward shift of the path of potential output (lower growth rate 
of capacity), so that the existing capacity will tend to be occupied earlier (it is 
therefore impossible to diagnose a stabilisation trap simply through the rate of 
capacity utilisation). The declining growth rate of the capital stock will, in turn, 
raise the rate of unemployment and underemployment, at least until emigration or 
the demographic transition catch up with the economic transition. This 
stabilisation trap will also reduce the economy’s capacity to accommodate high 
growth rates in the future, because inflation and balance of payments pressures 
will become binding at lower GDP growth rates. Rao (2002) hints at this exact 
same problem when he argues that: 
 
                                                          
 
 
25
 See Ghosh and Phillips (1998, p.673). 
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[E]xcessive fiscal deficit reduction and monetary restraint causes growth 
to be policy-constrained i.e., growth is demand-constrained but demand is 
itself policy-constrained. Thus, orthodox stabilization aims to promote 
growth with stability but ends up compressing investment.26  
 
This is especially problematic for the very low income countries, because a 
stabilisation trap will make it much harder to address their urgent problems of 
poverty and insufficient levels of human development.  
 
The stabilisation traps suggest that the neutrality of money, which is essential for 
the mainstream theory of inflation, is incorrect: monetary variables (and monetary 
policy) can affect the long-term trajectory of the economy. At a more practical 
level, they also suggest that the costs of IT could exceed the costs of moderate 
inflation in the long-run (see section 2.2.2). Finally, stabilisation traps facilitate 
the onset of deflation, which may be triggered by negative demand shocks or 
balance of payments crises (see sections 3.3 and 4.2). In this case, a stabilisation 
trap would lead into a self-reinforcing downward spiral of prices, profits, output, 
incomes and profit expectations, as well as continuous capital flight, from which it 
could be difficult to extricate the economy.  
 
 
                                                          
 
 
26
 ‘A price constrained economy can be defined as one that is either in a unique full employment 
general equilibrium, or prevented from achieving that general equilibrium by private or public 
price ‘distortions’. An economy is demand constrained when its level of output is limited by one or 
all of the components of aggregate demand: consumption, private investment, government 
expenditure, or exports’ (Weeks 2003). 
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5 – Pro-Poor Monetary Policy Alternatives 
 
It has become clear that most countries are unlikely to realise their MDGs. 
Mainstream (Washington consensus) policies have unquestionably failed to 
achieve their stated aims, and the search for alternative development strategies has 
become urgent. UNDP has offered an important contribution to the development 
of an alternative pro-poor policy agenda and pro-poor macroeconomic policies. 
This section reviews this contribution, and outlines pro-poor policy alternatives to 
the NMPC.  
 
This section includes three parts. The first briefly summarises selected principles 
of pro-poor macroeconomic policies.1 The second reviews some of these policies 
for illustration purposes, and in order to demonstrate their internal consistency. 
These policies can be distinguished from mainstream or Washington consensus 
policies on several counts. The most important differences are their direct and 
unmediated focus on achieving MDGs, and their emphasis on growth, distribution 
and the improvement of the welfare of the poor. In contrast, Washington 
consensus policies claim that low inflation, balance of payments equilibrium and 
investors’ ‘confidence’ are the keys for rapid and stable growth, and that the latter 
will spontaneously lead to gains for the poor.2 This approach has been 
unsuccessful almost everywhere. The disappointing record of mainstream 
policies, the declining growth rates in the world during the last three decades (see 
Box 2) and the deterioration of the distribution of income in most countries, and in 
the world economy as a whole,3 lend urgency to identifying pro-poor policy 
 
                                                          
 
 
1
 For an overview of this rapidly expanding literature, see Dagdeviren et al (2002), Kakwani 
(2001, 2002), Kakwani and Pernia (2000), MacEwan (1999), McCulloch and Baulch (1999), 
McKinley (2001, 2003, 2004), Osmani (2001), Palanivel (2003), Palley (2000), Pasha and 
Palanivel (2004), Rao (2002), Solimano (1999), UNDP (2002), Vandemoortele (2004) and 
Winters (2002). 
2
 See, for example, Sahay, Cashin and Mauro (2001). 
3
 ‘[I]nequality between countries continued to grow in the 1990s, albeit at a slower pace than in the 
1980s. Also, there were widespread increases in inequality within countries in the 1980s and 
1990s. And there is some evidence to suggest that inequality between the world’s individuals was 
on the rise in the 1980s, but stabilized in the 1990s’ (Weller and Hersh 2004, p.473). Moreover, 
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alternatives. This research effort will support government attempts to achieve high 
economic growth rates and greater equality, in order to fulfil their MDGs in the 
shortest possible time. The third and final part outlines the basic features of pro-
poor monetary and anti-inflation policies. The literature in this field is relatively 
scarce, and only a few pointers for further research can be offered here. When 
developed in detail, pro-poor monetary and anti-inflation policies will become an 
integral part of a pro-poor policy compact, contributing to the delivery of a stable 
macro-monetary framework in support of pro-poor goals.  
 
5.1 – Principles of Pro-Poor Economic Strategy 
 
For the Washington consensus, 
 
the cause of poverty reduction is best served by more rapid adjustment to 
fiscal imbalances, rapid adjustment to lower inflation and external deficits 
and the use of higher interest rates to achieve these ends, internal and 
external financial sector liberalization, deregulation of capital controls, 
deep and rapid privatization of state owned enterprises and, perhaps the 
strongest unifying factor – rapid and major opening up of an economy to 
trade and foreign direct investment.4 
 
This approach focuses inordinately on short-term stabilisation, and it undercuts 
the basis for long-term growth.5  
 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
 
 
 
 
‘[a] UNDP-supported study by the World Institute for Development Economics Research 
documents that inequality has risen in two-thirds of the countries for which reliable data are 
available. A more recent World Bank study also shows that world inequality, across as well as 
within countries, has been on the rise’ (Weeks 2003). See also Milanovic (2002, 2003). 
4
 Ravi Kanbur, cited in Rao (2002, p.2). 
5
 See McKinley (2001). 
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The inability of Washington consensus programmes to bring about economic 
stability and fast stable growth has become increasingly evident during the last 
twenty-five years. The slow improvement in the welfare of the poor given the 
available resources in the world economy and the resources that could be 
generated through faster growth is a severe indictment of mainstream economics 
and the so-called ‘international community’. 
 
The IMF and the World Bank have become increasingly aware of the limitations 
of mainstream economic adjustment programmes.6 The Heavily Indebted Poor 
Country initiatives (HIPC-1 and HIPC-2) attempt to link standard stabilisation and 
structural adjustment strategies with pro-poor outcomes, with a view to achieving 
MDGs. Their most important innovation, in terms of policy formulation and 
implementation, is the introduction of the PRSPs. In spite of their limitations, the 
PRSPs can offer a framework for the assessment of poverty in different countries, 
and a baseline for comparison across different economic strategies in order to 
select those that may be able to achieve MDGs more rapidly. 
 
Unfortunately, these ‘new generation’ mainstream economic programmes remain 
attached to the same failed strategies attempted in the past, plus targeted 
programmes to relieve poverty. These targeted (focused or marginal) interventions 
are insufficient to address the severe problems of poverty and relative economic 
stagnation in most poor countries. For example, economically worthwhile projects 
often fail to thrive in spite of the availability of new credit lines (or the 
introduction of micro-credit initiatives) because their economic returns are limited 
by the low wages and inadequate levels of aggregate demand in the economy. By 
the same token, if the country’s macroeconomic strategy fosters stagnation and 
the reproduction of poverty, the targeted social programmes and ‘safety nets’ 
 
                                                          
 
 
6
 For an overview, see Bird (2001), Buira (2003), IMF and IDA (1999, 2001), Pender (2001), 
Unctad (2000, ch.5; 2002, ch.5) and World Bank and IMF (2004). 
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promoted by the IMF and the World Bank cannot reverse the general trend.7 
However, even with a significant acceleration of growth many countries will still 
be unable to achieve their MDGs.8 Only a shift in their growth strategy can 
deliver the goals mandated by the United Nations. This section outlines the 
principles of an alternative (pro-poor) development strategy for poor and middle-
income countries. 
 
5.1.1 – Poverty and Growth 
 
Economic growth influences two types of poverty very differently. Basic poverty 
is due to the country’s very low levels of income and productivity in a country.9 
This type of poverty tends to decline with growth (‘a rising tide lifts all boats’). 
Growth creates new income generating activities, produces labour scarcities that 
can raise wages, increases the demand for foodstuffs and raw materials produced 
by the poor, and creates other opportunities for the material advancement of large 
numbers of people (see section 5.2.1). However, economic growth can also create 
market-generated poverty, due to the loss or lack of access to productive assets. 
Conventional economic growth strategies can create poverty because they lead to 
the dispossession of large numbers of small peasants and rural labourers and their 
eviction from the land, and because the structural economic changes that 
accompany growth deskill the employed workers and eliminate large numbers of 
jobs. It is not always possible for many workers to find alternative jobs with 
equivalent pay, or to retrain in order to seek better employment opportunities. The 
self-employed may also find that their economic prospects are depressed because 
of their insufficient access to credit and markets. 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
7
 See Pasha (2002). 
8
 For an assessment, see <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>, <http://www.undp.org/mdg/>, 
<http://www.developmentgoals.com/UNDG%20document_final.pdf> and 
<http://www.who.int/mdg/en/>. 
9
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The impact of growth on poverty depends on the trajectory of basic and market-
generated poverty and the interaction between them. In some cases, income and 
productivity growth can be so rapid that most people benefit in spite of the 
possibly rising inequality in the country (e.g., Brazil between the fifties and the 
seventies, and China since the eighties). Alternatively, GDP growth may be 
insufficient to trigger a significant reduction in poverty, leading to the stagnation 
or even decline of the standards of welfare of large numbers of people (e.g., 
Pakistan, Russia and many CIS countries since the nineties, and most Middle-
Eastern, North African and poor Latin American and sub-Saharan African 
countries since the eighties; see Box 2). These interactions are non-linear. At the 
early stages of growth basic poverty tends to dominate, and faster growth rates are 
sufficient to relieve poverty. As the country develops and additional resources 
become available the importance of distribution increases further (i.e., the 
elasticity of poverty with respect to growth tends to decline).10 However, at all 
stages of development pro-poor (distributive) economic policies can increase the 
poverty-reducing impact of growth, as is shown below. 
 
5.1.2 – Pro-Poor Growth and Distribution 
 
This section briefly outlines the principles of pro-poor economic strategies (or 
pro-poor growth regimes11) and their implications for policy formulation and 
implementation. These strategies have three distinguishing features.  
 
First, they prioritise rapid growth, structural transformation and distribution, 
subject to the preservation of macroeconomic stability.12 These objectives are very 
different from those of mainstream policies, which seek to ‘roll back the state’ and 
achieve static market-based allocative efficiency and price stability.  
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 See Dagdeviren et al (2002) and Weeks et al (2002). 
11
 See Rao (2002). 
12
 See Pasha (2002, p.3). 
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Second, pro-poor growth is equity-based growth,13 or growth through 
redistribution. Pro-poor growth not only needs to be faster, it must also benefit the 
poor more than the rich in order to reduce absolute as well as relative poverty.14 It 
is essential to shift the pattern of growth in a more equitable direction in order to 
achieve MDGs as rapidly as possible and, in any case, by 2015. 
 
Third, redistribution and growth should be pursued directly, in other words, they 
should be independent from trickle-down; moreover, the ensuing social welfare 
improvements should not be merely marginal: they must be unambiguous across a 
broad spectrum of measure of welfare.  
 
Experience shows that the countries that have achieved the most significant 
successes in poverty reduction have combined economic growth with structural 
economic transformations and greater equity both before and through the process 
of growth.15 This is not necessarily because equality is, in general, beneficial for 
growth.16 The relationship between these variables, if any, plays no role in the 
choice of pro-poor rather than mainstream growth strategies. For, in the pro-poor 
regime, equality is not an instrument to achieve growth maximisation, and the 
success of pro-poor strategies should not be judged primarily by the achievement 
of high GDP growth rates. Quite the contrary: in pro-poor strategies economic 
growth serves equality, and growth is conditioned by (and it should be conditional 
upon) the reduction of absolute and relative poverty and the improvement of the 
living standard of the majority of the population.  
 
Distribution plays an important role in pro-poor strategies at two levels. First, pro-
poor goals can be achieved more easily if the distribution of assets is modified by 
 
                                                          
 
 
13
 See McKinley (2003). 
14
 See, for example, McKinley (2003) and Weeks (2003, p.3). 
15
 See Pasha (2002). 
16
 This relationship has been disputed; for a survey, see Cramer (2000). 
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public policy, for example, through land reform,17 universalising basic education, 
skills and training programmes, the introduction of pensions and other welfare 
entitlements, and so on.18 In fact, ‘empirical evidence ... consistently indicates that 
size distributions of income are quite stable, in the absence of radical changes in 
institutions and political power’.19 Second, the dynamic processes of income 
generation and distribution also need to be transformed in order to benefit the poor 
disproportionately. This includes support for the development of strategic 
economic activities, directed credit lines, employment generation programmes, the 
creation of labour scarcities, incentives for wage increases for low-skilled 
workers, and so on (see section 5.2).20  
 
5.1.3 – Pro-Poor Growth Policy Framework 
 
Pro-poor policies pursue real (rather than nominal or monetary) goals, and the 
achievement of these goals requires the harnessing of all the available policy 
tools. This implies that nominal targets or anchors can play at best a secondary 
role in pro-poor strategies (see section 5.3). In order to achieve these objectives 
pro-poor policies need to be consistent, democratic and co-ordinated. 
 
Macroeconomic policy consistency includes both sustainability and efficiency. 
Sustainable policies should not create severe macroeconomic turbulence or 
generate major welfare traps and disincentives. Unsustainable policies cannot be 
maintained in the long-term, and they should normally be avoided even for short 
periods. 
 
                                                          
 
 
17
 ‘In most countries, redistribution of land to the poor will produce both efficiency gains and 
immediate benefits for the poor. Apart from bestowing the rent of land on cultivators, a more equal 
land distribution will raise labor incomes by raising both land yield and the demand for labor’ 
(Rao 2002).  
18
 ‘[M]acroeconomic policies can influence whether growth is pro-poor, but ... such policies 
cannot be a substitute for an equitable distribution of productive assets’ (McKinley 2001). 
19
 Rao (2002). 
20
 ‘[R]edistributive policies ensure lower poverty today, and faster reduction of poverty in the 
future’ (Osmani 2001, p.38). See also McKinley (2003) and Pasha (2002). 
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Pro-poor policies also need to be efficient, or achieve their stated objectives at the 
lowest possible cost (including the costs of implementation and monitoring). 
Policy efficiency is not given ex ante or in the abstract; it varies with the country 
and its circumstances, and it needs to be assessed continually. NMPC policies, for 
example, can be very costly (see sections 3 and 4). They tend to be excessively 
contractionary, induce unemployment, deindustrialisation, the build-up of excess 
foreign and domestic public debt and asset bubbles, and foster foreign currency 
waste in luxury imports and asset bubbles, among other ills. Excessively loose 
monetary policies can also be costly, because they can trigger consumption 
bubbles, malinvestment, inflation, capital flight and balance of payments crises. 
The potential costs of misguided macroeconomic policies and their distributive 
implications should be considered in order to calibrate the use of different 
instruments and facilitate the achievement of MDGs.  
 
There can be no guarantee that pro-poor monetary policies (explained in section 
5.3) will be less costly than the alternatives. In order to minimise their cost and 
check their internal consistency it is important to foster an environment in which 
the objectives of public policy are constantly scrutinised, the efficiency of the 
chosen instruments is continually assessed, and the policy outcomes are regularly 
checked against the initial goals.  
 
In other words, pro-poor policies must be democratically accountable. Although 
policy accountability can help to ensure the consistency and efficiency of 
macroeconomic policy, its importance is not primarily instrumental. 
Macroeconomic policy plays a key role in the determination of the levels of 
welfare, the work patterns and the material prospects of the majority of the 
population.  
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The only legitimate way to select the targets for government action and the 
appropriate policy tools is by involving the legislature and civil society in the 
choice, implementation and assessment of macroeconomic policy. This is 
especially important because the desired pro-poor outcomes are both complex and 
diverse; moreover, multiple restrictions affect macroeconomic policy, the 
potential policy tools are diverse, and there is a non-linear relationship between 
economic circumstances, policies and outcomes. Democratic participation and 
accountability will enhance the legitimacy of the government’s policy objectives, 
buttress the regulatory framework required by the chosen policies, and help to 
assess the implications of deviations from the selected targets. In addition to this, 
mass participation in policy debates will afford people the chance to influence the 
design of policies that will redistribute income and opportunities in the country.21 
These debates about macroeconomic policy should be welcomed, because it will 
help to break the monopoly of the moneyed interests, professional politicians, paid 
advisors, lobbyists and established academics in the selection, implementation and 
evaluation of economic policy. Paraphrasing Milton Friedman, economic policy is 
too important to be left to the policy-makers. 
 
Finally, pro-poor policies need to be co-ordinated, at two levels. First, pro-poor 
objectives are complex, and they can be achieved only through the use of a large 
number of policy instruments. These instruments do not operate in isolation from 
one another. In the case of monetary policy, for example,  
 
[c]oordination is necessary because ... all policy tools interact with each 
other, and what occurs when a government uses any given tool depends on 
the state of the other tools and on conditions prevailing at the time. So 
coordination of several policy tools is vital. The more coordination there is 
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 See Weller and Hersh (2004, p.482). 
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among monetary tools, and between them and other policy tools, the more 
workable monetary policy is expected to be.22 
 
Therefore, pro-poor monetary policies should be closely co-ordinated with fiscal, 
financial, trade, exchange rate and other policies (see section 5.3.3).  
 
Second, pro-poor policies also require co-ordination between private and public 
sector activities and the regulation of intersectoral and intertemporal resource 
allocation (including international capital flows) by the state through activist 
industrial and financial policies. This is not because the state is either necessarily 
efficient or inherently ‘good’. Policy activism and state-led co-ordination of 
public-private activity are necessary because the state is a fundamental tool of 
collective action. The state is the only democratically accountable institution that 
can influence the pattern of employment, the production and distribution of goods 
and services and the distribution of income and assets. Only the state can limit the 
power of private interests, raise sufficient funds for democratic economic reforms, 
and ensure that the demands of the majority guide private economic activity: 
 
In forming an alternative development strategy, the state might most 
usefully conceive of its role toward the private sector as one of 
constructing or shaping markets in ways that direct the private sector 
toward social ends. There are of course limits on the extent to which the 
state can direct private businesses; they exist, after all, to make profits. 
Nonetheless, within broad limits the state can move business toward social 
ends.23 
 
The expansion of economic and political democracy requires the extension of the 
political sphere and the (re)construction of state policy-making and managerial 
 
                                                          
 
 
22
 Sicsú (2001, p.674). 
23
 MacEwan (2003). 
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capacity in many poor countries. This will require, among other things, 
dismantling at least partially the administrative and policy structures that currently 
rival the state institutions in those countries, and reducing the interference of 
NGOs and international organisations on the selection, management and appraisal 
of investment programmes, even when they are aid-funded (see section 5.2).24 
This does not imply that the state should aim to ‘take over’ the economy. Pro-poor 
economic strategies are distinctive not because the state manages individual firms, 
but because of the way in which the state co-ordinates economic activity for 
democratic and distributive ends. State ownership of specific assets is a secondary 
and relatively unimportant issue. What matters are the objectives of government 
policy, and how state institutions interact with one another and with private 
concerns. 
 
Policy consistency, accountability and co-ordination imply that policy rules have 
only a very limited role to play in pro-poor strategies. Policy discretion is usually 
more appropriate, because only discretion is compatible with the continuous 
search for the most efficient combination of instruments and targets to deliver pro-
poor outcomes, the accountability of the state, and the preservation of 
macroeconomic stability. Policy rules, however worthwhile in themselves, cannot 
be allowed to overrule the democratic process. Government objectives, whether 
real or nominal, should always be open to scrutiny, and these debates must play an 
important part in the formulation, implementation and assessment of economic 
policy.  
 
5.1.4 – Policy Objectives and Constraints 
 
The accomplishment of pro-poor goals such as MDGs is subject to several 
constraints. They include, for example, the minimisation of economic volatility, 
inflation and the domestic public debt, balance of payments equilibrium and the 
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stabilisation of the real exchange rate. These objectives and constraints can be 
usefully summarised by achieving MDGs subject to macroeconomic stability.  
 
The reader may wonder why economic growth does not figure either as the 
principal objective or as the most important constraint to pro-poor growth. The 
reason, as was indicated in section 5.1.2, is that growth is not an end in itself. 
Growth is a source of resources for greater human welfare – it is a means to an 
end. What really matters is whether growth is translated into human development 
and poverty reduction in particular.25 Similarly, economic stability is a constraint 
to be managed, rather than an objective in itself.  
 
It is important to distinguish clearly between pro-poor goals (such as MDGs) and 
constraints (macroeconomic stability). Pro-poor policy goals include an array of 
desirable outcomes that should be described in detail and achieved within a given 
time-frame. In contrast, the macroeconomic constraints should not be defined 
clearly: the optimal policy is constructive ambiguity (or deliberate lack of 
clarity).26 Listing a set of restrictions to government action (such as maximum 
fiscal deficits, inflation rates or exchange rate levels), many of them determined 
arbitrarily, side-by-side with the pro-poor targets devalues the latter, introduces 
artificial limitations to the government’s programmes and confuses policy 
implementation because it signals that the government is only conditionally 
committed to its pro-poor objectives. For example, what should the government 
do if it had announced that the maximum acceptable inflation rate is 10 per cent, 
and inflation reached 12 per cent? Which of the pre-announced government 
commitments will be abandoned – the maximum inflation rate or the pro-poor 
income, housing and health programmes?  
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 See McKinley (2001). 
26
 Following, in a different context, the suggestion of Carare and Stone (2003, p.20); see section 
1.4.2. 
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Macroeconomic instability should be avoided because it could impair the 
achievement of the pro-poor targets either directly (if inflation redistributes 
income towards the rich, or if exchange rate instability limits essential imports), or 
indirectly (if it triggers capital flight, erodes popular support for the government, 
or offers easy targets for the opposition). However, stability – just like growth – is 
a means to an end, and it matters only insofar as it facilitates the achievement of 
socially desirable objectives. The government will decide how best to address any 
macroeconomic imbalances in order to ensure the success of its pro-poor 
programmes.  
 
5.1.5 – Possible Objections 
 
Pro-poor rhetoric is rapidly becoming fashionable. It frequently appears even in 
IMF documents, and there is the risk that this concept will be diluted beyond 
recognition. No one seems to be against some form of ‘pro-poor’ growth – but, in 
some cases, this is simply a fig-leaf for the same old growth strategy that has 
already failed to deliver in most countries. 
 
Arguments against pro-poor strategies could be divided into three groups. First, at 
a static level, some countries are ‘too poor to redistribute’ – their per capita 
income is so low that redistribution would have little impact on the level of 
poverty. This argument has been shown to be invalid: redistribution can help both 
statically and over time.27 Second, at a dynamic level, there may be a trade-off 
between growth and distribution: although distribution can reduce poverty to 
some extent, economic growth does so in a more sustainable manner. This 
argument is fallacious, because economic growth always redistributes income and 
wealth (see section 5.1.1). Therefore, the distinction between static and dynamic 
redistribution is purely analytical; in reality, they are inseparable. Since 
redistribution is inherent in the growth of a market economy, it is appropriate that 
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it be subjected to policy influence, through a democratically chosen development 
strategy.28 
 
Finally, it could be argued that pro-poor strategies are difficult to implement, and 
several governments have failed dismally in their attempts to follow similar 
strategies in the past. This is a serious argument, and there is no guarantee that the 
future will not bring similar failures. However, pro-poor goals are inherently 
worthwhile, and government policy is at least formally accountable to the 
majority through democratic political channels. This is more than can be claimed 
for the international financial institutions, which claim to offer ‘guidance’ to 
developing countries, and the (financial) markets that wish to lead the growth 
process (see sections 3.5 and 3.6). 
 
5.2 – Pro-Poor Macroeconomic Policies 
 
The previous section has outlined the basic objectives and limitations of pro-poor 
and democratic economic strategies. This section develops, in more detail, five 
elements of these strategies. They include the importance of growth and 
investment, fiscal policy and public investment issues, employment and 
productivity, the external sector and the role of social programmes in pro-poor 
development programmes. 
 
5.2.1 – Growth and Investment 
 
It was shown in section 5.1.1 that economic growth is critically important for the 
success of pro-poor development strategies. Sustained economic growth is one of 
the key driving factors behind the reduction of world poverty; moreover, if it is 
equitable and appropriately targeted, growth can also contribute decisively for the 
improvement of the relative position of the poor (see section 5.1.2).  
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Economic growth contributes to poverty reduction in many different ways. 
Growth increases the availability of goods and services and expands the country’s 
consumption possibilities. It creates employment, expands markets and sales 
income, and raises wages through the creation of labour scarcities (see section 
5.1.1). Growth also helps to fund distributive social programmes and finances the 
provision of public goods. Finally, economic growth can also help to generate the 
savings and the financial development required to fund investment and consumer 
spending. In the absence of growth (and, secondarily, foreign transfers, such as 
international aid and debt forgiveness, see section 5.3.4) poverty-reducing 
outcomes depend to a much greater extent on distribution, which can generate 
severe political tensions.  
 
These principles imply that pro-poor strategies are ‘bolder and more 
expansionary’29 than what is permissible under the mainstream policy compact 
that inspires the NMPC. However, high growth rates are insufficient. The 
relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction is determined by the 
distribution of income and, especially, its distribution near the poverty line, which 
depends on the circumstances of each country. In order to maximise its 
distributive and poverty-alleviating impact growth should, in general, be 
concentrated in two areas of the economy. First, the sectors that directly benefit 
the poor: those where the poor work, that generate income and employment for 
the poor, and that produce goods and services consumed primarily by the poor 
(for example, small-scale agriculture, construction and the informal sector).30  
 
Second, growth should be geared toward the promotion of investment. Although 
investment is the driving force of growth,31 growth is also the driving force of 
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 McKinley (2004, p.1). 
30
 See Pasha (2002). 
31
 There is no question that higher rates of capital formation are associated with higher growth 
rates; see, for example, Weller and Hersh (2004, p.492). 
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investment because rapid and sustained growth generates the demand that makes 
individual investment projects viable.32 Moreover, low investment rates delay and 
complicate the task of reallocating economic resources towards pro-poor 
objectives. The manipulation of interest rates is likely to prove insufficient to the 
task of inducing the required levels of investment, since there is no evidence that 
marginal shifts in interest rates can trigger the desired response.33 In order to kick-
start the virtuous circle of growth and rising investment the state needs to identify 
the sectors that hold the key to rapid growth, the reduction of inequality and the 
alleviation of the balance of payments constraint (see section 5.2.4). Their 
expansion should be fostered through targeted (vertical) industrial policies, public 
investment and focused incentives for the expansion of capacity and output: 
 
The concept of ‘focused’ incentives excludes the traditional sort of broad 
investment incentives often employed by governments – tax holidays for 
investments of any type or general protections from foreign competition. 
In shaping an alternative economic development strategy, a government 
does not simply want more investment; it wants more investment of a 
certain kind. This requires that incentives be focused.34 
 
In the middle-income countries these government policy priorities should be 
funded primarily by domestic sources. Foreign savings tend to be unreliable, 
difficult to target, and they are often inimical to pro-poor objectives.35 Raising the 
necessary resources domestically will require a concerted effort, since the 
available savings rates are usually insufficient to support ambitious pro-poor 
objectives. In most countries it will be necessary to increase tax rates through a 
more progressive tax system, the taxation of unearned incomes, and the additional 
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 See McKinley (2001) and Rao (2002). 
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 See Rao (2002). 
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 MacEwan (2003). 
35
 The suggestion that countries should rely primarily on domestic rather than foreign savings is 
supported by the pioneering work of Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and by more recent research by 
Calvo, Leiderman and Heinhart (1993). For a political economy interpretation, see Palma (1998). 
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tax revenues generated by economic growth. It will also be necessary for the state 
to set up or expand long-term savings programmes jointly with the private 
financial system in order to fund pensions, the expansion of housing and 
infrastructure, education and training programmes and other costly pro-poor 
projects. In contrast, in very poor countries the savings potentially available could 
be insufficient to permit the achievement of MDGs (or other pro-poor objectives) 
even under the best possible combination of policies. In this case, the rapid 
success of pro-poor strategies may require the expansion of foreign aid flows, 
other unrequited transfers (such as workers’ remittances) and debt forgiveness.36 
 
5.2.2 – Fiscal Policy and Public Investment 
 
Fiscal policy is a powerful tool for macroeconomic policy, and it is critically 
important for pro-poor programmes.37 The standard (NMPC and Washington 
consensus) macroeconomic framework argues that the size of the public sector 
should be kept to a minimum because low taxes, limited regulation and limited 
public investment will create incentives for private sector activity, which should 
lead the process of growth and bring about the alleviation of poverty. In contrast, 
pro-poor strategies require that the public sector should induce, regulate and 
sustain the process of growth, direct significant resources to priority sectors and 
preserve macroeconomic stability, since middle-income and poor countries are 
prone to experience more severe economic crises with greater frequency than the 
rich economies.38 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
36
 ‘[T]he bulk of the extra investment in basic services and anti-poverty programmes will have to 
come from domestic resources, not from external sources. However, this does not diminish the 
marginal value of ODA. Indeed, foreign aid can play a critical role in overcoming obstacles in the 
transitory phase towards pro-poor policies since the latter are bound to meet stiff resistance from 
several quarters’ (Vandemoortele 2004, p.16). 
37
 For a reassessment of the importance of fiscal policy, see Arestis and Saywer (2003). Pro-poor 
fiscal policy is reviewed in detail by Kakwani and Son (2001) and Weeks (2003). 
38
 Weller and Hersh (2004, p.488) claim that the volatility of growth hurts the poor even more than 
low growth rates. 
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Let us start from public investment and public expenditures more generally. They 
can boost aggregate demand (potentially sparking the recovery of a stagnant 
economy), loosen the supply constraints on long-term growth and help the 
reallocation of resources towards poverty reduction objectives, especially in 
economies operating below potential.  
 
Although mainstream economics insists that public investment crowds out (and is 
less efficient than) private investment, the literature offers no firm evidence 
supporting this claim. Quite the contrary: a significant body of work indicates that 
public investment can crowd in private investment either in complementary areas 
of the economy or in upstream or downstream activities (e.g., supplies of inputs 
and consumables, maintenance, trading and financial services, labour training and 
supply and so on). Public investment can also support private investment directly 
if it builds physical infrastructure (rural roads and ports, irrigation systems, 
electricity generating capacity and transmission lines, and so on), boosts labour 
productivity (through public education and training programmes, health provision, 
etc.), or fosters private savings:  
 
Contrary to the view that higher fiscal deficits ‘crowd-out’ private 
investment by raising interest rates, there is persuasive empirical evidence 
that if higher fiscal deficits are caused by larger public investment outlays 
then this may actually ‘crowd-in’ private investment on a net basis by 
removing physical bottlenecks of infrastructure and thereby raising the 
factor productivity of private investment. In addition, larger public outlays 
on education and health raise the productivity of the poor and equip them 
better to get out of the poverty trap.39 
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 Pasha (2002). Alternatively, ‘[p]ublic investment plays a leading role in stimulating growth by 
inducing greater private investment, both domestic and foreign, and by counteracting the 
contractionary effects of such policies as import-depressing devaluation. If properly designed, 
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Public investment can also support foreign investment in the country: 
 
[T]wo [Asian] countries with the strongest public investment programmes, 
China and Vietnam, also had the highest rates of growth. Both countries 
attached large inflows of foreign direct investment, suggesting that, at 
least, major public investments did not discourage such inflows and may 
have facilitated them.40 
 
Evidence shows, first, that public investment has played a key role in fostering 
growth and reducing poverty in several dynamic economies, especially in East 
Asia,41 and, second, that when public investment falters private sector profitability 
often declines, reducing the resources available for investment.42 In this sense, 
adequate levels of public investment can be essential for sustained pro-poor 
growth. 
 
In order to support economic stabilisation and large public investment 
programmes poor country governments need to jettison the excessively restrictive 
fiscal policy stance imposed by the NMPC and the Washington consensus and 
adopt more proactive policies.43 This is not necessarily inflationary – in fact, there 
is no evident relationship between fiscal deficits and inflation.44 Nevertheless, it is 
better to err on the side of stability rather than to generate unsustainable 
disequilibria, especially given the size of the social and investment programmes 
required by a pro-poor growth strategy. Experience indicates that if public deficits 
are used to finance investment that expands aggregate supply, and as long as they 
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 Weeks (2003). 
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 See Vandemoortele (2004) and Weeks (2003). 
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 McKinley (2004, p.9); see also Rao (2002). 
43
 ‘[T]he obsession with eliminating fiscal deficits (and, thereby, current account deficits), if 
achieved through cutbacks in public expenditure, especially on development and social services, 
has retarded the process of growth and created more poverty’ (Pasha 2002). 
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 See Fischer, Sahay and Végh (2002, pp.876-7). 
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are financed in a sustainable fashion (i.e., if the additional public debt can be paid 
off by the tax revenues generated by future growth) their impact should not be 
unduly inflationary either in he short or the long-term.45 Alternatively, if the 
government monetises the deficit, perhaps because the financial markets in very 
poor countries are insufficiently developed, care must be taken not to fuel 
aggregate demand excessively because of its inflationary implications. 
 
Proactive and pro-poor fiscal policy can be sustainable only if the tax system of 
poor countries is modernised and expanded.46 Tax revenues play a fundamental 
role in the mobilisation of resources for the allocative, distributive, growth and 
stabilisation functions of the state in poor countries, especially in the light of their 
weak financial systems (see below).47 However, this potential source of funds has 
been both underestimated and underutilised: 
 
The evidence clearly shows that the tax system in many countries has 
become less equitable and less pro-poor. Reforms are urgently needed in 
direct and indirect tax policies to generate more domestic resources for the 
MDGs and do so in a more progressive way.48 
 
There is a lot of scope for increasing tax revenues in developing countries and, 
simultaneously, to distribute income. These tax reforms will require the stricter 
enforcement of the existing tax laws, higher tax rates, closing the existing 
loopholes and eliminating many of the exemptions and deductions favouring the 
rich, taxing wealth and large or second properties in rural and urban areas, and 
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 See Rao (2002). 
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 ‘[T]he viability of an alternative program of social reform depends on more tax revenue’ 
(MacEwan 2003). 
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 ‘Whether or not higher taxes retard economic growth depends a great deal on what is done with 
those taxes – i.e., on how the government spends the money. If, for example, the government 
spends the money on creating a more effective infrastructure and a more productive workforce, the 
higher taxes are likely to lead to more, not less economic growth’ (MacEwan 2003). 
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taxing interest income, capital gains and international capital flows.49 The most 
important constraint to the expansion of the tax base is not economic or 
managerial (although these are surely relevant) – it is political. However, domestic 
pressures for economic privileges or threats of capital flight should not prevent the 
state from mobilising domestic resources: 
 
While systematic international evidence of the relationship between tax 
rates and capital movements is generally lacking, experience within the 
United States is instructive. There are no restrictions on capital movements 
among the fifty states, but state governments have a good deal of taxing 
and spending authority. Thus the United States economy provides a useful 
basis on which to draw general inferences about the response of business 
location decisions to government taxation and spending policy. The 
evidence from U.S. experience suggests that governments’ 
macroeconomic policies certainly make a difference for business location 
decisions, but overall there remains a good deal of leeway for government 
action.50 
 
In sum, pro-poor programmes require more expansionary fiscal policies funded by 
a larger tax base. However, it is important to avoid exaggeration – but not because 
of groundless fears about inflation. Critics of the mainstream often argue that pro-
poor strategies require loose fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies (see 
sections 5.2.4 and 5.3). This suggestion is potentially risky for three reasons. First, 
support for these ‘fully expansionary policies’ draws upon a narrow reading of the 
experience of the United States and large Western European economies between 
the early twentieth century and the mid-seventies. These countries could either 
print the world currency (especially Britain before World War 1 and the US after 
World War 2), or they had much easier access to foreign currency than today’s 
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poor countries. This experience is hardly relevant to most poor countries, whose 
balance of payments constraint is much tighter.  
 
Second, in poor countries loose fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies could 
generate unsustainable booms that would be destabilising both economically and 
politically. This is especially true for economies that are initially locked in 
stabilisation traps – that is, starved of investment for long periods, and where high 
unemployment coexists with low spare capacity in key sectors of the economy 
(see section 4.5). In these cases, a sudden and radical policy reversal could trigger 
accelerating inflation and send the currency spiralling downwards.  
 
Third, the ‘fully’ expansionary option is not always politically feasible. The rapid 
shift of the fiscal stance and the build-up of the domestic public debt could easily 
become a lightning rod for the critics of the government’s strategy. A rapid 
deterioration of the fiscal balance is likely to bring the wrath of the IMF, World 
Bank and the US Treasury Department and heavy criticism by the local media and 
the financial sector. This could destabilise the government, trigger capital flight, 
speculation with foreign currency or treasury bills, inflation and a balance of 
payments crisis before the expansionary and distributive impact of the 
government’s pro-poor policies could be felt. 
 
Recent experiences in Latin America and elsewhere show that excessive fiscal, 
monetary and exchange rate policy laxity can block economic growth, generate 
political instability and prevent the accomplishment of pro-poor objectives.51 In 
order to achieve the desirable outcomes, fiscal policy should be calibrated in order 
to deliver what monetary and exchange rate policies cannot offer, especially in 
poor countries: targeted investment programmes, incentives for the private sector 
to support the government’s pro-poor goals, and economic stabilisation when this 
becomes necessary.  
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5.2.3 – Employment and Productivity 
 
Fiscal policy can offer an important contribution for the expansion of employment 
opportunities, technological innovation and productivity growth in developing 
countries.  
 
It is essential to upgrade the technological and productive capabilities of poor 
countries because productivity gains are the key to sustained growth and rising 
incomes in the long-run.52 These gains can be achieved in at least two different 
ways.53 One is the development of mass production facilities where low-paid 
unskilled workers engage in repetitive tasks at high speed in traditional plantations 
or in manufacturing industries producing clothing, shoes or established electronic 
products, as in Mexico’s maquiladoras or in most Asian export processing zones. 
Alternatively, highly paid skilled workers could be expected to make decisions 
about their tasks, work co-operatively and apply sophisticated technical skills in 
the services industry, specialised agricultural production or the manufacture of 
sophisticated electronic goods, fine chemicals and machinery made to order. 
Obviously most middle-income and poor countries cannot move directly into 
these highly advanced production processes because they lack the technology, 
infrastructure, skills, managerial capacity and finance to do so. However, this type 
of development is precisely that which pro-poor and democratic economic 
programmes should aim for, even if they are achievable only in the medium and 
the long-run, and only in certain areas of the economy.  
  
The ‘high road’ to productivity growth offers several advantages.54 It opens 
valuable export opportunities, that help to relieve the balance of payments 
constraint (see section 5.2.4). It requires the development of chains of related 
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 McKinley (2003). 
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 See MacEwan (2003). 
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 See Korzeniewicz and Smith (2000) and Ocampo (1998, 2002). 
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activities that, if internalised, can generate employment and growth in other areas 
of the economy. It demands (and supplies) a skilled workforce that can be trained 
by public education programmes and that could transfer their know-how to other 
areas of the economy, or open small businesses. These workers will be better paid 
than the average, which will help to raise the demands of the workers employed 
elsewhere. Finally, these firms can set high standards of workplace safety and 
security that will facilitate the regulation and, eventually, the elimination of 
degrading and unsafe working conditions in other areas of the economy (e.g., in 
sweatshops).  
 
These outcomes are neither necessary nor automatic. Higher productivity and 
profitability give firms the scope to improve pay and conditions, but the market 
does not always spontaneously generate exports, internalise value chains, pay 
salaries commensurate with productivity or deliver minimum health standards in 
the workplace. State regulation and incentives are essential to achieve these 
outcomes.  
 
Regulation should make it difficult for firms to increase profitability by cutting 
wages, arbitrarily extending the working day or bypassing the existing health and 
safety rules. Productivity growth and better working conditions can be supported 
by legislation supporting trade union activity, rising minimum wages, and the 
offer of tax and other incentives for investment in priority sectors, the introduction 
of new technologies and the payment of high wages. These policies can be partly 
funded by progressive income taxes and social security contributions (see section 
5.2.2).  
 
Relatively high wages will ensure that the most productive firms will reap 
extraordinary profits while their inefficient competitors face losses. Export 
incentives and targeted import protection (to the maximum extent permitted under 
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WTO rules) will offer an alternative avenue for profitability and growth.55 At the 
same time, the workers left unemployed because of the bankruptcy of the 
inefficient firms or the declining availability of low-paid jobs should be retrained 
with public funds in order to find more productive and better-paying 
employment.56 These medium-term policies can help to raise economic 
productivity, increase the flexibility of the labour markets and reduce structural 
unemployment, while creating incentives for exports and for long-term 
productivity growth in industry, large-scale agriculture and the services sector.57  
 
In parallel, and at a more immediate level, it is essential to offer incentives for the 
development of labour-intensive industries producing non-tradable goods because 
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 ‘Cambodia, Mongolia and Nepal have banked heavily on garment and textile exports but 
international competition is intense in these subsectors and foreign direct investment is footloose. 
The [case of] Sri Lanka ... warns that too many developing countries are specializing in the same 
low-value-added products such as garments and have not diversified their manufactured exports. 
Instead, they should be concentrating on relatively income elastic and price inelastic export 
products’ (McKinley 2003). 
56
 ‘One example of focused incentives ... is a “training-for-jobs” program. In such a program, the 
government provides training programs that prepare workers with the specific technical skills 
needed by a firm. The firm, in return, makes an investment and hires the already-trained workers. 
A training-for-jobs program lowers costs for an investor and thus provides an incentive in the same 
manner as does a tax holiday ... [but] a training-for-jobs program has a special advantage over 
other forms of investment incentives. Even if the firm moves away, society has raised the skill 
level of its workers who remain. While specific skills are not always transferable to other 
activities, in acquiring those specific skills workers have necessarily gained a valuable general 
skill, a greater capacity to learn. Training-for-jobs programs ... [are funded through a] “levy-grant 
system” ... in many countries. The government creates a small new tax (one or two percent of 
earnings) on firms – the levy; but firms receive a rebate – the grant – if they implement training 
programs that raise the technological level of their work forces’ (MacEwan 2003).  
57
 ‘[A] coordinated policy of support for education and training coupled with protection of 
production activities based on relatively high levels of skill can be advantageous in terms of 
maximizing income over the longer run ... [T]he reasons are well known ... protection allows the 
development of activities that will be consistent with the longer run availabilities of skilled labor 
(given the programs of education and training); the development of these activities themselves 
creates new skills, as people learn by doing; and these sorts of activities generate extensive 
externalities that tend to spread new skills through the general workforce. A policy of protection 
may be viewed as an investment: a cost (higher prices for goods) incurred in the short-run in order 
to gain in the long-run (higher and more rapid growth of productivity). Through programs of skill 
upgrading and protection, a government can promote decisions that are consistent with the markets 
that will exist ... [O]ne lesson [from South Korea and other countries in East Asia] is that an 
emphasis on education and training coupled with regulation of a country’s foreign commerce can 
yield substantial gains. In fact, it would appear that all countries that have achieved development – 
from Japan to Western Europe to the United States – have done so with extensive government 
regulation of foreign commerce’ (MacEwan 2003). 
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of their employment-generating potential. These industries (especially small-scale 
agriculture, construction, small-scale workshops and some services industries, as 
well as public works) can support the absorption of the labour force and offer 
opportunities for on-the-job training for entrants on the formal labour markets.58 
At the same time, they could help to relieve localised supply constraints, for 
example, through the supply of food, inputs for the manufacturing industry, 
exportables or the construction of rural roads or irrigation facilities in public 
works programmes. These incentives and works programmes can be funded by 
general taxation (at any level of government) and by targeted credit by state-
owned and private financial institutions. Although the state should aim to provide 
opportunities for employment for all, it should not commit itself to the elimination 
of unemployment, for example through an ‘employment of last resort’ 
programme, at least initially, because of its fiscal and inflationary implications.59 
 
In most poor countries it is especially important to support the development of 
agriculture and its linkages with other economic sectors for three reasons: its 
current economic importance, the fact that most poor people live in rural areas, 
and the potentially severe dislocations to labour and agricultural production due to 
WTO-sponsored trade liberalisation. The Chinese, Indonesian and Vietnamese 
strategies between the seventies and the nineties can provide valuable examples 
for other developing countries as they attempt to raise agricultural productivity, 
boost the links with agriculture and other dynamic economic activities and 
increase the scope for the production of exportable goods.60 In order to do this, it 
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 ‘As the level of income is the key determinant of poverty and as productive employment is the 
principal source of income, expanding gainful employment opportunities has to be a major 
element in the strategy of poverty reduction... employment growth depends upon the growth of the 
economy... The rate of employment growth is also influenced by the sectoral composition of 
economic growth, the choice of technology and the degree of effective functioning of the labour 
market. If economic growth is concentrated in sectors in which most of the poor work, then this is 
likely to have a positive impact on poverty reduction’ (Pasha and Palanivel 2004, p.16). See also 
McKinley (2003). 
59
 For a critique of these programmes, see López-Gallardo (2000). 
60
 See Karshenas (2001). 
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may be necessary to transform significantly the existing land tenure systems and 
invest heavily in better technology and physical and social infrastructure: 
 
Very few countries in the world have experienced rapid and sustained 
growth without agricultural growth either preceding or accompanying it... 
strong agricultural growth has been a feature of countries that have 
successfully reduced poverty at different times... for the same rate of 
economic growth, the impact on poverty is likely to be more pronounced 
the faster the rate of agricultural growth.61 
 
Policies for promoting faster and sustainable agricultural development can focus 
on the  
 
[d]iversification of agriculture into labour-intensive high-value agricultural 
commodities such as horticulture and livestock for increased profit 
incentives and employment opportunities. This may require intervention 
by the state initially in the process of marketing and in providing minimum 
support prices to help farmers manage the risks of moving into new 
economic activities ... Strengthening of the backward and forward linkages 
between the agricultural sector and the off-farm sector in the rural areas in 
order to create a virtuous cycle of growth of incomes and employment ... 
[and the development] of small and medium-scale rural enterprises for agri 
processing and provision of agricultural inputs will require greater 
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 Pasha and Palanivel (2004, pp.18-19). Moreover, ‘[its] low productivity levels indicate that 
agriculture still retains considerable surplus labour, which nonfarm enterprises or urban 
manufacturing and services will have to absorb in the future. The lack of irrigated land and the 
slow growth of crop production in many ... [poor Asian] countries ... also suggests that there 
remains a substantial need for increased public investment in rural areas in order to boost 
productivity and increase output. This is critical for improving the conditions of the large numbers 
of rural poor ... [T]he countries that have made the most progress against poverty have 
concentrated efforts on agricultural and rural development’ (McKinley 2003). See also Kay 
(2002). 
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outreach for extension of rural credit, both farm and off-farm, by financial 
institutions, specialised or otherwise.62 
 
Focusing on low-productivity small-scale labour-intensive sectors such as family 
agriculture is unlikely to deliver the employment and productivity growth that are 
essential for the long-term success of a pro-poor development strategy. It is 
essential to plug these sectoral initiatives into broader programmes of education, 
training, technological development and labour transfer to high-productivity 
sectors in order to deliver higher productivity and better living standards for the 
poor.63 
 
The growth of the demand for skilled and unskilled labour, greater economic 
dynamism and more intense trade union activity will foster workers’ demands for 
better pay. This should be welcomed, because higher wages are essential to 
improve the welfare of the majority. However, wage growth cannot exceed 
productivity growth by a large margin and over long periods of time because of its 
potential implications for profitability, investment and the fiscal balance. This is a 
difficult dilemma, and short-term solutions will have to be negotiated sectorally. 
In certain sectors unit costs will decline as sales increase; in others costs may be 
constant or even increase, and certain sectors (e.g., public works and public 
services) will be funded entirely by general taxation – no solution will be optimal 
for all these sectors at the same time. In general, however, it is essential to give 
the maximum leeway for wage growth and equity through, on the one hand, 
sustained productivity growth and, on the other hand, centralised negotiations 
involving the workers, the employers and the government, in order to try to strike 
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 Pasha and Palanivel (2004, pp.30-31). 
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 ‘The longer-term objective of all development is to move the workforce, and poor workers in 
particular, out of low-productivity sectors, poorly resourced regions and low-skilled employment. 
In most cases, this would imply moving poor workers out of agriculture and into industry and a 
more modern service sector. If industry is able to grow rapidly enough and generate employment 
broadly enough, poverty will be reduced as a result of the movement of poor workers into higher-
productivity, higher-paid jobs’ (McKinley 2003). 
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a balance between wage growth, productivity growth and economic stability. In 
these negotiations regulation, targeted credit, export and employment incentives 
and public sector intervention are some of the instruments available to support the 
search for pro-poor outcomes.  
 
5.2.4 – The External Sector 
 
The currencies of poor countries do not function as international means of 
circulation or reserve value, and they do not serve as units of account for 
international transactions. This limitation severely restricts the ability of these 
countries to command resources in the world economy – it imposes a balance of 
payments constraint. The balance of payments constraint is probably the most 
important restriction to long-term growth in poor countries (see sections 3.3 and 
4.2). The rich countries have a more flexible balance of payments constraint, and 
they can almost always bypass supply bottlenecks through imports. In their case, 
the supply of labour is often the binding constraint to growth (and excess demand 
for labour can sometimes trigger inflation). In contrast, in the poor countries 
labour is relatively abundant, and it is the scarcity of foreign exchange that tends 
to limit growth.64 The binding constraint can trigger balance of payments crises, 
inflation, unemployment and other destabilising processes. 
 
The balance of payments constraint includes two types of restrictions, on trade 
(the current account) and capital flows (the capital and financial account). 
Washington consensus programmes recommend trade liberalisation in order to 
foster productivity growth, and the relaxation of the restrictions on capital flows in 
order to attract foreign savings that will finance any current account deficits. This 
recipe is not conducive to macroeconomic stability or the welfare of the poor, and 
it should be rejected. A different set of arrangements, compatible with 
macroeconomic stability and pro-poor outcomes, is outlined below. 
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The first element is the promotion of exports (see section 5.2.3). Export growth 
can give an important contribution to productivity growth because it exposes 
domestic producers to the stringent test of foreign markets. Exports also play an 
essential role in the generation of healthy trade surpluses and the accumulation of 
foreign currency reserves. This protective cushion is needed to allow poor 
countries to maintain exchange rate stability and expand their policy freedom to 
implement non-mainstream economic strategies. In the absence of sufficient 
currency reserves poor countries would be compelled to seek undesirable forms of 
finance in the international markets or borrow from the international financial 
organisations, whose conditionalities would severely limit the scope for pro-poor 
and democratic economic policies.  
 
Export growth requires a competitive exchange rate (see below) and co-ordinated 
industrial policy initiatives in order to develop competitive advantages in 
strategically important sectors.65 The promotion of domestic industries involves 
the government in the complex task of ‘picking winners’, which has been 
addressed successfully in several East Asian countries through the establishment 
of performance criteria.66 It goes without saying that these initiatives, and export 
promotion more generally, should avoid tilting incentives excessively towards the 
non-tradables sector. Although it is important to expand the production of non-
tradables because of its greater flexibility, simpler technology and large 
employment-generating potential, the production of tradables is vital for the long-
term progress of the country and the viability of its pro-poor development 
strategy. 
 
The second element is the import policy. In spite of myths to the contrary, 
‘openness and trade integration, either separately or together, do not have a 
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 See Amsden (1997, 2001) and Chang (1994). 
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measurable impact on long-run growth’.67 Trade must be liberalised cautiously 
because of the differential impact of liberalisation on large or strategically 
significant economic sectors, and on the poor: ‘it is incorrect to assume that trade 
liberalisation will automatically yield outcomes that are pro-poor, pro-jobs and 
pro-growth’.68 Rather,  
 
open trade is more a result of development rather than a prerequisite for it. 
As countries grow richer, they gradually take advantage of new 
opportunities offered by global trade. Trade follows development; it 
seldom leads development.69 
 
Rapid trade liberalisation and surging imports (especially if they are based on 
dumping strategies) should be avoided because of their potentially destabilising 
effects. In particular, vital economic sectors such as agriculture, construction and 
‘growth’ industries must be protected from unbridled liberalisation. Regulation is 
important not only because of the potentially severe social and economic 
dislocations of import liberalisation, but also because historical experience shows 
that relatively autonomous late development is possible only if domestic industry 
and agriculture are protected.70 
 
A pro-poor trade policy has to be linked to a broader industrial strategy, including 
clear avenues for productivity growth and the development of domestic 
production capabilities in selected areas. Increased trade may foster growth 
through the transfer of technology (through investment projects, the purchase of 
blueprints or the technology embodied in imported capital goods), and it may 
create opportunities for the development of new industries. However, these effects 
are likely to be limited: 
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[T]he positive effects of liberalization disappear over time, which is a 
pattern consistent with deregulation euphoria in the early years of 
liberalization, followed by macroeconomic instability and lower growth.71 
 
Import liberalisation could have a severe impact on the poor for three reasons. 
First, the benefits from trade can be concentrated in enclaves or increase the 
returns for skills or assets that are beyond the reach of the poor.72 Second, 
liberalisation may increase competition from low wage countries, reducing 
economic growth and the wages and employment opportunities of the poor. Third, 
heavily subsided exports from rich countries (including grain, sugar, cotton, fruit, 
meat and dairy products) can undermine the viability of small-scale agriculture 
and the livelihood of millions of rural poor.73 In their study of openness Weller 
and Hersh (2004) have concluded that  
 
the income shares of the poor are lower in countries with deregulated 
current and capital accounts compared to more regulated ones. This is not 
because trade is directly harmful for the poor but because of the 
institutional design under which trade is conducted ... [T]he short-term 
adverse effects of current and capital account deregulation on the income 
shares of the poor are not offset by faster income growth in the long-run, 
which could raise the possibility of faster income growth for the poor ... 
[because] liberalization has no robust impact on growth rates. But ... trade 
may have a beneficial effect on the income shares of the poor in the short-
run in a regulated environment ... [In sum,] countries where trade and 
capital flows [are] regulated ... do best for the poor.74 
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 Weller and Hersh (2004, p.499). 
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 ‘[T]he net impact [of trade liberalisation] on employment opportunities depends on how far 
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As was indicated above, pro-poor strategies require the regulation of the capital 
and financial account of the balance of payments. Capital account liberalisation 
can be extremely dangerous for poor and middle-income countries because of its 
potentially severe destabilising effects (see section 4.2). Unbridled liberalisation 
fosters the accumulation of excessive foreign debt, especially by banks, promotes 
speculative capital inflows that finance consumption more than investment, 
increases the country’s vulnerability to balance of payments crises and facilitates 
capital flight.75 In spite of the mainstream’s insistence on capital account 
liberalisation, this strategy does not contribute to macroeconomic stability and, 
even if it raises the economic growth rate in the short-term, this effect tends to 
disappear in the medium-term. In this context, balance of payments instability is 
especially damaging for the poor: 
 
The link between capital flows and incomes of the poor arises from a 
greater probability of financial crises in a liberalized environment. More 
capital flows, especially short-term portfolio flows, are often associated 
with a greater chance of financial crises ... [T]he burdens of financial crisis 
are disproportionately borne by a country’s poor ... Although high-income 
earners are more likely to hold financial assets and hence to be hurt by a 
crisis through declining asset values, low-income earners may be more 
likely to be affected by declining demand as unemployment rises ... [A]t 
the same time that economic crises increase the need for well-functioning 
social safety nets, unfettered capital flows limit governments’ abilities to 
design policies to help the poor when they need it most – in the middle of 
a crisis. The poor are the first to lose under such fiscal contractions, and 
the last to gain when crises subside and fiscal spending expands.76 
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Countries committed to a pro-poor development strategy must avoid capital 
account liberalisation for five reasons. First, as was explained above, capital 
controls support macroeconomic stability. Second, pro-poor strategies demand 
monetary policy autonomy (see section 5.3).77 Third, they also require the state to 
direct investment and other resource flows to growth-promoting and poverty-
reducing objectives (explained in sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3), which may conflict 
with the short-term interests of the domestic and international financial sector. 
Fourth, and more prosaically, capital controls are necessary to curb tax evasion, 
since the tax rates required to fund pro-poor programmes will be higher than 
abroad. Without capital controls pro-poor macroeconomic strategies are simply 
impossible.  
 
Several forms of capital control have been used recently by such diverse countries 
as Chile, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea and Sweden.78 In these countries, 
 
The use of controls has not resulted in interruptions of economic growth; 
on the contrary, when controls have been removed, as in Mexico in the 
early 1990s and in East Asia in the late 1990s, financial crises and severe 
economic downturns have been the result. Capital controls are not a fixed 
set of policies, and there are several different ways in which the flow of 
funds in and out of a country can be regulated ... Whatever form they take, 
controls over the movement of funds across a country’s borders are a 
necessary part of any general program of economic change; without such 
controls, a government cedes the regulation of its economy to international 
market forces, which often means the forces of large internationally 
operating firms and powerful governments of other countries.79 
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Forms of capital control can include, for example, restrictions on foreign currency 
bank accounts and currency transfers, taxes or administrative limits on outflows of 
direct and portfolio investment, restrictions on foreign payments for ‘technical 
assistance’ between connected firms, non-interest bearing ‘quarantines’ on 
investment inflows, controls on foreign borrowing and multiple exchange rates 
determined by the priority of each type of investment. These controls will impose 
an additional burden on the monetary authorities, but experience shows that the 
task is not beyond the capabilities of the central bank. The most significant 
obstacle to capital controls is political. 
 
Having said all this, the choice of a pro-poor exchange rate regime is 
comparatively simple. The choice lies between fixed exchange rate regimes 
(including currency boards), adjustable pegs and ‘dirty’ floating (free floating 
regimes are simply too unstable to be seriously considered). In order to preserve 
macroeconomic stability small countries, often poor and with very concentrated 
trade patterns, and countries where currency substitution is very advanced may be 
forced to adopt fixed exchange rate systems. This is not ideal, because it reduces 
the scope for pro-poor monetary policy initiatives (see section 5.3), but it may be 
unavoidable in the short-term. In this case, the role of pro-poor fiscal policy 
becomes even more important. 
 
Other countries may be able to count on additional degrees of freedom to adopt 
adjustable pegs or, even better, a ‘dirty’ floating exchange rate regime, which 
maximises the scope for monetary policy discretion. ‘Dirty’ floating creates the 
danger of real exchange rate instability, and the monetary authorities will need to 
beware of this risk.80 Although exchange rate overvaluation can offer immediate 
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benefits to the poor through cheaper imports and lower inflation, this type of 
‘exchange rate populism’ should be avoided. It can have destructive implications 
for the domestic productive base, in both industry and agriculture, and it can 
induce consumption and asset bubbles that may be difficult to neutralise. 
Experience suggests that export growth and the expansion of employment are 
more easily obtained with selective import protection, export incentives, capital 
controls and a moderately undervalued exchange rate.81 This may be achieved in 
different ways, including a relatively low currency peg (if this is relevant), 
expansionary monetary policies, the taxation and regulation of currency trading 
(especially in futures markets), capital controls and direct intervention in the 
currency markets.  
 
5.2.5 – Social Programmes 
 
Pro-poor economic strategies require specific polices and programmes to protect 
the poor and improve social welfare directly. Mainstream economic strategies 
claim that ‘trickle down’ and targeted social programmes can deliver significant 
benefits for the poor. However, this is not satisfactory by either social or 
economic criteria. It was shown in section 5.1 that adverse macroeconomic 
policies can overwhelm the impact of targeted programmes and, in mainstream 
strategies, they tend to contradict each other most of the time.82 In addition to this, 
targeted programmes are expensive to run, tend to miss out many potential 
claimants, are prone to corruption and allocation is always arbitrary at the margin: 
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industrial policy; see, for example, Agosín and Tussie (1993), Chang (1994) and Gereffi and 
Wyman (1990). 
82
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Narrowly targeted programmes are increasingly prescribed for reasons of 
efficiency and cost savings – for they claim to minimise leakage to the 
nonpoor ... As far as basic services are concerned, narrow targeting can 
have huge hidden costs. They result from the fact that it is often difficult to 
identify the poor and to reach them because the non-poor –most of who 
remain ‘near-poor’ – seldom fail to capture a large part of subsidies 
destined for more destitute people. Also, administering narrowly targeted 
programmes is at least twice as costly as running untargeted ones. In 
addition, the poor must frequently document eligibility—which involves 
expenses such as bus fares, apart from the social stigma they generate. 
Such out-of-pocket costs can be a real obstacle. Most importantly, 
however, is the fact that once the non-poor cease to have a stake in 
narrowly targeted programmes, the political commitment to sustain their 
scope and quality is at risk. The voice of the poor alone is usually too 
weak to maintain strong public support.83 
 
In order to maximise their pro-poor impact these policies and programmes should 
prioritise the provision of public goods and the social wage, rather than monetary 
handouts. Social programmes including the provision of public education, training 
and health provision, housing, water and sanitation, parks and public amenities, 
environmental preservation, the promotion of food security, and affordable 
clothing, shoes and public transportation can have relatively low managerial costs 
and they improve the standard of living of the poor directly:  
 
These [social] programs meet people’s basic needs, contributing to the 
reduction of poverty and to the equalization of the income distribution; 
they thus generate immediate benefits. Many of these programs ... 
contribute to people’s productivity, laying a foundation for more 
successful, long-term economic expansion. The production process to 
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create and operate social programs is often labour intensive, and thus their 
implementation tends to use the resource most abundant in low and middle 
income countries and, which is to say the same thing, tends to be 
employment-creating. The expansion of social programs generally does 
not require large amounts of foreign exchange, but can be undertaken 
mostly with domestic resources; it therefore does not excessively 
aggravate the foreign exchange problem ... Often these programs can be 
shaped in ways that directly and indirectly contribute to the development 
of democratic participation, which is valuable in itself and strengthens the 
foundation of change.84 
 
In many countries, the required administrative infrastructure is already in place, or 
it can be created at a relatively low cost. These programmes are also allowed by 
WTO rules as long as they do not discriminate between domestic products and 
imports.  
 
Public and social wage goods programmes can be rolled out gradually (e.g., one 
product or service at a time), making them relatively cheap and easy to run. They 
also include many of the advantages of targeted programmes, in spite of their 
universal coverage, which may be called ‘smart targeting’: public and wage goods 
programmes are universal because they are available to all, and they are also 
targeted because distinct social groups will be affected differently by each project 
or initiative. For example, subsidised staple foods sold in shops in poor areas (as 
in India) are available to all – but, in practice, the programme targets the poor both 
through its choice of product and the geographically limited availability of the 
staples, which will naturally exclude most of the non-poor. The precise balance 
between the targeted and universal aspects of the provision of public and wage 
goods depends on policy decisions about access and the nature of each project.  
 
                                                          
 
 
84
 MacEwan (2003). For Vandemoortele (2004, p.12), ‘[s]ince basic services are public goods with 
strong synergies and positive externalities, they should be either free or heavily subsidised – 
regardless of whether they are provided by public, private or non-governmental agencies’. 
  
 
 
 
 
137 
 
Finally, public and social wage goods programmes can be criticised because they 
may lead to overconsumption (e.g., free health services could foster trivial 
complaints or unnecessary prescriptions), or manipulation by unscrupulous 
politicians. This is certainly possible (although it can be minimised by universal 
access and ‘smart targeting’, see above). However, the commercialisation of 
health or education is not the only possible alternative. These potential problems 
can also be addressed through the expansion of democracy and public control of 
the state.  
 
Cash transfers are generally less desirable than public and social wage goods 
programmes except for emergency support to very poor groups and long-term 
assistance to dependent children, the elderly, and the chronically sick and 
disabled. Cash transfers are limited for cost, efficiency and equity reasons. First, it 
is usually cheaper to provide basic public goods centrally through state provision 
rather than privately, via cash transfers. The managerial costs tend to be lower, 
their quality is more uniform and, as long as provision is controlled 
democratically, corruption can be avoided more easily. Second, cash transfers are 
a form of targeting, which is relatively inefficient (see above).85 Third, cash 
transfers imply that social welfare is determined by the individual capacity to 
purchase private goods, rather than the availability of public goods. Transfers 
foster the commodification of social life and the development of competition, 
which conflicts with the social solidarity engendered by pro-poor policies. In 
contrast, public goods and social wage programmes ensure the provision of key 
goods and services to all, contribute to the de-commodification of the social 
relations, and foster the development of community relations. 
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 Universal basic income is the only type of non-targeted cash transfer, but it is unaffordable for 
most poor countries, and hardly the best use for their scarce resources. It is also vulnerable to the 
other criticisms of cash transfers listed above. 
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All social programmes are expensive to run, and the budgetary limitations in poor 
countries should not be underestimated. However, these programmes can have a 
significant distributive impact. They can also contribute to other pro-poor 
objectives – for example, they create employment at local level, they can be 
plugged into regional development programmes through the creation of markets 
for local produce, and they can be linked to the expansion of infrastructure (e.g., 
through public works programmes).86 In spite of these advantages, funding is 
likely to pose severe problems. In general these programmes should be funded by 
taxation. Cost-sharing or user fees, while not ruled out on principle, can be 
socially unfair and extremely inefficient, and should normally be avoided: 
 
While narrow targeting, user fees, and social investment funds can play a 
role, they can never be the mainstay of a country’s anti-poverty strategy. 
In most contexts, they are likely to yield savings that are penny-wise but 
pound-foolish ... Despite the very modest amount of money they generate, 
user fees invariably lead to a reduction in the demand for services, 
particularly among the poor. Attempts to protect the poor – through 
exemptions or waivers – are seldom effective, although often expensive. 
The introduction of user fees also tends to aggravate gender discrimination 
... Since the mid-1990s, school fees have been abolished in Malawi and 
Uganda and more recently in Kenya. That pro-poor policy was followed 
by a surge in enrolment in all three countries – with girls being the prime 
beneficiaries. These positive experiences illustrate that even a small 
nominal fee can be a formidable obstacle for poor families.87 
 
The political process is central to the success of pro-poor social programmes. On 
the one hand, their implementation requires breaking the political power of the 
traditional elites committed to inequality through the development of universal 
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 See, for example, Dagdeviren et al (2002, pp.401, 404). 
87
 Vandemoortele (2004, p.12). 
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citizenship. In fact, budgetary transfers tend to be insufficient dent poverty when 
the distribution of assets is highly unequal. In these circumstances, democratic 
political and economic reforms, including the distribution of assets, are essential. 
On the other hand, these programmes would benefit from direct user participation, 
which will increase the scope for democratic participation and intervention in the 
economy.  
 
In conclusion, the implementation of pro-poor economic programmes depends 
less on their internal consistency (which has nevertheless been indicated above) 
than on political limitations. More specifically, the most important constraint to 
the introduction of pro-poor strategies in poor countries is not resource scarcity. 
Rather, it is the lack of political will to confront the mainstream and build 
alternatives based upon the joint efforts of governments and civil society 
organisations. 
 
5.3 – Pro-Poor Anti-Inflation Policy 
 
This section outlines the basic principles of pro-poor anti-inflation policy 
alternatives to the NMPC. It was shown in sections 1-3 that the NMPC suffers 
from serious theoretical and empirical shortcomings and, in section 4, that these 
flaws are especially severe in poor countries. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 outlined the 
basic features of pro-poor economic development strategies for middle-income 
and poor countries. This section extends these suggestions into the fields of 
monetary and anti-inflation policy.  
 
Growing economies normally experience inflation. Mainstream economic theory 
claims that inflation control is the most important objective of monetary policy 
because it fosters investment and growth. For the NMPC, inflation control should 
be achieved primarily through contractionary monetary policy, that is, high 
interest rates. They should be supported by additional policies, including fiscal 
retrenchment, privatisations, trade, financial and capital account liberalisation and 
additional macroeconomic ‘reforms’ aiming to consolidate a specific 
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(mainstream) development strategy. It was shown above that this strategy is rarely 
conducive to sustained growth, macroeconomic stability or pro-poor outcomes. 
 
There is no question that high interest rates can give a decisive contribution for 
the elimination of hyperinflation; they can also maintain very low inflation for 
long periods. However, high interest rates are incompatible with pro-poor policies 
because they stifle growth, transfer income to finance and cancel out the potential 
benefits of expansionary fiscal policy.  
 
Both very low and very high inflation are inimical to pro-poor outcomes because 
they are associated with low growth rates and arbitrary and potentially regressive 
distributive shifts. Low or moderate inflation are more easily compatible with 
growth because they facilitate the adjustment of relative prices, support the 
transfer of resources to more profitable sectors, and assist the financing of 
productive investment. However, this does not ensure the achievement of pro-
poor goals. This section outlines monetary policies that can support inflation 
stabilisation and pro-poor economic strategies, and contrasts them with CBI and 
IT. 
 
5.3.1 – Principles of Pro-Poor Anti-Inflation Policy 
 
Pro-poor anti-inflation policies support the government’s pro-poor strategy by 
helping the economy to avoid very low, very high or rapidly accelerating 
inflation. Following the principles outlined in section 5.1.3, pro-poor anti-inflation 
policy needs to be efficient, sustainable and support the achievement of MDGs.  
 
In order to be efficient, pro-poor monetary and anti-inflation policies require 
government co-ordination and social co-operation (see section 5.3.3). To be 
sustainable, they need to be internally consistent. These policies should aim at 
clearly defined goals that are part of the government’s pro-poor strategy. These 
goals should be mutually compatible, and they should be achievable given the 
available resources and policy instruments. The available tools should be 
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deployed consistently, that is, they should be suitable to their stated goals, and 
they should not generate unwarranted economic dislocations or send contradictory 
signals to the markets. In this way state policies can best attract the co-operation 
of private actors, including the workers, entrepreneurs and civil society 
organisations.88 
 
Finally, pro-poor anti-inflation policies must support the achievement of MDGs, 
subject to the constraint of macroeconomic stability. At a macroeconomic level, 
these policies should help to maintain low interest rates, low inflation, long-run 
fiscal and balance of payments equilibrium and exchange rate and financial 
stability, including the minimisation of cycles and bubbles. At a microeconomic 
level, they should support the government’s industrial policies through targeted 
credit for priority sectors, the management of the country’s capital controls, and 
the regulation of private activity with a view to garnering financial system support 
for the government’s objectives.  
 
These monetary policy goals are incompatible with nominal targets or anchors, 
which would compromise the consistency of these pro-poor strategies. This does 
not deny the importance of low inflation for economic stability. However, it does 
mean that in the absence of a natural rate of unemployment and given the 
democratic selection of a pro-poor strategy, low inflation cannot be the only or the 
most important government policy objective.89 Unless government actions clearly 
focus on MDGs, their achievement will become increasingly unlikely. In this 
framework, nominal indicators of economic stability offer benchmarks and 
guidelines for government policy, but they are not to be targeted. 
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5.3.2 – Policy Tools 
 
The interest rates should not be saddled with the twin objectives of controlling 
inflation and achieving balance of payments equilibrium. It was shown in section 
3.3 that this double role tends to raise the interest rates to excessively high levels, 
and it can be destabilising. Section 5.2.4 has shown that, with the introduction of 
capital controls, the interest rates will no longer play an essential role in the 
stabilisation of the balance of payments. This does not imply that they are freely 
available for inflation control, quite the contrary. Monetary policy should serve 
broad pro-poor objectives, specifically the allocation of resources across different 
sectors of the economy, the regulation of domestic savings and investment and 
real exchange rate stability. The interest rates may contribute to demand control 
but only exceptionally, if economic stability is impaired. 
 
Lower interest rates will support the expansion of domestic economic activities 
and relieve the government budget through the reduction of interest payments on 
the domestic public debt. They will release resources for economic development 
objectives through higher levels of public and private investment, supported, if 
necessary, by the regulation of the financial system.90 In turn, the rentiers will be 
penalised directly through higher taxation, and indirectly through lower returns on 
their financial investments. Attempts to evade these restrictions through capital 
flight should be penalised severely.91 
 
This change in the economic role of the interest rates calls for a different anti-
inflation policy architecture. This policy should be based on three main 
 
                                                          
 
 
90
 Argitis and Pitelis (2001, p.633) have shown that lower interest rates can raise the industrial 
profit share, reduce production costs and inflation and improve competitiveness. This less 
restrictive economic environment promotes investment, productivity and growth.  
91
 ‘[M]ost successful development experiences were associated with the subordination of finance 
(through a variety of means) to the objectives of economic development’ (Chang and Grabel 2004, 
p.184). 
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instruments: fiscal policy, industrial policy (for productivity growth), and social 
co-operation through centralised bargaining.  
 
It was shown in sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 that fiscal policy fulfils several critically 
important roles in pro-poor development strategies. It assists economic 
stabilisation, supports public investment, crowds in private investment, supports 
technological upgrading and employment generation projects and funds social 
programmes, among other objectives. However, in contrast with interest rate 
policy, fiscal policy is vertical: it can be easily targeted towards different sectors, 
social groups or areas of the economy, and its impact is both rapid and 
unmediated. This makes it more powerful than monetary policy and easier to 
control. Its distributive implications are also more transparent. Therefore, the 
fiscal policy stance can be adjusted with less significant implications for the 
government’s pro-poor goals. For example, if a fiscal contraction becomes 
necessary, it could be either linear (as a change in interest rate would be) or it can 
be concentrated on specific programmes or regions. The implications of the policy 
change are transparent, which will facilitate the democratic debate about its 
convenience and opportunity. In contrast, the microeconomic impact of monetary 
policy changes is unclear, making targeting impossible and debate less fruitful. 
Finally, fiscal policy manipulation depends to a lesser extent on the degree of 
financial market development, and it can be implemented more independently by 
the government. 
 
While fiscal policy calibrates the government’s efforts to control inflation, 
centralised bargaining will address other potential sources of inflation through the 
creation of solidaristic mechanisms of wage-setting and the co-ordination of 
conflicting demands on the national product (presuming, of course, that the 
government is simultaneously addressing the question of asset distribution). 
Finally, industrial policy will foster productivity growth, increasing the size of the 
‘cake’ to be shared. Productivity growth is strongly anti-inflationary because it 
can permanently defuse distributive conflicts and foster social co-operation (see 
section 5.3.3). Other policy instruments may be used to support this policy triad; 
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for example, changes in tax policies, tariffs and other trade barriers, credit limits, 
price controls (especially in public utilities industries) and even – but only 
marginally and temporarily – exchange rate policy. 
 
5.3.3 – Policy Co-ordination and Social Co-operation 
 
Government policy co-ordination and social co-operation play important roles in 
the success of pro-poor anti-inflation policies at different levels.  
 
First, co-ordination between state institutions. This problem cannot be addressed 
here. It will simply be assumed that it can be achieved through legislation, careful 
choice of personnel and competent management (see, however, the note about the 
structural deficiencies in the state apparatus of poor countries in section 5.1.3).  
 
Second, co-ordination of economic policies. It was shown in section 5.3.2 that 
pro-poor anti-inflation programmes do not rely on one single policy. Rather, they 
require the co-ordinated deployment of a broad range of policies, among them 
fiscal, monetary, incomes, price, industrial and exchange rate policies in order to 
address the causes of inflation rather than its symptoms or propagation 
mechanisms. Each of these policies contributes in a specific way to the 
achievement of pro-poor goals and macroeconomic stability. Combining a wide 
variety of policies facilitates the involvement of society in the pursuit of low and 
stable inflation. In the absence of a social commitment to macroeconomic stability 
governments will be forced to deploy blunt instruments with insufficient 
information, possibly against unwilling social sectors. This will increase the cost 
of inflation control and, in all likelihood, reduce the welfare of the majority.  
 
Third, co-ordination between the state and other social sectors. This is more 
complicated, and different types of incentives will be required to obtain the co-
operation of reluctant social groups. This is not simply a question of pleading for 
the idealism of the population, or hoping that the selfless dedication of a few 
individuals will deliver the required macroeconomic outcomes. Legal, political 
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and economic incentives should be deployed to reward compliant behaviour and 
punish deviant economic practices. At the same time, civil society organisations 
will mobilise in defence of their own interests and the pro-poor objectives of the 
government’s programme. Evidently, social co-operation is more easily created 
through the democratic involvement of the citizens in economic policy-making 
and the implementation and assessment of government policies.92 
 
In sum, low inflation can be achieved at an acceptable social cost, but this requires 
more than just controlling the supply of money or jacking up interest rates as 
much as necessary to deliver arbitrary inflation targets. Low and stable inflation is 
the outcome of a social commitment to price stability that is part of a pro-poor 
policy compact. It cannot be delivered simply by central bank fiat. Co-operation 
and co-ordination can foster an environment in which society is committed to low 
inflation, where economic behaviours are broadly compatible with this objective, 
and where government policy contributes decisively to its achievement. They will 
reduce the scope and the need for central bank discretionary action, especially 
arbitrary changes in interest rates that create uncertainty, deter investment, 
generate unemployment, and impose obstacles to the achievement of MDGs (see 
section 5.3.4). In a pro-poor policy framework, inflation control is not the 
province of one single government institution; it is a national objective, 
supporting the achievement of MDGs. 
 
5.3.4 – Inflation Targeting, CBI and Pro-Poor Anti-Inflation Policy 
 
In what follows, it will be argued that pro-poor strategies are incompatible with 
the NMPC. In order to facilitate policy co-ordination and the mobilisation of 
monetary and anti-inflation policy tools for the achievement of MDGs, ITR 
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 ‘[S]ocial co-operation and social consensus would have to be created by involving people in the 
process itself: There is, of course, the experience of some ... countries which have been 
conspicuously successful with economic policies that relied on social consensus (Sweden, 
Norway,Australia and Austria are the best examples in this respect)’ (Philip Arestis, cited in Sicsú 
2001, p.676); see also Arestis and Sawyer (2002). 
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should be abandoned where they have been implemented, and central bank 
independence must be curtailed.  
 
From a pro-poor point of view the NMPC is either inconsistent or misguided at 
several levels. First, the NMPC is theoretically inconsistent, because there is no 
guarantee that a single interest rate can simultaneously deliver low inflation 
(through demand control), low unemployment, exchange rate stability, balance of 
payments equilibrium and a sustainable fiscal position (see section 3.3).  
 
Second, the NMPC turns very low inflation – a means to growth and welfare 
improvement – into the most important macroeconomic policy objective. This is 
analytically untenable because the tail (inflation) is wagging the dog (economic 
growth and social welfare). This policy arrangement also reduces accountability in 
the economy. The real goals of economic activity are transferred to the market, 
that is, beyond the scope of democratic debate, intervention and monitoring. In 
contrast, pro-poor policies focus directly on the desirable outcomes.  
 
Third, inflation targets are incompatible with pro-poor goals because they (just 
like any other nominal target) compel monetary policy to throttle demand 
unthinkingly whenever inflation rises above an arbitrary – and invariably very low 
– target level. This strategy can maintain very low inflation, but only at a high cost 
and at the expense of long-term equitable growth and the real pro-poor targets in 
MDGs. It was shown in sections 3 and 4 that IT is inefficient (its economic and 
social cost is too high), socially regressive (it fosters the concentration of income 
and the transfer of power to finance) and macroeconomically unsustainable (it is 
not conducive to long-term growth and it can trigger stabilisation traps).  
 
Pro-poor anti-inflation policies do not simply involve greater tolerance to inflation 
with the expectation of achieving, in return, faster GDP growth rates. Positing this 
non-existing trade-off as if it were real (see section 2.2.1), for example, through 
the argument that the IT should be ‘relaxed’, would be both insufficient and 
wrong. It would be wrong because it implicitly accepts the mainstream theory of 
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inflation that informs the NMPC – it admits the real-monetary dichotomy, the 
existence of a short-run Phillips curve, CBI and so on. This is unacceptable. It 
would also be insufficient, because it would simply replicate the shortcomings of 
IT at a higher level of inflation.93 If implemented, this ‘limited surrender’ would 
simply offer an easy target to attack, create inflation inertia and entrench high 
inflation expectations.  
 
It was shown in section 5.1.4 that nominal targets or anchors are inimical to pro-
poor goals, and that governments committed to these goals should not introduce 
any specific policy constraint (such as maximum inflation rates) that may create 
the expectation of paralysis or policy reversal at a later stage. Volunteering 
nominal limits to government programmes would offer clear aims for those 
negatively affected by the government’s pro-poor priorities. It would tempt them 
to confront the government, and simplify their destructive task.  
 
Pro-poor policies are also incompatible with CBI because, first, the central bank is 
unable to control inflation on its own (there is no real-monetary dichotomy, see 
section 2.1). Second, the government should be able to count on all available 
instruments to achieve its pro-poor objectives rapidly and efficiently, while 
seeking to preserve macroeconomic stability. If, through CBI, monetary policy 
lies outside the scope of central government policy-making, policy co-ordination 
becomes more difficult and social co-operation will become elusive: 
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 ‘One might perhaps hope for a modified independence where the central bank is not expected to 
target price stability exclusively, but rather to follow some other, more sophisticated, rule. The 
design of such a rule is, however, all but impossible. The circumstances of events like possible 
financial collapse, government default [and] sharply increased protectionist pressures ... are 
unusual, if not unique, and an unavoidable element of the political, bringing uncertainty with it, is 
present in them all ... To imagine that ideal policy will be the outcome of any particular 
institutional structure in circumstances like these is optimistic; but to imagine that even good 
policy can be determined by a rule in advance of knowing what the conditions are is much more 
problematic still ... Difficult as it is to know how to construct institutions for reasonable policy, the 
supposition that even acceptable policy will always be achieved by aiming exclusively at the 
maintenance of price stability verges on the absurd’ (Forder 2003, pp.17-18). 
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Independent central banks are incompatible with principles of democratic 
governance, particularly because monetary policy has such profound 
distributional and macroeconomic effects.94 
 
In addition to this, conflicts between the government and the central bank will 
increase the complexity, costs and delays of the pro-poor programme 
democratically selected by the citizens.  
 
In order to achieve these social goals the central bank needs to be accountable and 
fully committed to the government’s strategy, controlling the monetary policy 
tools with a view to delivering low interest rates, stable exchange rates, minimum 
unemployment levels and low and stable inflation. This is the bank’s contribution 
to the achievement of MDGs: 
 
Clear, transparent objectives for monetary policy ... should be established, 
and central banks should work with the government to achieve identified 
developmental objectives ... Taking a page from the neoliberal book, 
monetary policy should have targets. But instead of concentrating on 
inflation, monetary policy targets should comprise broader economic and 
social welfare goals. In this connection, monetary policy targets can seek 
to promote economic growth, employment and equality. The prevention of 
high rates of inflation should be pursued only as far as is consistent with 
these broader goals.95 
 
Accountability to the public and commitment to democratically-determined goals 
are the keys to institutional transparency and credibility within a pro-poor 
strategy. These principles apply to all government institutions, not just the central 
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bank. They are part of the framework of political democracy, and they are 
essential building blocks for the construction of economic democracy. 
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Conclusion 
 
IT and CBI are not merely technical matters, as the mainstream tends to believe. 
This policy framework has profound implications for the economy, society and 
the political system. The alternative pro-poor monetary policy framework outlined 
in this research paper also has implications at these three levels. The choice 
between them involves not only their internal consistency (which was 
demonstrated for the pro-poor alternatives, but shown to be lacking in the case of 
the NMPC). It also involves a choice between significantly different economic, 
social and political outcomes for each country. 
 
The NMPC is flawed in two important senses. First, it is based on an array of 
doubtful assumptions about the economy, wild generalisations from a very small 
number of cases and overly optimistic expectations about the convergence of the 
economy to a virtuous circle of growth and prosperity that tends to be elusive. In 
spite of these deficiencies IT and CBI can contribute to inflation control, both 
because governments will always set targets that they believe can be achieved,1 
and because demand control through high interest rates can reduce inflation 
regardless of its causes, especially in an open economy. In this sense, the main 
problem with conventional disinflation policies, including the NMPC, is not that 
they fail to achieve their stated aims. Rather, it is that they are blunt and 
inefficient, grinding down inflation through long periods of high unemployment, 
and reducing the economy’s growth potential in the process. Second, the hyper-
vigilance against inflation associated with IT and CBI tends to be incompatible 
with rapid and equitable growth, and it is inimical to economic democracy 
because it fosters the interests of finance at the expense of the majority of the 
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 In this sense, achieving a target may be a reflection of good forecasting of the outturn which was 
used in setting the target, rather than the ‘discipline’ or ‘purposefulness’ of the monetary 
authorities, or the ‘correction’ of their theoretical approach to economic policy-making (see 
Arestis and Sawyer 1998a). 
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population. Moreover, these policy regimes create institutional rigidities that will 
make it difficult to shift economic policies in the future. 
 
It is impossible to predict how these shortcomings will eventually pan out. They 
will probably not appear either through a renewed bout of inflation or through the 
inability of IT and CBI to flush out residual inflation from the economy (which 
was one of the symptoms of the failure of monetarism in the eighties). The current 
consensus will probably be abandoned for political reasons, especially because it 
is excessively costly and locks countries into a development strategy that is 
socially and economically regressive, regardless of its ability to deliver low 
inflation. In this case, there will be great demand for pro-poor and democratic 
monetary policy alternatives.  
 
This research paper does not offer a completely worked-out policy framework, 
although it does offer a fairly comprehensive critique of the NMPC. Further work 
is essential, because it will become possible to intervene in policy debates and 
mobilise support much more effectively on the basis of positive contributions 
rather than merely negative critiques. This is especially urgent because IT and 
CBI have yet to survive a severe test – the economic environment since the late 
eighties has been far too benign to impose a serious challenge to the ruling policy 
paradigm. History shows that these favourable circumstances will not last forever.  
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Appendix A 
 
Figure A1: Models of Central Bank Independence and Inflation Targeting 
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Figure A2: Inflation Control in the NMPC 
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Table A1 – Inflation Targeting Regimes in 2003 
  
FFIT EIT ITL  
Australia Euro Area Albania  
Brazil Japan Algeria  
Canada Singapore Croatia  
Chile Switzerland Dominican Republic  
Colombia United States Guatemala  
Czech Republic   Honduras  
Hungary   Indonesia  
Iceland   Jamaica  
Israel   Kazakhstan  
Mexico   Mauritius  
New Zealand   Peru  
Norway   Philippines  
Poland   Romania  
South Africa   Russia  
South Korea   Slovakia  
Sweden   Slovenia 
Thailand   Sri Lanka 
United Kingdom   Uruguay 
    Venezuela  
Source: Carare and Stone (2003). Stone and Bhundia (2004) include Peru and the Philippines 
among the FFIT countries, and Argentina, Egypt, Iran and Turkey among the ITL countries; they 
also claim that Honduras, Uruguay and Venezuela are exchange rate targeters rather than ITL. 
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Appendix B 
Box B1 – Classification of Countries 
 
The information included in this paper is based on the data provided by the World 
Bank (2003). The World Bank supplies information about 208 countries and 
economic areas. This paper excludes 56 small countries and regions with 
populations below one million in 2001,304 seven countries and regions for which 
there is insufficient data,305 and Puerto Rico (because of its close economic and 
political links with the United States).  
 
The remaining 144 countries were distributed into twelve groups on the basis of 
their geographical position, income level and long-term growth rates: 
 
• 21 Rich Countries (RICH): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and 
United States. Data available for 1961-2001, except Canada (since 1966) and 
Germany (since 1972).  
 
• 14 Eastern European and Central Asian High Income Countries (EECA-
HIGH): Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. Data available for 1991-2001, except Bulgaria and Estonia (from 
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 American Samoa, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bhamas, Bahrein, Barbados, Belize, 
Bermuda, Bhutan, Brunei, Cape Verde, Cayman Islands, Channel Islands, Comoros, Cyprus, 
Djibouti, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Faeroe Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Greenland, 
Grenada, Guam, Guyana, Iceland, Isle of Man, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macao, 
Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mayotte, Micronesia, Monaco, Netherlands Antilles, New 
Caledonia, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Seychelles and Solomon Islands 
305
 Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cuba, Iraq, North Korea, West Bank and Gaza and 
Yugoslavia. 
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1981), Hungary (from 1961), Latvia (from 1966), Russia (from 1990), 
Slovakia (from 1985) and Slovenia (from 1992).  
 
• 12 Eastern European and Central Asian Low Income Countries (EECA-
LOW): Albania (1981-2001), Armenia (1991-2001), Azerbaijan (1993-2001), 
Georgia (1966-2001), Kazakhstan (1990-2001), Kyrgyz Republic (1987-
2001), Moldova (1990-2001), Mongolia (1982-2001), Tajikistan (1986-2001), 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan (1988-2001).  
 
• 8 East Asian Fast Growth Countries (EA-FAST): China, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Data available 
for 1961-2001, except Vietnam (from 1986).  
 
• 4 East Asian Slow Growth Countries (EA-SLOW): Cambodia, Laos, Papua 
New Guinea and Philippines. Data available for 1961-2001, except Cambodia 
(from 1988) and Laos (from 1985).  
 
• 6 South Asian Countries (SASIA): Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Nepal, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Data available for 1961-2001. 
 
• 12 Latin American High Income Countries (LA-HIGH): Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Panama, 
Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. Data available for 
1961-2001.  
 
• 9 Latin American Low Income Countries (LA-LOW): Bolivia, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua and Peru. Data 
available for 1961-2001.  
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• 5 Sub-Saharan African High Income Countries (SSA-HIGH): Botswana, 
Gabon, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa. Data available for 1961-2001, 
except Mauritius and Namibia (from 1981).  
 
• 37 Sub-Saharan African Low Income Countries (SSA-LOW): Angola, 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo D.R., Congo R., Cote d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
Data available for 1961-2001, except Angola (from 1986), Eritrea (from 
1993), Ethiopia (from 1982), Gambia (from 1967), Guinea (from 1987), 
Guinea-Bissau (from 1971), Mali (from 1968), Mauritania and Mozambique 
(from 1981), Swaziland (from 1971), Tanzania (from 1989) and Uganda (from 
1983).  
 
• 9 Middle-Eastern and North African Non-OPEC Countries (MENA-NO): 
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen. 
Data available for 1961-2001, except Jordan (from 1976), Lebanon (from 
1989), Tunisia (from 1962), Turkey (from 1969) and Yemen (from 1991).  
 
• 7 Middle-Eastern and North African OPEC Countries (MENA-OIL): 
Algeria, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. 
Data available for 1961-2001, except Iran (from 1975), Kuwait (1963-89 and 
1993-2001), Libya (until 1987) and United Arab Emirates (1974-98).  
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Box B2 – Economic Growth Rates 
 
Table B2.1 and Figures B2.1-B2.6 show an unambiguous trend towards declining 
per capita GDP growth rates in most countries during the last four decades. 
 
• RICH: These countries generally show relatively high growth rates until 
1973, and declining rates afterwards. Growth rates in New Zealand were 
relatively slow and highly volatile between the mid-sixties and the mid-
seventies, but they have converged to the general pattern since the early 
eighties. Japan is another outlier, with very strong growth rates until the early 
seventies, and in the late eighties, but generally declining growth rates 
afterwards. Ireland shows a different pattern, with strong growth rates during 
the entire period, but rising since the late eighties. 
 
• EECA-HIGH: Per capita GDP growth rates in these countries declined very 
severely between the late eighties and the mid-nineties, but started rising 
strongly subsequently. The most dramatic decline was in Latvia, where per 
capita GDP fell by 10.1 per cent in 1991, 34.1 per cent in 1992, and 13.4 per 
cent in 1993, but it started growing strongly after 1996 (the performance of 
Estonia is similar). The mildest decline was in Poland (followed by Slovenia), 
where per capita GDP fell 7.3 per cent in 1991 (the first year in the series), but 
grew in every subsequent every year. 
 
• EECA-LOW: The pattern in these countries is similar to EECA-HIGH, but 
the decline was more severe. Per capita GDP in Georgia fell 7.7 per cent in 
1989, 15.0 per cent in 1990, 21.1 per cent in 1991, 44.8 per cent in 1992, 29.1 
per cent in 1993 and 10.2 per cent in 1994, but it has grown steadily since 
then. Armenia shows a similar but less severe decline, followed by Albania, 
Moldova and Tajikistan, where per capita GDP tumbled by at least 30 per cent 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
159 
in one single year. In all other countries per capita GDP fell by at least 10 per 
cent in one year, but all these economies later rebounded. 
 
• EA-FAST: These countries show a very strong economic performance, but 
growth has generally been volatile during the entire period. China’s 
performance has been consistently strong since 1963, and volatility has 
declined especially since the early nineties. China and Vietnam were the only 
countries spared the ravages of the Asian crisis (that afflicted Indonesia 
especially severely) and the collapse of the dotcom bubble at the turn of the 
millenium (which penalised Singapore more than other countries). 
 
• EA-SLOW: Performance in these countries has been highly volatile during 
the entire period, especially in Papua New Guinea where growth peaked at 
15.2 per cent in 1993, but the country also had fifteen years of negative 
growth during the period under analysis. Growth in the Philippines has also 
been disappointing, with a clear stop-and-go pattern. Cambodia and, 
especially, Laos show a more promising pattern, which resembles EA-FAST. 
 
• SASIA: Growth has been moderate but highly volatile in these countries, 
especially in Myanmar and Nepal. The economic performance of Pakistan has 
deteriorated significantly during the nineties, after relatively strong growth 
between the mid-seventies and the late eighties. The nineties were relatively 
good (though not especially good by East Asian standards) for Bangladesh, 
India and Sri Lanka. 
 
• LA-HIGH: Some of these countries had an outstanding growth performance 
until the early eighties, especially Brazil (where per capita incomes have 
almost stagnated afterwards) and Mexico (where it resumed, albeit more 
slowly, and with the exception of the crisis period in the mid-nineties). The 
Dominican Republic also grew strongly until the early eighties and after the 
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mid-nineties. Growth in Chile was also very strong between the mid-eighties 
and the mid-nineties. In contrast, income growth was disappointing or non-
existent in Argentina, Colombia, Paraguay and Venezuela, especially after the 
early eighties. In the remaining countries (Costa Rica, Panama, Trinidad and 
Tobago and Uruguay) growth was volatile but generally positive during the 
entire period, in spite of a declining trend since the late seventies. 
 
• LA-LOW: The growth performance in these countries has not been especially 
good. Incomes have virtually stagnated in most countries since the mid-
seventies, and growth has generally been volatile during the entire period.  
 
• SSA-HIGH: Performance has not been especially strong in these countries. 
Gabon grew exceptionally strongly in the mid-seventies (up to 34.8 per cent in 
1974), but stagnated afterwards. Namibia and South Africa have barely grown 
at all for many years. Only Botswana and Mauritius show a steady growth 
performance.  
 
• SSA-LOW: Growth performance in this region has been generally poor and 
highly volatile. Several countries have been afflicted by internal or external 
conflict, or by HIV-AIDS, with severe implications for their economic 
performance. Many of these countries are among the poorest in the world, and 
their debt burden is often very high. There is a clearly declining per capita 
GDP growth trend throughout this period. Several countries show significant 
declines in their income levels, e.g., Liberia, where growth rates were strongly 
negative every year between 1980 and 1995. 
 
• MENA-NO: These countries had a volatile and not especially strong growth 
performance during the entire period, in particular Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco 
and Syria. However, volatility seems to have declined significantly since the 
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late seventies. Income growth in Egypt and Turkey has been especially strong 
during this period. 
 
• MENA-OIL: Growth in these countries has been extraordinarily volatile, and 
showing a declining trend (except in Kuwait) since the early eighties. The 
performance decline has been especially obvious in Algeria and Lybia. The 
eighties were a very poor decade for Saudi Arabia, and negative growth rates 
(less severe and less volatile) were also the rule during the nineties. The 
Iranian economy stabilised and resumed (slow) growth in the early nineties. 
 
 
Table B2.1: Average per capita GDP growth rates (%)  
  1961-1970 1971-
1980 
1981-
1990 
1991-2001 
RICH 4.3 2.6 2.0 1.8 
EECA-HIGH 6.6 4.4 1.6 0.0 
EECA-LOW 5.9 5.2 0.2 -3.3 
EA-FAST 4.7 5.6 5.2 4.5 
EA-SLOW 3.1 1.6 0.5 2.1 
SASIA 1.8 1.1 2.4 3.3 
LA-HIGH 2.5 3.0 -0.4 1.8 
LA-LOW 1.8 1.3 -1.5 0.4 
SSA-HIGH 5.3 6.1 1.5 1.7 
SSA-LOW 1.5 0.7 -0.4 0.2 
MENA-NO 2.7 4.9 -0.2 1.9 
MENA-OIL 9.8 -1.3 -3.2 0.3 
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Figure B2.1: Rich Countries: GDP per capita growth rate (%)
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Figure B2.2: Eastern Europe and Central Asia: GDP per capita growth rate 
(%)
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Figure B2.3: East and South Asia: GDP per capita growth rate (%)
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Figure B2.4: Latin America: GDP per capita growth rate (%)
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Figure B2.5: Sub-Saharan Africa: GDP per capita growth rate
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Figure B2.6: Middle East and North Africa: GDP per capita growth rate (%)
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Box B3 – Inflation Rates 
 
Table B3.1 and Figures B3.1-B3.6 indicate that inflation has risen and later 
declined in every single region during the last decades. Each region shows a 
different pattern: 
 
• RICH: Inflation increased rapidly in most countries between the late sixties 
and the mid-seventies, declined slightly in the late seventies, and then rose 
again in the early eighties. Later, with the ‘Reagan recession’ and the onset of 
neoliberalism in most countries, inflation declined steadily (except in Norway, 
where there was a temporary spike in 2000). There are no indications that 
inflation will rise significantly in these countries in the near future. 
 
• EECA-HIGH: These countries had negligible inflation until the late eighties 
or the early nineties. Inflation increased rapidly in all countries in the context 
of their transition to capitalism. In the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia inflation peaked below 60 per cent and later declined steadily, if not 
rapidly, towards RICH levels. In Romania and Slovenia the peak was higher, 
around 200 per cent. In Belarus, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia and Russia inflation followed a similar pattern, but it peaked 
around 1,000 per cent (or even higher) in the early nineties. Finally, in 
Bulgaria inflation reached 200 per cent in the early nineties, declined, and then 
exploded towards 1,000 per cent in 1997, falling rapidly afterwards.  
 
• EECA-LOW: The pattern of inflation in these countries was similar to 
EECA-HIGH, but the peaks were generally higher. In Georgia and the 
Ukraine inflation reached 15,400 and 3,300 per cent, respectively, in 1993, 
and in Armenia 4,000 per cent the following year. In all the other countries 
peak inflation rates exceeded 800 per cent in the early nineties, except in 
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Albania and Mongolia, where inflation peaked at 250 per cent. In all cases 
inflation declined steadily in the late nineties. 
 
• EA-FAST: Inflation below 10 per cent is the rule, but two countries 
experienced high inflation, Indonesia (in the mid- and late sixties) and 
Vietnam (in the late eighties). In Korea inflation hovered between 20 and 35 
per cent until the early eighties, but later declined significantly. In the other 
countries inflation temporarily peaked above 15 per cent; in China this 
happened in the mid-nineties, in Hong Kong in the early eighties, and in 
Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore in the mid-seventies. 
 
• EA-SLOW: Most countries experienced bouts of high inflation since the mid-
eighties, in the same transition context as EECA. In Cambodia inflation 
reached nearly 150 per cent in the early nineties; in Laos inflation exceeded 
120 per cent at the turn of the millenium. In the Phillipines inflation exceeded 
30 per cent in 1974, and 50 per cent in 1984, but later declined well below 10 
per cent. In Papua New Guinea inflation rates have been erratic during the 
entire period, but inflation seems to have settled below 15 per cent since the 
mid-eighties. 
 
• SASIA: This is a low inflation region. Myanmar experienced exceptionally 
high inflation rates, above 50 per cent, in 1974, and inflation in this country 
has tended to exceed 20 per cent since the late eighties. In Bangladesh 
inflation reached 75 per cent in the mid-seventies, but subsequently declined 
and it has not exceeded 10 per cent since the late eighties. In the other 
countries inflation has been volatile, but it only rarely exceeds 20 per cent. It 
has also declined steadily since the early nineties. 
 
• LA-HIGH: This is traditionally a high inflation region. In several countries 
inflation hovered around 500 per cent for long periods, especially Argentina 
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(1976, 1984-85 and 1989-90), Brazil (1988-94) and Chile (1973-75). Inflation 
exceeded 100 per cent in Mexico (in the late eighties), Uruguay (1968, 1973, 
and 1990-91) and Venezuela (in the late eighties and mid-nineties). In the 
other countries inflation rates were lower, but still exceeded 50 per cent in the 
early seventies and/or the late eighties, except in Colombia, Panama and 
Paraguay. Inflation has declined steadily in all countries, and rarely exceeded 
10 per cent anywhere since the late nineties. 
 
• LA-LOW: Data available for 1961-2001. The pattern of inflation in these 
countries resembles LA-HIGH but in some cases it was more extreme, with 
Bolivia, Nicaragua and Peru experiencing hyperinflation during the eighties. 
In the other countries inflation rarely exceeded 10 per cent until the first oil 
shock. Inflation rates subsequently increased everywhere, often reaching 30 
per cent. Inflation declined afterwards, but increased again in the late eighties 
and early nineties, peaking above 60 per cent in Jamaica and Haiti. Elsewhere, 
inflation has rarely exceeded 30 per cent. Ecuador is an exceptional case, with 
low inflation generally, and episodes of deflation during most of the eighties 
and, again, at the end of the century. 
 
• SSA-HIGH: These are low inflation countries, except Gabon, where inflation 
has been exceptionally volatile, alternating between peaks above 50 per cent 
(in the early seventies) and repeated deflationary episodes. The other countries 
followed a very similar pattern: inflation tended to increase from below 5 per 
cent to above 20 per cent in the mid-nineties, and then declined below 10 per 
cent at the turn of the millenium. 
 
• SSA-LOW: These are normally low inflation countries. Congo D.R. 
experienced hyperinflation in the mid-nineties, and Angola and Liberia a few 
years later. In the other countries, inflation tended to increase between the late 
sixties and the early nineties, and then to decline again. In Ghana, Guinea-
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Bissau, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia peak 
inflation rates exceeded 100 per cent. Most other countries experienced peak 
inflation rates above 30 per cent. Mauritania is a notable exception, with 
inflation rarely exceeding 10 per cent. The only country with a continuing 
inflation problem into the new millenium is Zimbabwe. 
 
• MENA-NO: This is a region of low inflation, especially in Morocco and 
Tunisia. Israel and Lebanon experienced very high inflation in the mid-
eighties and early nineties, but this problem was later eliminated; in Turkey 
inflation continued to be a problem until the end of the decade. In all the other 
countries inflation declined strongly during the nineties.  
 
• MENA-OIL: All countries in this region experienced rapidly accelerating 
inflation in the aftermath of the first oil shock and, once again, in the early 
nineties. Algeria and Iran had moderate inflation rates during most of the 
nineties. Elsewhere, inflation rarely exceeded 20 per cent since the early 
nineties and, in the UAE, inflation has been nearly non-existent since the early 
eighties. 
 
 
Table B3.1: Average inflation, GDP deflator (annual %)  
  1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2001 
RICH 4.5 10.4 7.1 2.8 
EECA-HIGH -0.7 1.7 4.3 137.4 
EECA-LOW 0.7 1.0 1.0 485.1 
EA-FAST 34.7 10.8 21.3 6.9 
EA-SLOW 4.7 11.2 21.5 19.4 
SASIA 3.9 12.3 10.3 10.3 
LA-HIGH 14.2 47.1 134.0 58.6 
LA-LOW 3.3 15.0 559.3 62.7 
SSA-HIGH 3.1 14.3 11.1 7.5 
SSA-LOW 4.8 12.1 20.8 150.8 
MENA-NO 3.2 18.7 31.4 16.5 
MENA-OIL 2.0 26.2 4.2 9.8 
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Figure B3.1: Rich Countries: Average Inflation (%)
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Figure B3.2: Eastern Europe and Central Asia: Average Inflation (%)
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Figure B3.3: East and South Asia: Average Inflation (%)
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Figure B3.4: Latin America: Average Inflation (%)
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Figure B3.5: Sub-Saharan Africa: Average Inflation (%)
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Figure B3.6: Middle East and North Africa: Average Inflation (%)
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Box B4 – Inflation, Growth and Unemployment 
 
There seems to be no stable relationship between inflation, growth and 
unemployment. While growth and unemployment are consistently negatively 
related (for obvious reasons), they seem to move independently of inflation.  
 
A clear example of this lack of relationship is given by five RICH countries, 
France, Ireland, Italy, the UK and the US, between 1980 and 2000 (when World 
Bank data is available) (see Figures B4.1-B4.5). 
 
• In France, per capita GDP growth was low during the entire period, especially 
the early nineties. Unemployment consquently climbed steadily until 1994, 
and only began to descend later in that decade, as growth picked up again. In 
contrast, inflation declined steadily during the entire period. 
 
• In Ireland, per capita GDP growth increased regularly during the sample 
period, starting from a very low base and reaching extraordinarily high 10 per 
cent annual rates towards the end of the period. Unemployment, that started 
from a relatively high base, peaked at 17.1 per cent in the mid-eighties, but it 
began to decline steadily in the early nineties, and reached 4.7 per cent in 
2000. Inflation fell until 1989, then increased slightly but only touched above 
5 per cent in 1998. 
 
• In Italy, GDP growth was stable but low, and unemployment was also stable 
but high during the entire period. In contrast, inflation declined almost every 
year. 
 
• In the UK, economic growth was strong and stable during the eighties and 
since the mid-nineties, but unemployment responded only slightly. In contrast, 
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inflation tumbled (in spite of a recrudescence in the early nineties). It has been 
maintained well below 5 per cent since 1992. 
 
• Economic growth in the US was stronger than in the UK, although it showed a 
similar pattern. Unemployment reacted more strongly, and declined steadily 
especially since the early nineties. In contrast, inflation fell in the early 
eighties and has been under control ever since. 
 
Several developing countries had similar experiences (unemployment was not 
considered because data is less reliable than in the developed countries). There is 
no significant relationship between inflation and growth in low growth countries 
such as Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic and Chad, or in middle-
income countries such as Colombia, South Korea and Thailand (see Figures B4.6-
B4.12). 
 
 
Figure B4.1: France: Inflation, GDPpc Growth and Unemployment
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Figure B4.2: Ireland: Inflation, GDPpc Growth and Unemployment
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Figure B4.3: Italy: Inflation, GDPpc Growth and Unemployment
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Figure B4.4: UK: Inflation, GDPpc Growth and Unemployment
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Figure B5.5: US: Inflation, GDPpc Growth and Unemployment
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Figure B4.6a: Benin: GDP Per Capita Growth and Inflation
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Figure B4.6b: Benin: GDP Per Capita Growth and Inflation
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Figure B4.7a: Cameroon: GDP Per Capita Growth and Inflation
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Figure B4.7b: Cameroon: GDP Per Capita Growth and Inflation
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Figure B4.8a: Central African Republic: GDP Per Capita Growth and Inflation
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Figure B4.8b: Central African Republic: GDP Per Capita Growth and Inflation
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Figure B4.9a: Chad: GDP Per Capita Growth and Inflation
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Figure B4.9b: Chad: GDP Per Capita Growth and Inflation
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Figure B4.10a: Colombia: GDP Per Capita Growth and Inflation
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Figure B4.10b: Colombia: GDP Per Capita Growth and Inflation
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Figure B4.11a: South Korea: GDP Per Capita Growth and Inflation
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Figure B4.11b: South Korea: GDP Per Capita Growth and Inflation
-10.0
-5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
-5.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0
 
Figure B4.12a: Thailand: GDP Per Capita Growth and Inflation
-10.0
-5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
19
61
19
63
19
65
19
67
19
69
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
-15.0
-10.0
-5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
Inflation
GDPpc growth
 
Figure B4.12b: Thailand: GDP Per Capita Growth and Inflation
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Box B5 – Real Interest Rates and Distribution 
 
Data on real interest rates (RIR) and Gini coefficients is available for 112 
countries. A straightforward relationship between their average RIR and their 
latest available Gini coefficient shows a clear positive relationship (see Figure 
B5.1). 
 
This relationship seems to be robust. If the sample is divided between high RIR 
(above 10 per cent per annum),1 medium RIR (5-9.9 per cent per annum),2 low 
RIR (0-4.9 per cent per annum)3 and negative RIR countries4 a similar 
relationship holds (see Figures B5.2-B5.5). 
 
Conversely, the relationship also seems to hold (except in one case) if countries 
are divided between high inequality (latest Gini above 45),5 medium inequality 
(Gini between 35 and 44.9)6 and low inequality countries (Gini below 34.9)7 (see 
Figures B5.6-B5.8). 
 
                                                          
 
 
1
 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Gambia, 
Georgia, Israel, Kyrgyzistan, Macedonia, Madagascar, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Russia and Uruguay. 
2
 Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Costa 
Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Denmark, El Salvador, Germany, Guinea, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Italy, 
Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Malawi, Mali, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, 
Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Poland, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Sweden, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Vietnam and Yemen. 
3
 Botswana, Burundi, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Greece, 
Guatemala, Hong Kong, Hungary, Japan, Korea, Laos, Lesotho, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Nepal, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United 
States and Zimbabwe. 
4
 Algeria, Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Lithuania, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, 
Tajikistan, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, Venezuela and Zambia. 
5
 Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Papua New 
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
6
 Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Cambodia, China, Cote d’Ivoire, Ecuador, 
Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Kenya, Laos, Lithuania, Mauritania, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, 
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Figure B5.1: Average Real Interest Rate and Gini Coefficient
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Figure B5.2: Average Real Interest Rate and Gini Coefficient (High RIR 
Countries)
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New Zealand, Portugal, Senegal, Singapore, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and Vietnam. 
7
 Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Hungary, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Kyrgyzistan, Latvia, 
Macedonia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Yemen. 
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Figure B5.3: Average Real Interest Rate and Gini Coefficient (Medium RIR 
Countries)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
 
Figure B5.4: Average Real Interest Rate and Gini Coefficient (Low RIR 
Countries)
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Figure B5.5: Average Real Interest Rate and Gini Coefficient (Negative 
RIR Countries)
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Figure B5.6: Average Real Interest Rate and Gini Coefficient (High Inequality 
Countries)
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Figure B5.7: Average Real Interest Rate and Gini Coefficient (Medium 
Inequality Countries)
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Figure B5.8: Average Real Interest Rate and Gini Coefficient (Low Inequality 
Countries)
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